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ABSTRACT
The rapid advances in wireless communications and networking have given rise
to a number of emerging heterogeneous wireless and mobile networks along with novel
networking paradigms, including wireless sensor networks, mobile crowdsourcing, and
mobile social networking. While offering promising solutions to a wide range of new
applications, their widespread adoption and large-scale deployment are often hindered
by people’s concerns about the security, user privacy, or both. In this dissertation, we
aim to address a number of challenging security and privacy issues in heterogeneous
wireless and mobile networks in an attempt to foster their widespread adoption.
Our contributions are mainly fivefold. First, we introduce a novel secure and
loss-resilient code dissemination scheme for wireless sensor networks deployed in hos-
tile and harsh environments. Second, we devise a novel scheme to enable mobile users
to detect any inauthentic or unsound location-based top-k query result returned by an
untrusted location-based service providers. Third, we develop a novel verifiable privacy-
preserving aggregation scheme for people-centric mobile sensing systems. Fourth, we
present a suite of privacy-preserving profile matching protocols for proximity-based mo-
bile social networking, which can support a wide range of matching metrics with different
privacy levels. Last, we present a secure combination scheme for crowdsourcing-based
cooperative spectrum sensing systems that can enable robust primary user detection
even when malicious cognitive radio users constitute the majority.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The rapid advances in wireless communications and networking have given rise to a
number of emerging heterogeneous wireless and mobile networks along with novel and
promising networking paradigms. Wireless sensor networks, formed by a large number
of low-cost, low-power, and multi-functional sensor nodes with communication capabil-
ity, have been widely considered as ideal candidates for a wide range of applications
such as health monitoring, environment monitoring, and military operations. Participa-
tory mobile sensing and crowdsourcing systems, powered by the explosive growth of
smartphones and tablets with ever-growing capabilities in sensing, computation, stor-
age, and communications, makes it possible for people-centric urban-scale distributed
data collection, analysis, and sharing. Mobile social networking, driven by the marriage
between traditional web-based social networks and mobile devices, makes it easier than
ever for people to stay connected and interact with each other at anywhere and anytime.
These heterogeneous wireless and mobile networks are expected to drastically change
people’s daily lives.
While offering promising solutions to a wide range of applications, the widespread
adoption and large-scale deployment of these emerging heterogeneous wireless and
mobile network are often hindered by the concerns about the system security, user pri-
vacy, or both. On the one hand, these heterogeneous wireless and mobile networks
not only inherit all the security vulnerabilities of traditional wired networks, but also face
new security challenges raised by the openness of wireless medium, the lack of trust
of individual participating nodes, the resource constraints of mobile devices, and so on.
On the other hand, people have growing concerns about disclosing their personal in-
formation, data access pattern, etc, which may be used against their interests. In other
words, potential users may not want to adopt emerging networking paradigms if their
privacy cannot be guaranteed.
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In this dissertation, we introduce novel solutions to a number of challenging
security and privacy issues in heterogeneous mobile and wireless networks to pave
the way for their wide adoption and deployment. These challenging issues are either
newly identified or not well addressed in the literature. The rest of this dissertation is
structured as follows.
Chapter 2 tackles secure and loss-resilient code dissemination in wireless sen-
sor networks. Code dissemination refers to the process of disseminating a new code
image via wireless links to all sensor nodes after they are deployed. It is desirable and
often necessary due to the need for, e.g., removing program bugs and adding new func-
tionalities in a multi-task sensor network. A sound code dissemination scheme need be
both loss-resilient and attack-resilient, which are crucial for sensor networks deployed
in lossy and hostile environments. We propose LR-Seluge, the first loss-resilient and
secure code dissemination scheme based on a novel integration of fixed-rate erasure
code and efficient cryptographic primitive. The efficacy and efficiency of LR-Seluge are
confirmed by both theoretical analysis and extensive simulation results. In particular,
LR-Seluge can reduce up to 40% communication overhead in lossy environments with
the same level of attack resilience in contrast to existing schemes.
Chapter 3 considers verifiable location-based top-k query processing against
untrusted location-based service provider. In view of the significant drawbacks of ex-
isting location-based query services, we propose a novel architecture for collaborative
location-based information collection and sharing, which relies on some trusted data
collectors acting as the central hubs using various incentives to collect point-of-interest
(POI) reviews from consumers and then sell the aggregated POI data set to individual
location-based service providers (LBSPs). We then develop effective and efficient so-
lutions to enable location-based service users to verify the authenticity and correctness
of the query results from the untrusted LBSP.
Chapter 4 investigates verifiable privacy-preserving aggregation in people-centric
mobile sensing systems (PC-MSSs). People-centric mobile sensing systems refer to
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using human-carried mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets with ever-growing
capabilities in sensing, computation, storage, and communications for urbanscale dis-
tributed data collection, analysis, and sharing. A main obstacle for the widespread
adoption of PC-MSSs is the privacy concern of participating individuals as well as the
concern about data integrity. To tackle this open challenge, we propose VPA, a novel
solution to verifiable privacy-preserving data aggregation in PC-MSSs. VPA can sup-
port a wide range of statistical additive and non-additive aggregation functions such
as Sum, Average, Variance, Count, Max/Min, Median, Histogram, and Percentile with
accurate aggregation results.
Chapter 5 addresses privacy-preserving profile matching in proximity-based so-
cial networking (PMSN). PMSN refers to adjacent mobile users interacting through the
Bluetooth/WiFi interfaces on their mobile devices. The first step toward effective PMSN
is for two users to compare their profiles, known as profile matching, which is never-
theless hindered by the growing privacy concerns about disclosing sensitive personal
profiles to strangers. To tackle this open challenge, we designed a suite of novel proto-
cols to enable two users to perform profile matching without disclosing any information
about their profiles beyond the comparison result. In contrast to existing coarse-grained
private matching schemes for PMSN, our protocols allow finer differentiation between
PMSN users and can support a wide range of matching metrics at different privacy
levels.
Chapter 6 studies secure combination of spectrum-sensing results in crowd-
sourcing-based cooperative (spectrum) sensing systems. Cooperative sensing is a key
function for dynamic spectrum access and is essential for avoiding interference with
licensed primary users and identifying spectrum holes. A promising approach for effec-
tive cooperative sensing over a large geographic region is to rely on special spectrum-
sensing providers (SSPs), which outsource spectrum-sensing tasks to distributed mo-
bile users. Crowdsourcing-based cooperative spectrum sensing is, however, vulnerable
to malicious sensing data injection attack, in which a malicious cognitive radio users
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submit false sensing reports containing power measurements much larger (or smaller)
than the true value to inflate (or deflate) the final average, in which case the SSP may
falsely determine that the channel is busy (or vacant). To tackle this challenge, we
propose a novel scheme to enable secure crowdsourcingbased cooperative spectrum
sensing by jointly considering the instantaneous trustworthiness of mobile detectors in
combination with their reputation scores during data fusion. Our scheme can enable
robust cooperative sensing even if the malicious CR users are the majority.
We summarize our work along with a discussion on future directions in Chap-
ter 7.
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Chapter 2
LOSS-RESILIENT AND SECURE CODE DISSEMINATION IN WIRELESS SENSOR
NETWORKS
2.1 Introduction
Code dissemination [47] or over-the-air reprogramming [43] in wireless sensor networks
refers to the process of disseminating a new code image via wireless links to all sensor
nodes after they are deployed. It is desirable and often necessary due to the need
for, e.g., removing program bugs and adding new functionalities in a multi-task sensor
network [104].
A sound code dissemination scheme faces two critical challenges. First, wire-
less channels are lossy in nature, especially for sensor networks deployed in remote
and harsh environments. Packets may get lost during transmission due to many reason-
s such as RF interference and environmental factors [115]. This calls for loss-resilient
code dissemination schemes like [43,46,92] that can withstand high packet losses. Sec-
ond, sensor networks in hostile environments such as the battlefield may be attacked.
In particular, the adversary may exploit the code dissemination mechanism to launch
various attacks. For example, the adversary may inject bogus code images to take over
the control of the whole sensor network or launch the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack
by transmitting many bogus image packets to deplete the limited energy and/or buffer
of sensor nodes. This situation necessitates secure code dissemination schemes such
as Seluge [49] which provides code-image integrity and DoS attack resilience through
immediate and efficient packet authentication.
To the best of our knowledge, no existing code dissemination scheme satisfies
loss resilience and attack resilience at the same time. On the one hand, all existing
secure code dissemination schemes such as [25,49,60,105,106,110] are secure ver-
sions of Deluge [47], the de facto non-secure code dissemination scheme. Deluge [47]
relies on Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ) protocols for reliable broadcast transmis-
sions, in which each local broadcast receiver uses NACKs to request retransmission
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of lost packets. ARQ protocols, however, are generally not suitable for broadcasting in
highly lossy networks due to too many retransmissions and the accompanying high la-
tency [115]. On the other hand, most loss-resilient code dissemination schemes employ
rateless erasure codes such as Fountain codes [92] and random linear codes [43] at the
sender side to cope with packet losses. The common idea is to encode the code image
into an unlimited number of packets such that each local receiver can recover the code
image after receiving sufficiently many packets. It is unfortunately infeasible to use the
similar methods as in Seluge [49] to realize immediate and efficient authentication of
potentially unlimited erasure-coded packets. There is a clear gap between these two
lines of research.
In this chapter, we fill the this gap by LR-Seluge, a novel loss-resilient and se-
cure code dissemination scheme for sensor networks deployed in hostile and lossy
environments. As the first of its kind, LR-Seluge is aimed to strike a good balance be-
tween loss resilience and immediate packet authentication by using a limited number of
predetermined redundant packets. More specifically, we encode the code image using
a fixed-rate erasure code and carefully create chaining relationships between original
and encoded packets using lightweight cryptographic hash functions. This design al-
lows sensor nodes not only to recover the original code image from a subset of the en-
coded packets but also to efficiently authenticate any encoded packet upon its arrival,
thus simultaneously achieving sufficiently high loss resilience and attack resilience.
Our main contributions in this chapter are summarized as follows.
• We notice the lack of a sound code dissemination scheme for sensor network-
s in lossy and hostile environments with satisfactory loss resilience and attack
resilience and fill this void by proposing LR-Seluge.
• We theoretically analyze and compare the performance of LR-Seluge with and
Seluge [49], a representative secure code dissemination scheme that ensures
code-image integrity and provides very strong resilience to DoS attacks. We fur-
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ther confirm the efficacy and efficiency of LR-Seluge by extensive simulation re-
sults. Our results reveal that LR-Seluge can save up to 40% in communication
overhead and 40% in code-dissemination latency with the same level of attack
resilience in comparison with Seluge.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. We introduce our network and
adversary models and the design goal in Section 2.3, followed by a brief discussion on
the background Section 2.2. We then present the design of LR-Seluge in Section 2.4.
Subsequently, we analyze the performance of LR-Seluge in Section 2.5 and evaluate
LR-Seluge using extensive simulation results in Section 2.6. We discuss the related
work in Section 2.7 and finally concludes this chapter in Section 2.8.
2.2 Background
This section introduces the background knowledge necessary for understanding the
design of LR-Seluge.
2.2.1 Deluge
Deluge [47] is the de facto code dissemination paradigm for sensor network, which is
also one of the standard components of the TinyOS distribution [2].
Deluge employs a page-by-page dissemination strategy, in which a large code
image is divided into smaller fixed-size pages, and each page is further divided into
same-size packets. A sensor node requests for a new page only after completely re-
ceiving all the packets of the previous page. During the code dissemination process,
each node works in one of the following three states: maintenance, in which node
periodically advertises the version of its code image and the number of pages it has
for that version, receiving, in which the node actively requests the remaining packets
to complete the current page using Selective NACK (SNACK for short) requests, and
transmitting, in which the node broadcasts all the requested packets of the current page
and continuously serves any subsequent request.
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Deluge employs various suppression techniques to maximize the effect of over-
hearing and reduce packet collisions. For example, each node suppresses its own
advertisement after overhearing a threshold number of advertisements with the same
information. Moreover, a node suppresses its own request (or data) packet if overhear-
ing request (or data) packets for a page with the same or smaller indices. We refer
readers to [47] for the details about these suppression techniques.
2.2.2 Seluge
Seluge [49] is an exemplary secure code dissemination scheme, which ensures code-
image integrity and DoS attack resilience by enabling efficient and immediate packet
authentication.
Seluge integrates three different techniques to realize efficient and immediate
packet authentication. First, Seluge chains the packets of two adjacent pages with a
cryptographic hash function. For example, the hash image of the jth packet of page i
is embedded into the jth packet of page i− 1. Since Seluge adopts the same page-by-
page dissemination strategy from Deluge, any packet of page i can be authenticated
upon arrival because all the packets of page i−1 must have been received. Second, to
authenticate the first page, Seluge introduces a special hash page formed by concate-
nating all the hash images of packets of the first page. A Merkle hash tree is built on top
of the hash page, and the base station digitally signs the root of the Merkle hash tree
to ensure its integrity. In this way, each packet of the hash page can be authenticated
by computing the hash images along the path to the tree root. Finally, to prevent the
adversary from transmitting a large number of signature packets to force sensor nodes
to perform computationally expensive signature verifications, Seluge let the base sta-
tion attach a weak authenticator to the signature packet, which is a message specific
puzzle [81]. Only if the weak authenticator is valid do sensor nodes verify the signature.
Seluge does not work well in lossy environments due to its dependence on Deluge, as
to be shown later.
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2.2.3 Erasure Code
A k-n-k′ erasure code transforms k packets into n ≥ k encoded packets of the same
length such that the original k packets can be recovered from any k′ encoded packets.
The fraction k/n is called the code rate, and the fraction k′/k is called reception effi-
ciency, where k′ denotes the number of packets required for recovery. When k′ = k,
the erasure code is optimal. Typical erasure codes include Reed-Solomon codes, Tor-
nado codes, Raptor codes, Online codes, and LT codes, for which a good survey can
be found in [75].
2.3 Network/Adversary Models and Design Goals
This section outlines the network and adversary models underlying LR-Seluge as well
as our design goals.
2.3.1 Network Model
As in Seluge [49], we consider a WSN consisting of a base station and many sensor
nodes densely deployed in hostile environments such as the battlefield. The base sta-
tion has a new code image M to be disseminated to all the sensor nodes via wireless
links. We assume that the base station has abundant resources in computation and
communication and is safeguarded from attacks. We also assume that the base sta-
tion has a public/private key pair. In contrast, sensor nodes are more constrained in
storage, energy, computation, and communication capabilities. We, however, adopt the
same assumption in [49] that a sensor node can verify a few digital signatures, e.g., one
signature verification per code image. It is worth noting that technical advances have
rendered it quite feasible to execute once-daunting public-key operations on sensor
nodes. For example, it takes 1.12s for a Tmote Sky mote to verify an ECDSA signa-
ture [113]. Such public-key operations will be minimized in LR-Seluge, as to be shown
later. Moreover, we assume lossy and unreliable wireless channels such that packet-
s may get lost due to many reasons such as environmental factors and accidental or
malicious RF interference [115].
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2.3.2 Adversary Model
We also adopt the adversary model from [49]. In particular, we consider a computa-
tionally bounded adversary consisting of both external and internal attackers. External
attackers do not belong to the target WSN, but they are capable of overhearing pack-
et transmissions, injecting bogus packets, and replaying intercepted packets. Internal
attackers are compromised yet undetected sensor nodes which are fully controlled by
the adversary. We, however, follow the conventional assumption that non-compromised
sensor nodes are always the majority.
Despite the many attacks the adversary can launch, this chapter has the same
target as Seluge [49] and focuses on defeating the following two attacks on code dis-
semination.
• The adversary may inject forged code images to take control of the sensor net-
work.
• The adversary may send many fake packets or replay intercepted packets to force
sensor nodes into wasteful packet processing so as to quickly deplete their limited
energy and/or memory buffer.
2.3.3 Design Objectives
In view of the two attacks outlined above, LR-Seluge is designed with the following
goals in mind.
• Code-image integrity: Every sensor node is guaranteed to receive an authentic
code image unless the node is isolated from the rest of the network.
• DoS attack resilience: Any forged packets should be immediately detected upon
their arrivals, and packet authentication should be efficient.
• Loss resilience: LR-Seluge should enable more efficient code dissemination in
the presence of severe packet losses than prior work such as Seluge [49].
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2.4 LR-Seluge Design
In this section, we first give an overview of LR-Seluge and then present its design in
detail.
2.4.1 Overview of LR-Seluge
LR-Seluge is largely inspired by two observations. First, loss-resilient broadcasting can
be achieved by using erasure codes at the sender side, i.e., introducing redundant
packets, as demonstrated in [43, 46, 92, 115]. Second, immediate and efficient packet
authentication can be realized if all the packets to be transmitted are predetermined.
Consider Seluge [49] as an example, in which all the image packets are preprocessed
to create some chaining relationships with cryptographic hash functions to enable im-
mediate and efficient packet authentication. Such preprocessing can be done only if all
the packets can be determined prior to transmission.
The key idea of LR-Seluge is to introduce a limited number of predetermined
redundant packets to increase loss resilience and also achieve immediate packet au-
thentication by carefully creating chaining relationships between encoded packets and
original packets. More specifically, LR-Seluge differs from existing loss-resilient code
dissemination schemes [43,46,92,115] in that it uses a fixed-rate erasure code instead
of rateless ones to encode the image packets. To enable immediate packet authenti-
cation, LR-Seluge creates some chaining relationships between the original packets of
one page and the encoded packets of the next page. In this way, once a node receives
sufficient encoded packets to recover one page, it also recovers all the hash images of
the next page at the same time. This design differs from Seluge [49] in that there is no
one-to-one correspondence between the packets of adjacent pages. Furthermore, LR-
Seluge employs a simple but effective scheduling algorithm that allows each sender to
transmit much fewer packets to ensure that every one-hop neighbor receives sufficient
encoded packets to recover a code page.
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Figure 2.1: An example of code-image preprocessing for pages M1 to Mg, where
g = 3, k = 3, n = 6.
In what follows, we detail the operations of LR-Seluge, including initialization,
code-image preprocessing, efficient loss-resilient code dissemination, and authenticat-
ed packet transmission.
2.4.2 Initialization
Before the network deployment, the network owner preloads each sensor node with the
following information.
• The same instance of a k-n-k′ erasure code f(·);
• The same instance of a k0-n0-k′0 erasure code f0(·);
• The public key of the base station;
• A public cryptographic hash function H(·).
With f(·) or f0(·), every node can generate the same n or n0 encoded packets from the
same k or k0 input packets.
2.4.3 Code-Image Preprocessing
Assume that the base station has a code image M for dissemination to all sensor
nodes. As in [47,105], the base station partitions the original image M into g pages of
fixed size, denoted by {Mi}gi=1. Each page Mi is then further divided into k original
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blocks of equal length, i.e., Mi = {mi,j}kj=1, ∀i ∈ [1, g]. We will use the terms “Page
i” and “Page Mi” interchangeably hereafter. Starting from page Mg, the base station
constructs the packets for each page in the reverse order as the pages are transmitted.
An example is given in Fig. 2.1, where g = 3, k = 3, n = 6.
2.4.3.1 Page g
For page Mg , the base station applies f on {mg,j}kj=1 to generate n encoded blocks
as
f(mg,1, · · · ,mg,k) = (eg,1, · · · , eg,n) . (2.1)
The n packets of page Mg are then constructed as Pg,j := 〈ν, g, j, eg,j〉,∀j ∈ [1, n],
where ν and g denote the code version and the page number, respectively.
2.4.3.2 Pages g − 1 to 1
After constructing {Pg,j}nj=1, the base station proceeds to construct {Pg−1,j}nj=1 for
pageMg−1. The basic idea is to append the hash images of {Pg,j}nj=1 to the original k
blocks of pageMg−1 and then apply f to generate the n packets ofMg−1. In particular,
the base station computes hg,j = H(Pg,j), ∀j ∈ [1, n], and then splits hg,1|| · · · ||hg,n
into k slices of equal length, denoted by {hg,j}kj=1. The n encoded blocks of page
Mg−1 are then generated as
f(m′g−1,j, · · · ,m′g−1,k) = (eg−1,1, · · · , eg−1,n) , (2.2)
where m′g−1,j := mg−1,j||hl,j . The n packets of page Mg−1 to be transmitted are
finally generated as Pg−1,j := 〈ν, g − 1, j, eg−1,j〉, ∀j ∈ [1, n].
By repeating the above process, the base station can also iteratively construct
the packets for pages g − 2 to 1, i.e., {Pi,j}nj=1,∀i ∈ [1, g − 2].
2.4.3.3 Page 0 and Signature Packet
We use a similar approach as in Seluge [49] to authenticate page M1 by purposefully
introducing a hash page M0 as the concatenation of the n hash images of page M1,
i.e., M0 := h1,1|| · · · ||h1,n. In general, M0 is much shorter than other pages but still
cannot fit into one packet. Therefore, the base station first splits M0 into k0 blocks of
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equal length, denoted by {m0,i}k0i=1, and then applies the erasure code f0 to generate
n0 encoded blocks as follows,
f0(m0,1, · · · ,m0,k0) = (e0,1, · · · , e0,n0) , (2.3)
where n0 = 2d for some integer d.
The base station then builds a Merkle hash tree [71] of depth d on top of
{e0,j}n0j=1, as illustrated in Fig. 2.2. In particular, the base station computes vj =
H(e0,j), j ∈ [1, n0], and builds a binary tree by computing each internal node as the
hash of its adjacent children nodes. For example, v3−4 = H(v3||v4) and v1−4 =
H(v1−2||v3−4) in Fig. 2.2.
Given the Merkle hash tree, the base station constructs one packet for each
e0,j , which consists of e0,j itself and its authentication information, i.e., all the siblings
of the nodes in the path from v0,j to the root of the Merkle hash tree. For example,
P0,2 := 〈ν, 0, 2, e0,2,v1,v3−4,v5−8〉 in Fig. 2.2.
The whole code image is authenticated by the base station signing the root of
the Merkle hash tree using its private key. To mitigate the possible DoS attack in which
the adversary injects many signature packets to deceive sensor nodes into continuous
relatively expensive signature verifications, a weak authenticator like a message specific
puzzle in Seluge [49] can be attached to the signature packet as a defense.
2.4.4 Efficient Loss-Resilient Code Dissemination
This subsection details the code dissemination process of LR-Seluge which efficient-
ly copes with packet losses. To ease the illustration, we defer the illustration of LR-
Seluge’s packet authentication mechanisms to Section 2.4.5. As in Deluge and Seluge,
every node in LR-Seluge works in one of three states at any time: MAINTAIN, RX and
TX. LR-Seluge differs from Deluge and Seluge mainly in the TX state due to the use
of erasure codes. For self-containment, below we briefly discuss the operations in the
MAINTAIN and RX states and then detail the operations in the TX state.
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Figure 2.2: An example of construction Merkle hash tree over page M0, where n =
24, k0 = 4, n0 = 8.
2.4.4.1 MAINTAIN
Every node in the MAINTAIN state monitors all its one-hop neighbors to ensure that
they all possess the same number of pages of the latest code image. For this purpose,
every node periodically broadcasts advertisements, each consisting of the sender ID,
the code version number, and the largest page number in possession (which implies
all previous pages are also in possession). Here a page is said to be possessed if the
sender has received at least k′ or k′0 out of n of n0 encoded packets of the page and
successfully decoded it.
If a node detects that any neighboring node has either a newer code image or
more pages of the same code image, it requests the missing pages from that neighbor
with an SNACK request. For example, assume that node v overhears an advertisement
from node u indicating that node u has more pages, node v switches to the RX state and
begins requesting the missing pages from node u which will switch to the TX state upon
an SNACK request from node v. In addition, to enable fast code propagation while
limiting the number of advertisement packets, every node adjusts the advertisement
frequency using Trickle [63], a protocol for maintaining code updates in WSNs.
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Node Pi,1 Pi,2 Pi,3 Pi,4 d
v1 0 1 0 1 1
v2 1 1 0 1 2
v3 1 1 1 1 3
Pop. 2 3 1 3
(a) Node u’s tracking table at some time T
Node Pi,1 Pi,2 Pi,3 Pi,4 d
v2 1 0 0 1 1
v3 1 0 1 1 2
Pop. 2 0 1 2
(b) After transmitting packet Pi,2
Node Pi,1 Pi,2 Pi,3 Pi,4 d
v3 1 0 1 0 1
Pop. 1 0 1 0
(c) After transmitting packet Pi,4
Table 2.1: An example of node operation in TX state, where k = k0 = 3, n = 4.
2.4.4.2 RX
A node in the RX state keeps sending SNACK requests to corresponding neighboring
nodes which possess a missing page until receiving enough packets to decode the
missing page. A SNACK request includes a bit-vector of n bits with every bit indicating
whether the corresponding packet is desired. For every received packet, the requesting
node first authenticates it using the methods in Section 2.4.5 and stores only the packet
passing the authentication. Once k′ or k′0 out of n or n0 authenticated packets are
received, the requesting node can erasure-decode the missing page and then returns
to the MAINTAIN state.
2.4.4.3 TX
A node, say u, switches to the TX state after receiving an SNACK request for a page
it has. The operations of LR-Seluge in the TX state differs from Deluge and Seluge
mainly in the following two aspects.
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First, to serve an SNACK request, a node need erasure-encode the requested
page with the hash images of the next page’s packets. Consider node u as an example.
Assume that u has received at least k′ authenticated packets of page Mi and erasure-
decoded them to recover Mi and the appended hash images of pageMi+1’s encoded
packets, i.e., hi+1,1|| · · · ||hi+1,n. Suppose that u receives an SNACK request from node
v requesting Mi. As the base station does in Section 2.4.3, node u applies the same
erasure code f to Mi appended by hi+1,1|| · · · ||hi+1,n and obtains the n encoded
packets. Node u can then broadcast the encoded packets corresponding to the bit
vector in the SNACK request. Since node v has received pageMi−1 and thus the hash
images of Mi’s n encoded packets, it can immediately authenticate the packets from u
using the method in Section 2.4.5.
Second, a suitable scheduling algorithm is needed for nodes in the TX state to
reduce the number of transmissions for reducing communication overhead. In partic-
ular, different packets of the same page may be needed by different neighbors of the
node having that page due to random packet losses. It is thus desirable for the sender
to transmit the smallest subset of the n encoded packets to simultaneously satisfy the
requests from all its neighbors. This scheduling requirement is not found in existing
code dissemination schemes. In particular, a node in Deluge and Seluge simply trans-
mits packets corresponding to the union of bit vectors in SNACK packets, and a node
in the schemes [43, 46, 92] based on rateless erasure codes always transmits a fresh
encoded packet for an SNACK request.
We propose an effective greedy round-robin scheduling algorithm for nodes
in the TX state. The basic idea is for a node to transmit the packet desired by the
highest number of neighbors in a round-robin fashion. More specifically, every node
in the TX state, say node u, maintains a so-called tracking table with every table entry
corresponding to one neighbor from which an SNACK was received. The tracking entry
for a node, say v, consists of the following fields.
• The node ID v;
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• A bit vector of length n indicating which packets have been received by v from u’s
current point of view;
• The distance of node v, denoted by dv and referring to the number of additional
packets v needs to recover the requested page.
Initially, the tracking table is empty. Upon receiving an SNACK request from a
node, say v, node u first checks if there is an entry for node v. If not, node u creates an
entry for node v, copies the bit vector from the SNACK request, and sets the distance
dv as the additional number of packets needed by v. For example, if all bits in the bit
vector of the SNACK request are ones, then dv = k′. In general, since node v needs at
most k′ packets for decoding the requested page, we have dv = q + k′ − n, where q is
the number of ones in the bit vector. If there is an entry for node v, node u updates the
entry according to the SNACK request.
To illustrate the scheduling algorithm, assume that node u is handling the S-
NACK requests from its neighbors for page Mi which is erasure-encoded into packets
{Pi,j}nj=1. We also define the popularity of a packet as the number of nodes requesting
it. Also assume that there are z entries in node u’s tracking table. The z bit vectors
form a z × n bitmap, in which the total number of ones in the jth column indicates the
popularity of packet Pi,j . The first packet, say Pi,x, sent by u is the packet with the
highest popularity and also the lowest packet index in case that there are multiple pack-
ets of the highest popularity. After sending Pi,x, node u updates the tracking table by
setting all the bits in the xth column to zero and decreasing the distances of the nodes
needing Pi,x by one. Note that if Pi,x failed to reach some nodes, these nodes may
request it again in a later SNACK packet. If some nodes’ distances reach zero, their
entries are deleted. The next packet is selected as the one with the highest popularity
and the index equal to min{x + 1, · · · , n, n + 1, · · · , n + x − 1} mod n, i.e., the first
packet to the right of Pi,x with the highest popularity. This process continues until u’s
tracking table is empty.
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Table 2.1 gives an example where k = k′ = 3, n = 4. Assume that at some
point, node u’s tracking table has three entries for nodes v1, v2 and v3, as shown
in Table 2.1a. The popularity of packets Pi,1 to Pi,4 are 2, 3, 1, and 3, respectively.
Node u will first transmit Pi,2 and then updates the tracking table to Table 2.1b. Note
that node v1 has been removed from the tracking table because its distance reaches
zero. Subsequently, node u chooses Pi,4 to transmit because it is the first packet of
the highest popularity on Pi,2’s right side. After Pi,4 is transmitted, the tracking table is
updated again to Table 2.1c. Finally, packet Pi,1 is transmitted, after which the tracking
table becomes empty.
2.4.5 Authenticated Code Dissemination
This subsection details how LR-Seluge realizes authenticated code dissemination. LR-
Seluge adopts the page-by-page dissemination approach from Deluge and Seluge in
which a node can only request a new page if all previous pages have been completely
received and recovered. This page-by-page strategy together with LR-Seluge’s packet
construction enables immediate packet authentication to ensure code-image integri-
ty and also prevents the DoS attack that targets exhausting the receivers’ energy or
buffers.
In particular, the base station initiates the dissemination process by broadcast-
ing the signature packet. On receiving the signature packet, every sensor node, say
u, verifies the signature to authenticate the root of the Merkle hash tree, e.g., v1−8 in
Fig. 2.2. If the verification succeeds, node u begins to send SNACK packets requesting
the packets of page M0. Every packet in page M0 can be immediately authenticated
upon its arrival. For example, for packet P0,1 in Fig. 2.2, node u can verify its authenticity
by checking if the following equation holds,
v1−8 = H(H(H(H(e0,1)||v2)||v3−4)||v5−8) .
If so, it stores the packet and otherwise drops it.
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Once node u has collected k′0 authenticated packets of pageM0, say {P0,jx}k
′
0
x=1,
it can erasure-decode M0 as
f−10 (e0,j1 , · · · , e0,jk′
0
) = (m0,1, · · · ,m0,k0) . (2.4)
Recall that M0 contains all the hash images of the packets of page M1. Therefore,
node u can subsequently authenticate all the packets of page M1 upon their arrivals
by a simple hash verification. Similarly, once at least k′ authenticated packets of M1
have been collected, node u can decode M1 to get all the hash images of the packets
of page M2 whereby to immediately authenticate all the packets of page M3. In short,
the page-by-page strategy guarantees that whenever node u requests a new page from
a neighboring node, all the information needed for authenticating the new page is avail-
able at that time. Therefore, any data packet can be immediately authenticated upon
their arrivals.
In addition, LR-Seluge adopts the same mechanisms in Seluge, i.e., cluster key
and message specific puzzle, to authenticate advertisement and SNACK packets and
to effectively filter out forged signatures of the root of the Merkle hash tree, respectively.
Therefore, LR-Seluge inherits the same level of resilience to DoS attacks that exploit
Deluge’s epidemic propagation and suppression mechanisms.
It is worth noticing that LR-Seluge and all existing secure code dissemination
schemes [25, 49, 60, 105, 106, 110] are vulnerable to a special kind of denial of receipt
attack in which a compromised sensor node denies it has received any data packets
but keeps sending SNACK packets to a victim node in order to deplete its energy. In
particular, a victim node need transmit k′ data packets on receiving a SNACK packet
with all bits set to one. It is fundamentally difficult to verify whether a particular packet
has been received by certain nodes in lossy environment.
To mitigate the impact of this attack, a possible solution is to replace cluster key
by a local authentication scheme like LEAP [140] to simultaneously authenticate and
identify the source of any SNACK packet. In addition, each node in TX state maintains
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a counter for the number of SNACK packets from each neighbor. For any page, if the
number of data packets requested by a neighboring node, say v, exceeds some certain
threshold, the node that serving the page, say u, can simply ignore future SNACK
packets from v, under the assumption that either v is launching the denial of receipt
attack or the channel between u and v is too bad so that v should request data packets
from its other neighbors.
2.5 Performance Analysis
Section 2.4.5 discusses how LR-Seluge realizes code-image integrity and DoS re-
silience. In this section, we analyze the communication and computation overhead
of LR-Seluge.
2.5.1 Communication Overhead
The communication costs of Seluge and LR-Seluge both comprise the transmissions
of data, advertisement, and SNACK packets, among which data-packet transmissions
account for the most. Both costs are very difficult to analyze in a general multi-hop
sensor network with arbitrary topologies and random packet losses. To enable theoreti-
cal tractability, we here analyze the number of data-packet transmissions under Seluge
and LR-Seluge, respectively, under a one-hop scenario. This is a meaningful simplifica-
tion, as the performance of Seluge and LR-Seluge largely depends on hop-by-hop local
broadcasting. The impact of advertisement and SNACK packets and also the commu-
nication costs of Seluge and LR-Seluge in multi-hop scenarios will be demonstrated
using simulations in Section 2.6.
We consider a one-hop scenario consisting of N receivers and a local sender
at the center. Our main goal is to demonstrate the impact of employing erasure codes
in lossy environments. So we adopt a similar model as in [80] in which every packet to
node i gets lost with probability pi and packet losses at different nodes are uncorrelated.
We then have the following theorems regarding the number of data packet trans-
missions in Seluge and LR-Seluge, respectively, whose proofs are available in our tech-
nical report [135]. It is worth mentioning that the result in Theorem 2.5.2 is obtained by
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analyzing a variation of LR-Seluge. In this variation, instead of using SNACK packet-
s, each receiver returns an ACK packet only after receiving k′ packets of the current
page. Since the local sender has no information about which packets are missing at
each node, it has to repeatedly transmit the n erasure-coded packets until receiving an
ACK from every neighboring node. This variation is apparently less efficient than LR-
Seluge, as the sender may unnecessarily transmit some packets which have reached
all the receivers. Therefore, its communication cost can be viewed as the upper bound
of LR-Seluge
Theorem 2.5.1. With Seluge, the expected number of data-packet transmissions need-
ed to transmit a page of k packets to all N nodes is given by
k
∞∑
t=1
t · ( N∏
i=1
(1− pti)−
N∏
i=1
(1− pt−1i )
)
. (2.5)
The proof is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 2.5.2. With LR-Seluge employing a k-n-k′ erasure code, the expected num-
ber of data-packet transmissions needed for all N nodes to receive at least k′ packets
to recover the original page of k packets is bounded by
n
∞∑
r=1
r · (Pr(R ≤ r)− Pr(R ≤ r − 1)) , (2.6)
where Pr(R ≤ r) =∏Ni=1∑nj=k′ (nj)(1− pri )jpr(n−j)i .
The proof is given in Appendix B.
2.5.2 Computation Overhead
The computation overhead of LR-Seluge comes from packet authentication and page
encoding/decoding.
The computation cost incurred by packet authentication is very similar to that
of Seluge. First, authenticating a signature packet requires one hash function for the
weak authenticator and one signature verification. Second, authenticating a packet of
page M0 requires d + 1 hash computations, and total k′0(d + 1) hash computations
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are needed for page M0. In contrast, authenticating a packet of page Mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ g
requires one hash computation, so total k′ hash computations are needed for each
page Mi.
The computation cost incurred by erasure decoding and encoding depends on
the particular erasure code used by LR-Seluge. Theoretically speaking, LR-Seluge can
be integrated with any erasure code as long as the parameters (k, n, k′) are satisfied.
In our evaluation, we adopt a fixed-rate LT code from SYNAPSE [92], in which each
encoded packet is the XOR of some original packets. Assuming that k = 32, n = 64,
and k′ = 35, decoding a page of 32 original packets of 25 bytes requires 5142 XOR
operations on average and takes about 462 ms on a Tmote Sky sensor node [92].
Same as Seluge [49], LR-Seluge uses data packets with an effective payload length of
96 bytes. Since the decoding cost of the LT code is linear to the packet length, decoding
a page of 32 original packets of 96 bytes requires approximately 19745 XOR operations
and takes about 1.8 seconds. Finally, nodes in the TX state need erasure-encode the
original page to obtain the other n − k′ missing packets, which requires s(n − k′) ∗ 96
XOR operations on average, where s is the average number of original blocks XORed
to generate an encoded packet. If s = 12.06 as in [92], the encoding cost for a page in
LR-Seluge requires approximately 33576 XOR operations and takes about 3.1 seconds
on a Tmote Sky sensor node. It is also worth noting that in LR-Seluge, only a few nodes
in the TX state need perform encoding.
Although LR-Seluge introduces additional decoding and encoding delays at
sensor nodes in comparison with Seluge, it greatly reduces the overall code-dissemination
latency due to the dramatic reduction in the number of packet transmissions. This ar-
gument will be validated using simulations in the next section.
2.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we compare LR-Seluge with Seluge using extensive simulations in
TOSSIM [62], a discrete event simulator distributed with TinyOS 2.1.1.
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Unless stated otherwise, the following simulation configurations are used. For
the k-n-k′ erasure code f(·), we have k = 32, n = 64, and k′ = 35; for the k0-n0-
k′0 erasure code f0(·), we have k0 = 8, n0 = 16, and k′0 = 11. As in Seluge [49],
we set the packet-payload size to 102 bytes (the maximum payload size in the IEEE
802.15.4 standard) and use the 64-bit truncation of SHA-1 as the hash function H(·),
and use a gap of 17 ms between two data-packet transmissions. The image version
number, page number, and packet number in both Seluge and LR-Seluge packets totally
consume 6 bytes, which leaves 96 bytes for the effective packet payload. In addition,
except the packets of Page 0, each packet in Seluge and LR-Seluge contains one and
n/k hash values, respectively. 1 Therefore, the packets of Seluge and LR-Seluge have
96 − 8 = 88 bytes and 96 − 8 ∗ n/k = 80 bytes, respectively, for code-image slices.
In our simulations, each page consists of 32 packets for both Seluge and LR-Seluge,
and the code image M is of 20 KB. Under Seluge, M leads to totally g = 8 pages,
among which the last page comprises only 9 packets; under LR-Seluge, M leads to
totally g = 8 pages as well, all of which comprise 32 packets.
In addition, we set the minimum delays between two advertisement packets and
between two SNACK packets to 1 second and 128 ms, respectively, for both Seluge and
LR-Seluge. 2 Moreover, we use the delays of 2.5 and 3.5 seconds to emulate the de-
coding and encoding of a page, respectively, which is clearly in favor of Seluge because
the decoding and encoding times are estimated as 1.8 and 3.1 seconds, respectively,
in Section 2.5.2.
The performance metrics used in our comparisons include the total number of
data packets, the total number of SNACK packets, the total number of advertisement
packets, and the overall dissemination latency which is defined as the time required
to finish disseminating a code image to all the nodes in the network. Since SNACK
1The packets of the last page in both Seluge and LR-Seluge do not contain any hash value, but we
ignore such subtly and assume that all the packets in both Seluge and LR-Seluge have the same effective
payload length.
2The two delays are set to 2 seconds and 1 second in [49], respectively. Our simulations indicate that
our chosen parameters help significantly reduce the dissemination latency of Seluge.
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(a) 20 receivers (b) p = 0.3
Figure 2.3: One-hop one-page scenario.
packets in LR-Seluge are n− k bits longer than those in Seluge, we will also show the
total communication cost covering data, SNACK and advertisement packets in bytes for
fairness. Each measurement in the following figures is the average over 20 simulation
runs, each with a different seed.
2.6.1 Validation of Analytical Results
To validate the analytical results in Section 2.5.1, we first simulate the transmission of
one page in Seluge and LR-Seluge in a fully-connected one-hop scenario with one local
sender and a varying number of local receivers. To fully control and illustrate the impact
of packet losses, we use a similar simulation strategy as in [92], where nodes are placed
close enough to eliminate packet transmission errors caused by channel impairments,
and packet losses are emulated by each node dropping received data, advertisement,
or SNACK packets with the same probability p at the application layer.
Figs. 2.3a and 2.3b show the analytical results of Seluge and ACK-based LR-
Seluge and the simulation results of Seluge and LR-Seluge. We can see that the sim-
ulation result of Seluge closely matches the analytical result, and the number of data
packets transmitted in ACK-based LR-Seluge is always larger than that of LR-Seluge
obtained from simulations, which confirms that the number of data-packet transmission-
s in LR-Seluge is upper bounded by that in ACK-based LR-Seluge. In addition, we can
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see a significant increase in the number of data packet transmissions in ACK-based
LR-Seluge when the packet loss rate increases from 0.3 to 0.4. The reason is that
when p ≤ 0.3 (or p ≥ 0.4), ACK-based LR-Seluge can finish transmitting one page in
one round (or two rounds) with high probability. The figures also confirm that LR-Seluge
incurs much fewer data-packet transmissions than Seluge in lossy environments and is
less sensitive to the number of receivers as well.
2.6.2 The One-Hop Case
We focus on comparing LR-Seluge and Seluge with simulations which involve dissem-
inating a code image M of 20 KB. We first show more simulation results for the afore-
mentioned one-hop scenario, which is the basis of the more general multi-hop scenario.
2.6.2.1 Impact of the Packet-Loss Rate
Figs. 2.4a∼2.4e show the impact of the packet-loss rate p on LR-Seluge and Seluge,
where there are N = 20 local receivers. It is not surprising to see that the total com-
munication costs and dissemination latencies of LR-Seluge and Seluge both increase
as p increases. In addition, when p ≤ 0.01, LR-Seluge has a slightly larger commu-
nication cost than Seluge for both data and control packets. There are two reasons.
First, LR-Seluge has more data packets than Seluge for the same code image due to
the use of erasure codes. Second, under LR-Seluge, each node needs k′ > k packets
to recover each page, so more data-packet transmissions are needed to disseminate
one page if there are no or rare packet losses. In contrast, when p > 0.01, LR-Seluge
outperforms Seluge in all the five performance metrics. For example, when p = 0.4,
LR-Seluge reduces the total communication cost by 44% and the dissemination latency
by 48% in comparison with Seluge. These results clearly demonstrate that LR-Seluge
is much more resilient to packet losses than Seluge.
2.6.2.2 Impact of the Node Density
Figs. 2.5a∼2.5e show the impact of the number N of local receivers on LR-Seluge and
Seluge, where the packet-loss rate p = 0.1. We can see that the communication costs
of LR-Seluge and Seluge all increase as N increases. This is understandable because
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(a) data packet (b) SNACK packet
(c) advertisement packet (d) total communication cost
(e) dissemination latency
Figure 2.4: Impact of the packet-loss rate, where there are N = 20 local receivers.
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(a) data packet (b) SNACK packet
(c) advertisement packet (d) total communication cost
(e) dissemination latency
Figure 2.5: Impact of the node density, where the packet-loss rate p = 0.1.
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Table 2.2: Performance comparison under network with high density
LR-Seluge Seluge Ratio
Total # of SNACK packets 1804 3629 49.71%
Total # of data packets 4040 5496 73.50%
Total # of adver. packets 1059 1678 63.11%
Total comm. cost in bytes 6.05 × 105 8.78 × 105 68.91%
Dissemination latency (s) 93 146 63.70%
it always requires more data and control packet transmissions to disseminate the same
code image under packet losses. However, LR-Seluge is much less sensitive to the
increase of N , which can be clearly seen in Figs. 2.5a∼2.5d. In addition, the dissem-
ination latency of Seluge increases slightly as N increases, while that in LR-Seluge
slightly decreases. This could be explained as follows. In Seluge, as N increases, the
numbers of SNACK and data packet transmissions increase significantly, which leads
to higher the dissemination latency. In contrast, the numbers of SNACK and data pack-
et transmissions increase much slower in LR-Seluge as N increases. In addition, the
more nodes that demand the current page, the earlier the first node receives k′ packets
and thus recovers the current page, and the earlier the SNACK packet is transmitted to
request the next page. This leads to the decrease in total dissemination latency.
2.6.2.3 Impact of the erasure-coding rate
Figs. 2.6a∼2.6e show the impact of the erasure-coding rate n/k on LR-Seluge under
different packet-loss rates, where k is fixed to 32. We can see that by introducing a
limited number of redundant data packets, the communication cost of LR-Seluge de-
creases significantly. For example, when p = 0.1 and n = 56, the total number of
SNACK and data packet transmissions decrease by 70.5% and 30%, respectively. As
n/k further increases, the communication cost and dissemination latency increase s-
lowly. The reason is that higher erasure-coding rates lead to shorter packet space for
code-image slices and thus more packets for the same code image.
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(a) data packet (b) SNACK packet
(c) advertisement packet (d) total communication cost
(e) dissemination latency
Figure 2.6: Impact of the erasure-coding rate.
30
Table 2.3: Performance comparison under network with medium density
LR-Seluge Seluge Ratio
Total # of SNACK packets 10927 20287 53.86%
Total # of data packets 38197 47373 80.63%
Total # of adver. packets 13088 18812 69.57%
Total comm. cost in bytes 5.55 × 106 7.27 × 106 76.34%
Dissemination latency (s) 1154 1534 75.23%
2.6.3 The Multi-Hop Case
We also simulate LR-Seluge and Seluge in multi-hop networks. In particular, we sim-
ulate them under two 15 × 15 grid sensor networks using the exemplary topologies
specified in 15-15-tight-mica2-grid.txt (high node density) and 15-15-medium-mica2-
grid.txt (low node density) and RF noise and interference from the sample noise trace
file meyer-heavy.txt of the TinyOS distribution.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 compare the performance of LR-Seluge and Seluge under
these two topologies, respectively. We can see that LR-Seluge outperforms Seluge for
all the performance metrics by significant margins, which coincides with the results un-
der the one-hop scenario. We have also simulated other network topologies generated
by the topology tool provided by the TinyOS distribution which is based on theoretical
propagation models. In general, the results are very similar to those shown in Tables 2.2
and 2.3 and thus are omitted here.
2.6.4 Discussion
We summarize the simulation results as follows.
• LR-Seluge incurs slightly higher communication cost and dissemination latency
when packet loss rate is small.
• LR-Seluge can tolerate packet loss while incur much less communication over-
head than Seluge does.
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• LR-Seluge does not require high erasure code rate, because high rate decreases
the effective payload length.
2.7 Related Work
In addition to Deluge [47] and Seluge [49], the following work is most related to our
LR-Seluge scheme.
Sluice [60] aims at authenticated code dissemination based on signature and
cryptographic hash functions. It creates a chaining relationship among adjacent pages
by embedding the hash image of each page into the previous page and signing only the
first page. A scheme similar to Sluice is presented in [25], in which the hash image of
each packet is included in the previous packet. Both schemes, however, are vulnerable
to DoS attacks in which the adversary keeps sending bogus packets that cannot be
immediately authenticated, as pointed out in [49]. A scheme with better DoS resilience
is presented in [20] and uses Merkle hash trees to enable immediate authentication of
packets upon their arrivals. In addition, Tan at al. propose a secure code dissemination
scheme based on multiple hash chains [105] and also a code dissemination scheme
which preserves the confidentiality of the code image [106]. Most recently, Ugus et
al. [110] present a ROM-friendly secure code dissemination protocol which significant-
ly reduces the memory requirement. All these previous schemes rely on Deluge and
thus do not work well in lossy environments. In this chapter, we demonstrate the sig-
nificant advantages of the proposed LR-Seluge over Seluge which has the best DoS
resilience among similar schemes. Also note that the techniques in [110] can be easily
incorporated into LR-Seluge to make LR-Seluge also ROM-friendly.
There are also some loss-resilient code dissemination schemes such as Adap-
Code [46], Rateless Deluge and ACKless Deluge [43], and SYNAPSE [92], which do
not take security into consideration.
2.8 Summary
This chapter presents the design and evaluation of LR-Seluge, the first loss-resilient
and secure code dissemination scheme for sensor networks. LR-Seluge achieves loss-
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resilience and attack-resilience by seamlessly integrating fixed-rate erasure code and
efficient cryptographic primitives. The performance of LR-Seluge is confirmed by both
theoretical analysis and thorough simulation results.
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Chapter 3
SECURE TOP-k QUERY PROCESSING VIA UNTRUSTED LOCATION-BASED
SERVICE PROVIDERS
3.1 Introduction
The explosive growth of Internet-capable and location-aware mobile devices and the
surge in social network usage are fostering collaborative information generation and
sharing on an unprecedented scale. In particular, IDC believes that total worldwide
smartphone shipments will reach 659.8 million units in 2012 and will grow at a CAGR
of 18.6% until 2016.1 Almost all smartphones have cellular/WiFi Internet access and
can always acquire their precise locations via pre-installed positioning software. Also
owing to the growing popularity of social networks, it is more and more convenient
and motivating for mobile users to share with others their experience with all kinds of
points of interests (POIs) such as bars, restaurants, grocery stores, coffee shops, and
hotels. Meanwhile, it becomes commonplace for people to perform various spatial POI
queries at online location-based service providers (LBSPs) such as Google and Yelp.
As probably the most familiar type of spatial queries, a spatial (or location-based) top-k
query asks for the POIs in a certain region and with the highest k ratings for a given
POI attribute. For example, one may search for the best 10 Italian restaurants with the
highest food ratings within five miles of his current location. This chapter focuses on
spatial top-k queries, and the term “spatial” will be omitted hereafter for brevity.
We observe two essential drawbacks with current top-k query services. First,
individual LBSPs often have very small data sets comprising POI reviews. This would
largely affect the usefulness and eventually hinder the more prevalent use of spatial
top-k query services. Continue with the restaurant example. The data sets at individual
LBSPs may not cover all the Italian restaurants within a search radius. Additionally,
the same restaurant may receive diverse ratings at different LBSPs, so users may get
confused by very different query results from different LBSPs for the same query. A
leading reason for limited data sets at individual LBSPs is that people tend to leave
1http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=233553
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reviews for the same POI at one or at most only a few LBSPs’s websites which they
often visit. Second, LBSPs may modify their data sets by deleting some reviews or
adding fake reviews and return tailored query results in favor of the restaurants which
would like to pay. Even if LBSPs are not malicious, they may return unfaithful query
results under the influence of various attacks such as the Sybil attack [127,128] whereby
the same attacker can submit many fake reviews for the same POI. In either case, top-k
query users may be misled by the query results to make unwise decisions.
A promising solution to the above two issues is to introduce some trusted data
collectors as the central hubs for collecting POI reviews. In particular, data collectors
can offer various incentives such as free coffee coupons for stimulating review sub-
missions and then profit by selling the review data to individual LBSPs. Instead of
submitting POI reviews to individual LBSPs, people (called data contributors) can now
submit them to a few data collectors to earn rewards. The data sets maintained by data
collectors can thus be considered the union of the small data sets currently at individual
LBSPs. Such centralized data collection also makes it much easier and feasible for data
collectors to employ sophisticated defenses such as [127,128] to filter out fake reviews
from malicious entities like Sybil attackers. Data collectors can be either new service
providers or more preferably existing ones with a large user base, such as Google, Ya-
hoo, Facebook, Twitter, and MSN. Many of these service providers have offered open
APIs for exporting selected data from their systems. We postulate that they may act as
location-based data collectors and sellers if sound techniques and business models are
in place.
The above system model is also highly beneficial for LBSPs. In particular, they
no longer need struggle to solicit faithful user reviews, which is often a daunting task es-
pecially for small/medium-scale LBSPs. Instead, they can focus their limited resources
on developing appealing functionalities (such as driving directions and aerial photos)
combined with the high-quality review data purchased from data collectors. The query
results they can provide will be much more trustworthy, which would in turn help them
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attract more and more users. This system model thus can greatly help lower the en-
trance bar for new LBSPs without sufficient funding and thus foster the prosperity of
location-based services and applications.
A main challenge for realizing the appealing system above is how to deal with
untrusted and possibly malicious LBSPs. Specifically, malicious LBSPs may still modify
the data sets from data collectors and provide biased top-k query results in favor of POIs
willing to pay. Even worse, they may falsely claim generating query results based on the
review data from trusted data collectors which they actually did not purchase. Moreover,
non-malicious LBSPs may be compromised to return fake top-k query results.
In this chapter, we propose three novel schemes to tackle the above challenge
for fostering the practical deployment and wide use of the envisioned system. The key
idea of our schemes is that the data collector precomputes and authenticates some
auxiliary information (called authenticated hints) about its data set, which will be sold
along with its data set to LBSPs. To faithfully answer a top-k query, a LBSP need return
the correct top-k POI data records as well as proper authenticity and correctness proofs
constructed from authenticated hints. The authenticity proof allows the query user to
confirm that the query result only consists of authentic data records from the trusted
data collector’s data set, and the correctness proof enables the user to verify that the
returned top-k POIs are the true ones satisfying the query. The first two schemes both
target snapshot top-k queries but differ in how authenticated hints are precomputed
and how authenticity and correctness proofs are constructed and verified as well as
the related communication and computation overhead. The third scheme, built upon
the first scheme, realizes efficient and verifiable moving top-k queries. The efficacy
and efficiency of our schemes are thoroughly analyzed and evaluated through detailed
simulation studies.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the
related work, and Section 3.3 gives the problem formulation. Section 3.4 presents two
schemes for secure snapshot top-k query processing, which are extended for secure
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moving top-k query processing in Section 3.5. All the schemes are then thoroughly
analyzed in Section 3.6 and evaluated via detailed simulations in Section 3.7. This
chapter is finally concluded in Section 3.8.
3.2 Related Work
Our work is most related to data outsourcing [42], for which we can only review repre-
sentative schemes due to space constraints. The framework of data outsourcing was
first introduced in [42], in which a data owner outsources its data to a third-party service
provider who is responsible for answering the data queries from either the data owner
or other users. In general, there are two security concerns in data outsourcing: data
privacy and query integrity [59].
Ensuring data privacy requires the data owner to outsource encrypted data to
the service provider, and efficient techniques are needed to support querying encrypt-
ed data. A bucketization approach was proposed in [41, 45] to enable efficient range
queries over encrypted data. Shi et al. presented novel methods for multi-dimensional
range queries over encrypted data [102]. Some most recent proposals aim at secure
ranked keyword search [9,10] or fine-grained access control [129] over encrypted data.
This line of work is orthogonal to our work, as we focus on publicly accessible location-
based data without need for privacy protection.
Another line of research has been devoted to ensure query integrity, i.e., that a
query result was indeed generated from the outsourced data (the authenticity require-
ment) and contains all the data satisfying the query (the correctness requirement). In
these schemes, the data owner outsources both its data and also its signatures over the
data to the service provider which returns both the query result and a verification object
(VO) computed from the signatures for the querying user to verify query integrity. Many
techniques were proposed for signature and VO generations, such as those [79,83,84]
based on signature chaining and those [59, 119, 123, 124] based on the Merkle hash
tree [72] or its variants. None of these schemes consider spatial top-k queries and thus
are not directly applicable to our intended scenario.
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Secure remote query processing in tiered sensor networks [14, 101, 103, 133,
134] is also loosely related to our work here. These schemes assume that some
master nodes are in charge of storing data from regular sensor nodes and answer-
ing the queries from the remote network owner. Various techniques were proposed
in [14, 101, 103, 134] to ensure data privacy against master nodes and also enable the
network owner to verify range-query integrity. Moreover, Zhang et al. [133] proposed ef-
ficient techniques for the network owner to validate the integrity of top-k queries. These
schemes cannot be adapted to address our problem in this chapter.
3.3 Problem Formulation
In this section, we first introduce our system model and then formulate the problem.
3.3.1 System Model
We assume a distributed system comprising a data collector, data contributors, LBSPs,
and top-k query users. Data contributors are common people who submit POI reviews
to the data collector’s website. The data collector normally need offer some incentives
such as FourSquare’s badges to stimulate review submissions and also employ nec-
essary countermeasures such as [127, 128] to filter out fake reviews from malicious
data contributors. The data collector sells aggregated POI reviews in the form of a
location-based data set to individual LBSPs. Every LBSP operates a website for users
to perform top-k queries over the purchased data set and may add some appealing
functionalities to the query result such as street maps and photos. In addition, although
there might be multiple data collectors with each selling data to a number of LBSPs, we
hereafter focus on one pair of data collector and LBSP for the purpose of this chapter.
The data set is classified according to POI categories such as restaurants, bars,
and coffee shops, and it contains a unique record for every POI in every category. As
a result, POIs falling into multiple categories (e.g., both a restaurant and bar) have one
record for every affiliated category. This chapter focuses on top-k queries involving a
single category, which are most commonly used in practice, and the extension of our
schemes to involve multiple categories is part of our future work. In particular, our
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discussion will focus on one POI category whose total data records form a set D. For
simplicity, we assume that the category has one numerical attribute taking values from
a given range. For instance, if restaurant is the category under consideration, there
may be λ = 4 attributes including food, price, service, and hygiene, with each rated on
a scale of 1 to 10.
The geographic area covered by the data collector is partitioned into M ≥ 1
equally-sized non-overlapping zones. For every zone i, let ni denote the number of
POIs, and POIi,j and Di,j denote the jth POI and its corresponding data record, re-
spectively. It follows that D = ⋃Mi=1Di, Di = ⋃nij=1Di,j , and Di⋂Dj = φ for all i = j.
Also note that Di can be empty for some i ∈ [1,M ], meaning that there is no POI in
zone i that has been reviewed.
To illustrate the content of a data record, assume that the data collector got
reviews about POIi,j from ni,j data contributors. Every review includes a rating on
every attribute and possibly text comments. We also let Ai,j,q denote the rating for
attribute q averaged over ni,j individual ratings. The data record di,j for POIi,j includes
its name, location li,j , {Ai,j,q}λq=1, ni,j reviews, and possibly other information.
3.3.2 Problem Statement
We consider two types of top-k queries in this chapter. A snapshot top-k query includes
the interested POI category, a query region R, and an integer k ≥ 1. As an example,
the POI category and attribute can be restaurant and food, respectively. The query
region can be in multiple formats. For instance, the user can specify a GPS location
or street address along with a search radius, and he may also select multiple zones on
a map provided by the LBSP. An authentic and correct query result should include the
records for k POIs in the specified category of the data collector’s true data set, all of
which are in the query region R, have the attribute-q rating among the highest k, and
are ordered with respect to the attribute-q rating in the descending order. For brevity,
we will refer to the POIs that are both authentic and correct as top-k POIs hereforth. In
contrast, a moving top-k query can be viewed as the continuous version of snapshot
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top-k queries, whereby the user is interested in the top-k POIs in a moving region R
defined with respect to the user’s current location.
We assume that the data collector is trusted, while the LBSP is untrusted. In
particular, the LBSPmay alter the query result in favor of the POIs willing to pay, to which
similar misbehavior has been widely reported in web-search industry. For example, the
LBSP may replace some true top-k POIs with others not among the top k or even not
in the data collector’s data set, and it may also modify some data records by adding
more good reviews and deleting bad ones. In addition, a LBSP good in nature may be
compromised by attackers to forge query results as well.
Our design objective is to enable the user to verify the authenticity and correct-
ness of the query result returned by the LBSP. The query result is considered authentic
if all its k POI records exist in the data collector’s data set and have not been tampered
with, and it is called correct if it contains the true top-k POI records in the query region.
3.4 Secure Snapshot Top-k Query Processing
In this section, we propose two novel schemes for secure snapshot top-k query pro-
cessing via untrusted LBSPs.
3.4.1 Overview: Design Challenge and Basic Idea
The main design challenge is the lack of shared information between the data collector
and top-k query users. On the one hand, the data collector cannot predict the content
of any top-k query from arbitrary users. On the other hand, users do not know the data
collector’s data set and thus have difficulty in verifying the authenticity and correctness
of query results. The only entity knowing both the query content and the data set is the
untrusted LBSP. A seemingly workable solution is to let the data collector attach a digital
signature to every POI record for the receiving user to verify. This solution, however,
can only enable authenticity verification, and incorrect query results comprising only
authentic POI records can still escape detection.
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Figure 3.1: An example of constructing the Merkle hash tree over {hi,1}8i=1.
The above challenge motivates the key idea underlying our two schemes. In
particular, we let the data collector precomputes and authenticates some auxiliary in-
formation (called authenticated hints) about its data set, which will be sold along with
its data set to LBSPs. To faithfully answer a top-k query, the LBSP need return the
true top-k POI data records as well as proper authenticity and correctness proofs con-
structed from authenticated hints. As the names suggest, authenticity and correctness
proofs enable the user to verify the authenticity and correctness of the query result,
respectively. Our two schemes differ in how authenticated hints are precomputed and
how authenticity and correctness proofs are constructed and verified.
In the remainder of this section, we illustrate our two schemes which both com-
prises three phases and differ in operation details. In the data-preprocessing phase,
the data collector uses cryptographic methods to create authenticated hints over its da-
ta set. In the subsequent query-processing phase, the LBSP answers a top-k query
by returning the query result as well as the authenticity and correctness proofs to the
query user. In the final verification phase, the user verifies authenticity and correctness
proofs. For ease of presentation, we shall temporarily assume that no two POIs have
the same rating for any attribute q ∈ [1, λ], which implies that there is one and only
one correct result for any top-k query. We will also temporarily assume that there are
always at least k POIs in the query region so that the query result contains exactly k
POI records for arbitrary k. These two assumptions are relaxed in Section 3.4.4.
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3.4.2 Scheme 1
In Scheme 1, authenticated hints are created by chaining ordered POIs in every zone
via cryptographic hash functions and then tieing the POIs in different zones via a Merkle
hash tree [71]. The details about constructing and using authenticated hints are as
follows.
3.4.2.1 Data Preprocessing
The data collector preprocesses its data set D = ⋃Mi=1Di before selling it to LBSP-
s, where M denotes the total number of zones. Recall that Di =
⋃ni
j=1Di,j , where
Di,j denotes the record of POIi,j and includes its name, location li,j , received ratings
{Ai,j,q}λq=1 for q attributes, individual reviews, and some other information. The data
collector performs the following operations for every attribute q ∈ [1, λ].
First, for each i ∈ [1,M ], the data collector sorts Di according to the attribute-q
rating to generate an orderer list D′i = 〈D′i,1,D′i,2, . . . ,D′i,ni〉 such that A′i,1,q > A′i,2,q >
· · · > A′i,ni,q. It then computes an index for every D′i,j ∈ D′i as
φi,j = 〈l′i,j, A′i,j,q,H(D′i,j)〉 , (3.1)
where l′i,j denotes the location of D
′
i,j , and H(·) denotes a cryptographic hash func-
tion. Note that φi,j contains sufficient information for a user to determine whether D′i,j
satisfies a top-k query, which will be further illustrated shortly.
Second, the data collector chains {φi,j}nij=1 using cryptographic hash functions
to enable authenticity verifications of query results. In particular, recall that every at-
tribute rating is on a given range [Amin, Amax], say [1, 10]. Let χ denote a publicly
known number smaller than Amin. The data collector recursively computes a sequence
of hash values as follows,
hi,j =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
H(χ) j = ni + 1,
H(hi,j+1||φi,j) 1 ≤ j ≤ ni,
(3.2)
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where || denotes concatenation and ni ≥ 0. Note that if ni = 0, i.e., there is no POI in
zone i, we let φi,1 = hi,1 = H(χ).
Finally, the data collector builds a Merkle hash tree over {hi,1}Mi=1 to enable
efficient authentication of query results. More specifically, assuming that M = 2d for
some integer d, the data collector builds a binary tree of depth d, in which every leaf
node corresponds to one of {hi,1}Mi=1, and every non-leaf node is computed as the
hash of the concatenation of its immediate children nodes. We also define an auxiliary
set Ti as the set of non-leaf nodes required along with any leaf node hi,1 to compute
the Merkle root hash. An example for M = 8 is shown in Fig. 3.1, in which h1−2 =
H(h1,1||h2,1), h3−4 = H(h3,1||h4,1), h5−6 = H(h5,1||h6,1), h7−8 = H(h7,1||h8,1),
h1−4 = H(h1−2||h3−4), h5−8 = H(h5−6||h7−8), and h1−8 = H(h1−4||h5−8). If h3,1
is the given leaf node, we then have T3 = {h4,1, h1−2, h5−8}, as the root h1−8 =
H(H(h1−2||H(h3,1||h4,1))||h5−8). Note that if M is not a power of two, some dum-
my leaf nodes need be introduced for constructing the Merkle hash tree.
Since there are totally λ attributes, every POIi,j has λ indexes, based on which
the data collector builds a separate Merkle hash tree for every attribute and signs ev-
ery root using its private key. In addition, the data collector need perform the above
operations separately for the data set of every POI category.
3.4.2.2 Query Processing
The LBSP purchases the data sets of interested POI categories from the data collector.
For every POI category selected by the LBSP, the data collector returns the original
data set D, the signatures on λ Merkle root hashes, and all the intermediate results
for constructing the Merkle hash tree. Alternatively, the data collector can just return
the first two pieces of information and let the LBSP itself perform a one-time process to
derive the third piece in the same way as the date collector.
Now we illustrate the processing of a snapshot top-k query, including the de-
sired POI category, the interested attribute q ∈ [1, λ] for ranking POIs, the query region
R, and k. We denote the k POIs in R with the highest k attribute-q ratings by kPOI, a-
43
mong which the lowest attribute-q rating is denoted by γ. In addition, we call each zone
either completely or partially covered by the query region a candidate zone. A correct
and authentic query result needs to satisfy two conditions. The correctness condition
requires the query result to contain at least the following information: (1) the complete
data records for kPOI; (2) the data indexes (much shorter than data records) for all the
POIs in each candidate zone but not in R whose attribute-q rating is larger than γ; and
(3) some additional information to prove that the query result includes either the data
record or index of every POI in every candidate zone with attribute-q rating not small-
er than γ. In addition, the authenticity condition requires that the query result include
the auxiliary set for every candidate zone for the calculation and verification of the qth
Merkle root hash.
To satisfy the correctness condition, the LBSP first searches {D′i}Mi=1 to locate
kPOI and then determine the lowest attribute-q rating γ. Next, the LBSP determines the
set of candidate zones, denoted by I ⊆ {1, . . . ,M}. Let τi the number of POIs in zone
i with attribute-q ratings higher than γ. Apparently, we have ni ≥ τi,∀i ∈ I . It follows
that
∑
i∈I τi ≥ k, which holds because any candidate zone that partially overlaps with
R may have some POIs outsideR but with attribute-q ratings higher than γ. We further
define
Xi,j =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
D′i,j if l
′
i,j ∈ R,
φi,j o.w.,
(3.3)
for all i ∈ I, j ∈ [1, ni]. In other words, Xi,j equals D′i,j if the POI is in R and a shorter
index otherwise. The LBSP returns the following information Si for each candidate zone
i ∈ I in the query result to enable correctness verification.
• Case 1: if ni = 0, Si = 〈i〉.
• Case 2: if ni = 1, Si = 〈i,Xi,1〉.
• Case 3: if ni ≥ 2 and τi = 0, Si = 〈i, φi,1, hi,2〉.
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• Case 4: if ni ≥ 2 and ni > τi ≥ 1,
Si = 〈i,Xi,1, . . . ,Xi,τi , φi,τi+1, hi,τi+2〉 .
• Case 5: if ni = τi ≥ 2, Si = 〈i,Xi,1, . . . ,Xi,τi〉.
Note that the last two fields in both Case 3 and Case 4 correspond to the POI in zone
i with the largest attribute-q rating smaller than γ. Since the POIs in zone i have been
ranked and chained together under cryptographic hash functions during data prepro-
cessing, the inclusion of such fields is necessary for proving that every POI in every can-
didate zone whose attribute-q rating not smaller than γ has been covered in the query
result in the form of either a data record or index. Such information has been implicitly
covered in the other three cases as well. In addition, the LBSP returns T = ⋃i∈I Ti
and the data collector’s signature on the qth Merkle root hash to enable authenticity
verification.
3.4.2.3 Query-Result Verification
Now we discuss how the user verifies the authenticity and correctness of the query re-
sult, which can be done via a small plug-in developed by the data collector and installed
on his web browser. The security analysis of Scheme 1 is postponed to Section 3.6.
For authenticity verification, the user checks if every piece of information in
the query result can lead to the same Merkle root hash matching the data collector’s
signature. Specifically, the user first determines which of the above five cases Si (∀i ∈
I) belongs to based on its message format. He then derives the indexes for all related
POIs in {Si}i∈I . Note that the indexes of the POIs outside R are explicitly included in
{Si}i∈I , while those of the POIs in R can be computed from their corresponding data
records in {Si}i∈I . Subsequently, the user computes hi,1 for each i ∈ I according to
Eq. (3.2). Since the auxiliary information Ti for hi,1 is also in the query result, the user
further uses hi,1 and Ti to compute the Merkle root hash. If the query result is authentic,
the user can derive the same root hash for each i ∈ I , in which case he further verifies
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Query region
POI returned Index returned POI need not be returned 
Index returned in Scheme 1, not returned in Scheme 2
Figure 3.2: An example for Scheme 1, where M = 4, k = 4, and the dots in zone i
correspond to POI records D′i,1 to D
′
i,4 from top to bottom.
whether the data collector’s signature in the query result is a valid signature on the
derived root hash. If so, he considers the query result authentic.
To perform correctness verification, the user first checks if zones I encloses
the query region R. If so, he proceeds with the following verifications in accordance
with the aforementioned correctness condition used in query processing.
1. There are exactly k data records in the query result with POI locations all in R,
which correspond to the top-k POIs (i.e., kPOI) in R. If so, the user locates the
lowest attribute-k rating γ.
2. None of the POIs for which the data indexes (instead of data records) are returned
satisfy the query. In particular, for each index φi,j (i ∈ I), at least one of the
following conditions does not hold.
• φi,j contains a location l′i,j ∈ R.
• φi,j contains an attribute−q rating A′i,j,q > γ.
In addition, since the query result is authentic, it must include either the data record or
index for every POI in every candidate zone whose attribute-q rating is not smaller than
γ. Therefore, the user considers the query result correct if the above two verifications
succeed.
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3.4.2.4 An Example
To better illustrate Scheme 1, we show an example in Fig. 3.2 with M = 4 zones,
where we assume one-dimensional POI locations for simplicity, i.e., that all POIs are
distributed on a straight line, and all the shown POIs have been ordered according
to the attribute-q rating (q is omitted from subscripts for brevity). Suppose that the
user queries the top-4 POIs in the query region that completely covers zone 2 and
partially overlaps with zones 1 and 3. It follows that I = {1, 2, 3}, and τ1, τ2, τ3 are
3, 2, 0, respectively. For zone 1, there is one POI outside the query region with a
rating higher than γ, so we have S1 = 〈1,D′1,1, φ1,2,D′1,3, φ1,4, h1,5〉. Similarly, we
have S2 = 〈2,D′2,1,D′2,2, φ2,3, h2,4〉 for zone 2 and S3 = 〈3, φ3,1, h3,2〉 for zone 3. The
query result includes S1, S2, S3, the auxiliary indexes {Ti}3i=1, and the data collector’s
signature on h1−4 which is the root of the Merkle hash tree with depth d = 2. Based
on S1, S2, and S3, the user can derive h1,1, h2,1, and h3,1, respectively. He can further
compute three Merkle root hashes using h1,1 and T1, h2,1 and T2, and h3,1 and T3,
respectively. If the three root hashes are equal and match the data collector’s signature,
the user considers the query result authentic. If the query result can also pass the
aforementioned three correctness verifications, the user considers the query result both
authentic and correct.
3.4.3 Scheme 2
Scheme 1 requires the LBSP to return some information for every candidate zone even
if it has no top-k POI satisfying the query. This may incur significant communication
overhead for a large query region. Given this observation, we propose Scheme 2 which
works by embedding some information among nearby zones to dramatically reduce the
amount of information returned to the user.
The basic idea of Scheme 2 can be better illustrated using a simple example.
Assume that zones i and j are two candidate zones. But neither contains a top-k POI.
Under Scheme 1, the LBSP need return both 〈i, φi,1, hi,2,Ti〉 and 〈j, φj,1, hj,2,Tj〉 to
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prove that no POI in zones i or j satisfies the query. In contrast, if we could consider
zones i and j as one virtual zone, the LBSP only need return 〈x, φx,1, hx,2,Tx〉, where
x = i if the largest attribute-q rating in zone j is smaller than that in zone i, and x = j
otherwise. The amount of information returned to the user can thus be reduced.
3.4.3.1 Data Preprocessing
To implement the basic idea exemplified above, the data collector binds to every POI
data index some additional information about the POIs in adjacent zones. In particular,
the data collector partitions the original M zones into non-overlapping macro zones,
each consisting of m nearby zones, where m is a public system parameter. Assuming
thatM is divisible by m, we let Me denote the set of zones composing the macro zone
e ∈ [1,M/m].
Consider a macro zone e as an example. As in Scheme 1, the data collector
first sorts Di for every zone i ∈ Me according to the descending order of the attribute-
q rating to generate an orderer list D′i = 〈D′i,1,D′i,2, . . . ,D′i,ni〉. Let A′j,0,q = χ and
A′j,ni+1,q = χ denote two public values larger than the largest possible attribute rating
and smaller than the smallest possible attribute rating, respectively. The data collector
further generates {Ii,j}ni+1j=1 , where Ii,j = {〈s,A′s,1,q〉|s ∈ Me \ {i}} with A′s,1,q ∈
(A′i,j−1,q, A
′
i,j,q). In other words, Ii,j comprises all the other zones in Me \ {i} and
their largest attribute-q ratings in (A′i,j−1,q, A
′
i,j,q). Apparently, we have |
⋃ni+1
j=1 Ii,j| =
|Me \ {i}| = m− 1. The data collector then computes an index as
φi,j = 〈li,j,Ii,j, A′i,j,q,H(Ii,j||D′i,j)〉 (3.4)
for all j ∈ [1, ni] and chains {φi,j}nij=1 according to Eq. (3.2). Finally, it builds a Merkle
hash tree over {hi,1}Mi=1 and signs the root as in Scheme 1. The essential difference
in data preprocessing between Schemes 1 and 2 thus lies in the construction of POI
indexes.
As in Scheme 1, the data collector builds a separate Merkle hash tree for every
attribute q ∈ [1, λ] in every POI category and signs every Merkle root hash using its
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private key.
3.4.3.2 Query Processing
The LBSP purchases the original data set D, the signatures on λ Merkle root hashes,
and all the intermediate results for constructing the Merkle hash tree of every interested
POI category from the data collector.
After receiving a top-k query, the LBSP first determines the top-k POIs (i.e.,
kPOI) in the query region R and also the set of candidate zones I ⊆ {1, . . . ,M}. The
LBSP then determines the lowest attribute-q rating γ in kPOI and τi as the number of
POIs in zone i ∈ I with attribute-q ratings not smaller than γ. Next, the LBSP defines
Yi,j =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
D′i,j||Ii,j if l′i,j ∈ R,
φi,j o.w.,
(3.5)
for all i ∈ I, j ∈ [1, ni], where Ii,j is as defined in the data-preprocessing phase. The
query result includes the following information Si for each zone i ∈ I with τi > 0.
• Case 1: if ni = τi ≥ 1, Si = 〈i, Yi,1, . . . , Yi,τi〉.
• Case 2: if ni ≥ 2 and ni > τi > 0,
Si = 〈i, Yi,1, . . . , Yi,τi , φi,τi+1, hi,τi+2〉 .
Moreover, let M′e = {i|i ∈ Me
⋂ I, τi < ni, ni = 0} denote the zones with at least
one attribute-q rating smaller than γ in every macro zone e ∈ [1,M/m]. There are two
cases.
• Case 3: if there is zone i ∈ M′e, τi > 0, nothing need be done because this case
has been covered by Case 2.
• Case 4: otherwise, we have τi = 0,∀i ∈ M′e. Assuming that A′j,1,q is the highest
attribute-q rating in M′e, the LBSP also adds Sj = 〈j, φj,1, hj,2〉 to the query
result.
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Furthermore, for any candidate macro zone e, if there is no POI in zones Me
⋂I with
attribute-q rating not smaller than γ, we must have ni = τi for all i ∈ Me
⋂ I , in which
case the LBSP is required to return Si = 〈i〉 for each i ∈ Me
⋂I if ni = τi = 0
(Case 5). Note that the case for ni = τi > 0 has been covered by Case 1 above.
As in Scheme 1, the LBSP additionally returns the data collector’s signature
on the qth Merkle root hash and T = ⋃i∈I′ Ti, where I ′ ⊆ I is the set of zones in
which there at least one POI data record or index has been included in the query result.
In contrast to Scheme 1, 〈i, φi,1, hi,2,Ti〉 need not be returned for any zone i ∈ I
when τi = 0 in most cases due to the macro-zone idea, which can lead to much lower
computation and communication overhead in practice.
3.4.3.3 Query-Result Verification
After receiving the query result, the user first verifies its authenticity as in Scheme 1.
If the authentication succeeds, he proceeds with correctness verification by checking
whether the query result contains some information for every candidate macro zone
e ∈ [1,M/m] that overlaps with the query region R. This verification should succeed
for a correct query result according to the query-processing process. If so, the user
further checks that the query result satisfies the same two conditions as in Scheme 1
(see Section 3.4.3.3) and then determines the lowest attribute-q rating γ among kPOI.
Subsequently, based on the information format Si for every zone i in the query result,
the user determines τi (i.e., the number of POIs in zone i with attribute-q ratings ≥ γ)
and also the relationship between τi and ni (the total number of POIs in zone i).
Unlike Scheme 1, Scheme 2 does not require some information to be returned
for every candidate zone i ∈ I overlapping with the query regionR if τi = 0. The LBSP
may exploit this situation and return no information for zone i even if τi > 0. To detect
this possible attack, the user conducts the following verifications for every candidate
macro zone e in accordance with the five cases in query processing.
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• If there is any zone i ∈ I⋂Me with 0 < τi < ni (i.e., Case 2 in query pro-
cessing), the user checks whether the query result contains a valid Sx field corre-
sponding to Case 1 or 2 in query processing for every zone x ∈ I⋂Me⋂(⋃τi+1j=1 Ii,j)
that satisfies A′x,1,q ≥ γ > A′i,τi+1,q. If not, the user considers the query result
incorrect. The reason is that the pair 〈x,A′x,1,q〉 should have been inserted by the
data collector in one of {Ii,j}τi+1j=1 if x ∈ Me and A′x,1,q > A′i,τi+1,q. If x is also in
I and A′x,1,q ≥ γ, we have τx ≥ 1, so the LBSP should have returned a valid Sx
for zone x corresponding to Case 1 or 2.
• If such zone i does not exist, the user checks if the query result contains Sj =
〈j, φj,1, hj,2〉 = 〈j, lj,1,Ij,1, A′j,1,q,H(Ij,1||D′j,1)〉 with A′j,1,q < γ for j ∈ I
⋂Me,
which corresponds to the case of τi = 0 for all i ∈ M′e = {i|i ∈ Me
⋂ I, τi <
ni, ni = 0}. If so, for every zone x ∈ I
⋂Me⋂ Ij,1 with A′x,1,q ≥ γ > A′j,1,q,
the user checks whether the query result contains a valid Sx corresponding to
Case 1 or 2 in query processing. If not, the query result is considered incor-
rect. Note that this verification implicitly ensures the compliance with Case 4 in
query processing, i.e., that the LBSP only returns the information for the highest
attribute-q rating in M′e.
• If such zone j does not exist either, it must be true that ni = τi for all i ∈ I
⋂Me
and that there is no attribute-q rating in zones I⋂Me smaller than γ. The user
verifies this by checking if ni = 0 or ni = τi > 0 for each zone i ∈ I
⋂Me
according to the corresponding field Sx. If not, the user considers the query result
incorrect.
If the query result pass all the above verifications, the user considers it both authentic
and correct.
3.4.3.4 An Example
We continue with the example in Fig. 3.2, where we assume that zones 1 to 3 compose
a macro zone. Unlike in Scheme 1, the LBSP need not return any information for
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zone 3, which has been embedded into the query result along with the information from
zones 1 and 2. More specifically, we can see that the highest POI rating A′3,1 in zone 3
satisfies A′1,3 > A′3,1 > A′1,4 and A′2,2 > A′3,1 > A′2,3. Therefore, 〈3, A′3,1〉 must have
been embedded into I1,4 and also I2,3, so there is no need to include 〈3, A′3,1,T3〉 in
the query result. After verifying the query result, the user can find that no POI in zone 3
has a rating higher than γ.
3.4.4 Discussion
Thus far we have assumed that there are at least k POIs in the query region and that
no POIs have the same rating for any attribute. This section discusses the impact on
our schemes if these assumptions do not hold.
3.4.4.1 Insufficient POIs in the Query Region
If there are less than k POIs in the query region R, any POI there satisfies the top-k
query. Therefore, the LBSP need prove to the user that the query result contains every
POI record in R by returning all the POIs in candidate zones I . Take Scheme 1 as an
example. On receiving a top-k query, the LBSP includes Si = 〈i,Xi,1, . . . ,Xi,ni〉 for
each zone i ∈ I in the query result, which the user can verify in the same way. Similar
modifications can be made to Scheme 2 and are omitted here.
The impact of such scenarios on our schemes is limited. Consider Scheme 1
as an example, Xi,j equals the index φi,j for POIi,j outside R and the record D′i,j for
POIi,j in R according to Eq. (3.3), while an index contains much fewer bits than a data
record. So the additional communication overhead incurred by returning the indexes of
all the POIs in I but not inR is relatively very low. Moreover, such cases can be largely
avoided in practice by putting an upper limit on k and/or a lower limit on the query-region
size. For example, users are not allowed to submit a top-k query with k exceeding a
certain threshold and/or too small a query region.
3.4.4.2 Multiple POIs with Equal Attribute Ratings
Due to the limited rating range, multiple POIs may have an equal rating for the same
attribute. The tie can be easily broken by considering additional information for compar-
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ing POIs. For example, we can add the time of the last review into the index φi,j of any
POIi,j in Schemes 1 and 2. In case there are multiple POIs with equal ratings, the one
with the most recent review is preferred. The impact of such scenarios on our schemes
is thus negligible.
3.5 Secure Moving Top-k Query Processing
In this section, we propose a scheme to realize secure moving top-k query processing.
3.5.1 Basics of Moving Top-k Queries
A moving top-k query asks for the top-k POIs in a moving query regionR. For example,
a user may want to find the k gas stations with the lowest gas price within 5 miles radius
when driving a car. In this example,R is a changing circle of radius 5 miles centered at
the user’s current location.
One may think about securely processing a moving top-k query as a sequence
of snapshot top-k queries. In particular, the mobile user submits a snapshot top-k query
at a sufficiently high frequency which can be processed by the LBSP using Scheme 1
or 2. Since the query results for consecutive snapshot top-k queries may largely over-
lap, this naive solution may incur unnecessary communication and computation over-
head. This observation motivates us to develop a more efficient solution to moving
top-k queries.
3.5.2 Scheme 3
Our basic idea is to let the LBSP process consecutive snapshot top-k queries involved
in a moving top-k query as a whole and only return a query result if there is any update
in the top-k POIs satisfying the query. An update in the top-k POIs may occur when a
current top-k POI is no longer in the moving query region or when a new POI appears in
the moving query region, which has an attribute-q rating higher than the lowest among
the current top-k POIs. The user can directly tell when the first situation occurs based
on the current top-k POIs he knows, in which case he can issue a new snapshot top-k
query for the current query region. The user, however, cannot tell when the second
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situation will occur. Without a sound defense in place, the LBSP can choose not to
inform the user about updated top-k POIs in the second situation.
Scheme 3 aims at the second situation discussed above and can be built upon
either Scheme 1 or Scheme 2. Due to space constraints, we focus on Scheme 1 and
assume that the data set has been preprocessed by the data collector accordingly, and
the same design principles apply when Scheme 2 is chosen instead. Without loss of
generality, we assume that a user issues a moving top-k query for attribute q during
time period [0, T ], where T may be unknown in advance. Since a moving top-k query
involves a sequence of snapshot top-k queries, we denote the ath snapshot top-k query
by Qa and the corresponding query region Ra. We also let kPOIa be the top-k POIs
in Ra and γa the lowest attribute-q rating among kPOIa. In what follows, we detail the
additional operations in Scheme 3 in contrast to Scheme 1, including query scheduling,
query processing, and query-result verification.
3.5.2.1 Query Scheduling
To realize a moving top-k query, the user issues a sequence of snapshot top-k queries
according to a query schedule. In particular, the user issues the ath snapshot top-k
query (i.e., Qa) at time
ta =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if a = 1,
min(ta−1 +t, tu, T ) o.w. ,
(3.6)
wheret is his personal parameter determining the lowest frequency at which snapshot
queries are issued, and tu denotes the time when the first POI in the current top-k POIs
moves out of the query region. To be more clear, after receiving kPOIa from the LBSP
in response to Qa, the user sets a timer of length t. Then he issues Qa+1 when
the timer fires or when the first POI in kPOIa is no longer in his moving query region,
whichever comes first.
As before, Qa includes the interested POI category, the interested attribute q,
the current query regionRa, and an integer k ≥ 1. To facilitate query processing at the
LBSP, it also includes both an integer id uniquely identifying this moving top-k query
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Figure 3.3: An example of two consecutive snapshot top-k queries.
and a one-bit flag indicating whether Qa is the last snapshot query for this moving top-k
query.
3.5.2.2 Query Processing
Assume that the LBSP has purchased the data set from the data collector as in under
Scheme 1. It processes the sequence of snapshot top-k queries of the same moving
top-k query as follows.
We first define a special region to ease our subsequent illustration. Consider
two consecutive snapshot top-k queriesQa andQa+1 with query regionsRa andRa+1,
respectively. Since the user’s query region R is always defined with regard to his cur-
rent location, we have R = Ra at time ta and R = Ra+1 at time ta+1. We define
the progression region, denoted by Pa, as the area in Ra+1 but not in Ra. Consider
Fig. 3.3 as an example where the user issues two consecutive snapshot top-k queries
at locations X and Y with query regions R1 and R2, respectively. The progression
region P1 is the area formed by arcs AD and ACFD.
On receiving query Q1, the LBSP locates kPOI1 in the query region R1 and
then returns a complete query result constructed as in Scheme 1. In addition, the LBSP
records id, R1, and kPOI1 to facilitate the processing of subsequent snapshot top-k
queries with the same moving top-k identifier id. Then it processes any subsequent
query Qb (b > a) as follows. Without loss of generality, assume that the last complete
query result the LBSP returned is in response to Qa (a ≥ 1), which contains kPOIa in
55
Ra. In other words, we assume that the top-k POIs {kPOIa}b−1i=a in the query regions
{Ri}b−1i=a are all equal to kPOIa.
First, the LBSP checks if a complete query result containing the top-k POIs (i.e.,
kPOIb) in the current query region Rb need be returned by checking the following two
conditions.
• kPOIb have different POIs from kPOIa.
• The one-bit flag in Qb is set, meaning that it is the last snapshot query for the
current moving top-k query identified by the same id.
If neither condition holds, the LBSP returns a short ACK containing a predefined flag to
the user, which means that the previously returned top-k POIs in kPOIa remain valid in
the current query region Rb. Otherwise, the LBSP constructs a complete query result
as follows.
First, the LBSP locates the top-k POIs (i.e., kPOIb) in the query region Rb
whose attribute-q ratings are among the highest k. Second, the LBSP retrieves the
recorded query regions {Rx}bx=a based on their same moving top-k identifier id, based
on which to compute the progressive regions {Px}b−1x=a. Next, the LBSP computes a ver-
ification region as Va→b =
⋃b−1
x=aPx whereby to find the set of zones either completely
or partially covered by Rb
⋃
Va→b, denoted by Ia→b.
Let γa and γb be the lowest attribute-q rating among kPOIa and kPOIb, respec-
tively. For each zone i ∈ Ia→b, we define
τi =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
τb,i if zone i only overlaps with Rb,
τa,i if zone i only overlaps with Va→b,
max(τa,i, τb,i) if zone i overlaps with both Rb and Va→b ,
where τa,i and τb,i are the number of POIs in zone i with the attribute-q rating ≥ γa or
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γb, respectively. We further define
Zi,j =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
D′i,j if l
′
i,j ∈ Rb and A′i,j,q ≥ γb,
φi,j otherwise ,
which means that the LBSP only needs to return a much shorter index instead of the
complete record for any POI not in the query regionRb or not among the top-k. Similar
as in Scheme 1, the LBSP finally returns the following information Si for each zone
i ∈ Ia→b as part of the query result.
• Case 1: if ni = 0, Si = 〈i〉.
• Case 2: if ni = 1, Si = 〈i, Zi,1〉.
• Case 3: if ni ≥ 2 and τi = 0, Si = 〈i, φi,1, hi,2〉.
• Case 4: if ni ≥ 2 and ni > τi ≥ 1,
Si = 〈i, Zi,1, . . . , Zi,τi , φi,τi+1, hi,τi+2〉 .
• Case 5: if ni = τi ≥ 2, Si = 〈i, Zi,1, . . . , Zi,τi〉.
In addition, the LBSP returns T = ⋃i∈Ia→b Ti and the data collector’s signature
on the qth Merkle root hash.
3.5.2.3 Query-Result Verification
For every snapshot top-k queryQb of the same moving top-k query, the LBSP (if benign)
should return a complete query result if b = 1 or there has been any change in the top-k
POIs, or return an ACK if b > 1 and the previously returned top-k POIs are still valid.
Accordingly, there are three cases for the user to verify the query result in response
to Qb. First, if the user receives an ACK when Qb is the final snapshot query, he can
immediately tell that the result is incorrect. Second, if receiving an ACK when Qb is
not the final snapshot query, he marked this query result unverified and waits for the
next complete query result. Third, if receiving a complete query result for Qb (no matter
whether Qb is the final query), he verifies it as follows.
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First, the user checks if the query result is authentic as in Scheme 1. If so,
the user derives the set of zones Ia→b from the POI information returned in the query
result and checks if zones Ia→b encloses the region Rb
⋃
Va→b. If so, he locates the
lowest attribute-q rating γb in the query result whereby to check whether all the following
conditions hold.
1. There are exactly k POI records in the query result.
2. Every returned POI record is in Rb.
3. None of the POIs for which the indexes are returned satisfy the query. In par-
ticular, for each index φi,j ,∀i ∈ Ia→b, at least one following condition does not
hold.
• φi,j contains a location l′i,j ∈ Rb.
• φi,j contains an attribute rating A′i,j,q ≥ γb.
If so, the top-k POI records are correct.
Assume that the last complete query result the user verified is for Qa and con-
tains kPOIa in the region Ra and that b > a + 1. The user should have accumulated
b−a−1 unverified query results for queries {Qx}b−1x=a+1 and can verify their correctness
by checking whether the LBSP should have returned a complete query result instead
of an ACK for each of them instead. Let γa again denote the lowest attribute-q rating
in kPOIa and Sa→b =
⋃b−2
j=aPj denote the suspicion region. If all the unverified query
results are correct, there should not be any POI in Sa→b with attribute-q rating higher
than γa. According to the query-processing process, the LBSP should have returned
one or multiple data indices for every zone i that overlaps with Sa→b; otherwise, the
query result for Qb would not have passed the verification. The user thus proceeds to
check whether at least one following condition does not hold for any such index, say
φi,j .
• φi,j contains a location l′i,j ∈ Sa→b.
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• φi,j contains an attribute rating A′i,j,q > γa.
If so, all the unverified query results are marked verified; otherwise, the LBSP has
misbehaved.
3.6 Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze Schemes 1∼3 with regard to their correctness in detecting
inauthentic and/or incorrect query results and the related communication/computation
overhead. To make the quantitative analysis tractable, we make the following assump-
tions.
• There are n > k POIs uniformly distributed in each zone, i.e., ni = n,∀i ∈ [1,M ],
where M = 2d for an integer d > 1.
• All attribute ratings are i.i.d. random variables uniformly distributed in the range
[0, 1] after proper normalization.
• The query-region size is δ times of the zone size.
3.6.1 Analysis of Scheme 1
The following theorem is for the correctness of Scheme 1.
Theorem 3.6.1. Scheme 1 can detect any incorrect and/or inauthentic query result from
a misbehaving LBSP.
We give the proof in Appendix C.
The main extra computation overhead incurred by Scheme 1 on top-k query
processing involves hash computations and signature generations/verifications. Con-
sider the data collector first. For every zone i ∈ [1,M ] and every attribute, the data
collector performs n hash computations to generate the indexes {φi,j}nj=1 and n hash
computations to derive hi,1, which leads to totally 2Mn hash computations. In addition,
the data collector needs M − 1 hash computations to construct the Merkle hash tree
of every attribute and one signature generation for the root hash. Since there are q
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POI attributes, the total computation overhead per POI category at the data collector
is λ(2Mn +M − 1) hash computations and λ signatures. Moreover, the computation
overhead at the LBSP is negligible because the LBSP need not perform any hash or
signature operations for query processing.2 Finally, we consider the computation over-
head at the user. For every query result, the user needs one signature verification for
the Merkle root hash and also a certain number of hash computations given below.
Theorem 3.6.2. The expected number of hash computations the user performs to verify
the query result under Scheme 1 is given by
E[Nhash,1] = k + |I| · (k + δ)n + 1
δn + 1
+
d−1∑
j=1
2j−1(1− (1− 2−(j−1))|I|) . (3.7)
We give the proof in Appendix D.
Now we analyze the communication overhead associated with transmitting the
necessary information for authenticity and correctness proofs from the data collector to
the LBSP. Let Lh, Lloc, Lr, and Lsig denote the bit-lengths of a hash value H(·), a POI
location, an attribute rating, and the data collector’s signature, respectively. For each of
λ POI attributes, the data collector sends n indexes of Lloc + Lr + Lh bits for each of
M zones as well as a Merkle hash tree of (M − 1)Lh bits. The extra communication
overhead in bits per POI category Scheme 1 incurs between the data collector and
LBSP is thus
S1 = λ(Mn(Lloc + Lr + Lh) + (M − 1)Lh + Lsig). (3.8)
We also have the following theorem about the extra communication overhead associ-
ated with sending authenticity and correctness proofs of a top-k query result from the
LBSP to the user.
2Here we ignore the LBSP’s database lookup overhead which exists with or without our scheme.
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Theorem 3.6.3. The additional communication overhead between the LBSP and the
user incurred by Scheme 1 is given by
E[T1] = (|I| · (k + δ)n + 1
δn + 1
− k)(Lloc + Lr + Lh) + |I| · d
+
d−1∑
j=1
2j(1− (1− 2−j)|I|)Lh + Lsig ,
(3.9)
We give the proof in Appendix E.
3.6.2 Analysis of Scheme 2
The following theorem is for the correctness of Scheme 2.
Theorem 3.6.4. Scheme 2 can detect any incorrect and/or inauthentic query result from
a misbehaving LBSP.
We give the proof in Appendix F.
Scheme 2 incurs the same computation overhead to the data collector and
LBSP as Scheme 1, which has been analyzed before. To verify the authenticity and
correctness of a top-k query result, the user performs one signature verification on the
Merkle root hash and also a certain number of hash computations given in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.6.5. The expected number of hash computations the user performs to verify
the query result under Scheme 2 is given by
E[Nhash,2] = |I|μ1 +
d−1∑
j=1
2j−1(1− (1− 2−(j−1))|I|(1−μn2 )) , (3.10)
where μ1 = (n− nμ2 + 1− μn2 ) and μ2 = δn−k+1δn+1 .
We give the proof in Appendix G.
Now we analyze the communication overhead incurred by Scheme 2. In Scheme 2,
every zone belongs to a macro zone of m zones. For every zone i in a macro zone
Me, the set {j,A′j,1,q}j∈Me\{i} need be transmitted along with both POI records and
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indexes. Since a zone ID is of log2M = d bits, Scheme 2 requires the data collector to
additionally transmit 2(m − 1)(d + Lr) bits for attribute q in contrast to Scheme 1. The
extra communication overhead per POI category Scheme 2 incurs between the data
collector and LBSP is thus
S2 = S1 + 2(m− 1)λ(d + Lr) , (3.11)
where S1 is given in Eq. (3.8). We also have the following theorem about the communi-
cation overhead for sending authenticity and correctness proofs of a query result from
the LBSP to the user.
Theorem 3.6.6. Assuming that the query region comprises mˇ zones I fully contained
in a macro zone Me with m zones. The expected additional communication overhead
Scheme 2 incurs between the LBSP and user is bounded as follows,
T2 ≤ mˇ(1− μn)d+ mˇ(n− nμ+ 1− μn)(Lloc + Lr + Lh)
+ (mˇ(1− μn) +
d−1∑
j=1
2j(1− (1− 2−j)mˇ(1−μn)))Lh
+ mˇ(1− μn)(m− mˇ)(1 − (n− ν
n+ 1
)n)(d+ Lr)
+ g(g − 1)(d + Lr) + Lsig ,
(3.12)
where μ = (mˇn− k + 1)/(mˇn+ 1), ν = n(1− μ)/(1 − μn), and g = min(k, mˇ).
We give the proof in Appendix H. We have not been able to obtain a close-form
solution for the more general case, which we will evaluate using simulation in the next
section.
3.6.3 Analysis of Scheme 3
The following theorem is for the correctness of the Scheme 3.
Theorem 3.6.7. Any misbehavior of the LBSP, including returning incorrect/inauthentic
query result and omitting complete query results, will be eventually detected under
Scheme 3.
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Table 3.1: Default simulation settings
Para. Val. Para. Val. Para. Val. Para. Val.
M 10000 m 100 n 100 δ 10
k 5 d 14 d 20 Lh 160
Lloc 20 Lsig 160 Lr 10
We give the proof in Appendix I. We will use simulation to evaluate the commu-
nication and computation overhead incurred by Scheme 3 in the next section.
3.7 Simulation Results
In this section, we evaluate our schemes using simulations. We assume that the data
set covers 100 × 100 unit square zones of 1000 × 1000m2, each containing 100 POIs
uniformly distributed. The simulation code is written in C++, and each data point rep-
resents an average of 50 simulation runs with different random seeds. In addition, our
simulations use the default parameters in Table 3.1, unless stated otherwise.
3.7.1 Snapshot Top-k Queries
We first report the simulation results for Schemes 1 and 2. Recall that δ denote the ratio
of the query-region size to the zone size and that I represent the set of candidate zones
that completely or partially overlap with the query region R. We simulate the following
two types of queries.
• Type-1 queries: R exactly covers an integer number of zones, which means that
I = R and |I| = δ.
• Type-2 queries: R is a circle of radius r centered at a random location, which
means that I > R and |I| > δ.
3.7.1.1 Type-1 Queries: |I| = δ
For this set of simulations, we let the query region R formed by δ zones randomly
chosen from the same macro zone.
Fig. 3.4a shows the impact of δ on the user’s computation overhead for k = 5,
where the single signature verification is not included for brevity. Clearly, our analytical
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and simulation results closely match under both schemes. In addition, the user’s com-
putation overhead increases with δ under Scheme 1, while it initially increases as δ goes
from 1 to 10 and then is relatively stable under Scheme 2. The reason is that Scheme 1
requires the LBSP to return information for every zone inR for the user to verify. There-
fore, the larger δ, the higher the user’s computation overhead in Scheme 1. In contrast,
Scheme 2 requires the LBSP to return information only for the zones that have at least
one POI among the top-k POIs under our simulation settings, and there are at most k
such zones inR. Therefore, Scheme 2 incurs lower computation overhead on the user
for small k and large δ.
Fig. 3.4b shows the impact of δ on the LBSP-user communication overhead
for k = 5. It is clear that the simulation results are always below the corresponding
theoretical upper bounds. As in Fig. 3.4a, we can also observe that the LBSP-user
communication overhead in Scheme 1 always increases with δ and is higher than that
in Scheme 2. In contrast, the LBSP-user communication overhead under Scheme 2 is
relatively stable and even slightly decreases when δ grows. The reason is that the kth
largest attribute rating becomes large as δ increases, which means that the query result
contains less information for other zones in the same macro zone with attribute ratings
higher than any top-k rating.
Fig. 3.5a shows the impact of k on the user’s computation overhead for δ = 10.
We can see that our simulation and analytical results closely match and increase with
k under both schemes. The reason is that the number of hash computations increases
with the number of zones with information in the query result, which itself increases with
k. In addition, since Scheme 2 does not require the LBSP to return any information for
zones without a top-k POI, it requires the user to perform fewer hash computations and
thus incurs smaller computation overhead than Scheme 1. The difference between the
two schemes gradually diminishes when k goes beyond 20, as the number of zones in
R without a top-k POI quickly decreases for sufficiently large k.
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(a) computation cost (b) communication cost
Figure 3.4: The impact of δ for Type-1 queries, where k = 5.
(a) computation cost (b) communication cost
Figure 3.5: The impact of k for Type-1 queries, where δ = 10.
Fig. 3.5b shows the impact of k on the LBSP-user communication overhead for
δ = 10. Again, our simulation and analytical results closely match. In addition, the
LBSP-user communication overhead of Scheme 1 is not affected by k because it only
involves transmitting |I| = δ POI indexes. In contrast, the LBSP-user communication
overhead of Scheme 2 always increases with k, as the number of POI records or in-
dexes increases with k, and accordingly the information about other zones in the same
macro zone returned along with every POI record or index also increases.
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(a) computation cost (b) communication cost
Figure 3.6: The impact of query radius r for Type-2 queries.
(a) computation cost (b) communication cost
Figure 3.7: The impact of m on Scheme 2.
3.7.1.2 Type-2 Queries: |I| > δ
For this set of simulations, we simulate a circular query region with radius r centered at
a random location and only report the simulation results for simplicity.
Figs. 3.6a and 3.6b show the impact of query radius r on the user’s computation
overhead and the LBSP-user communication overhead, respectively, for k = 5 or 50.
Note that δ = πr2 increases quadratically with r, so does the number of candidate
zones. It is thus not surprising to see that the user’s computation overhead and the
LBSP-user communication overhead both increase as r increases under Scheme 1.
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(a) computation cost (b) communication cost
Figure 3.8: The impact of n.
In contrast, both metrics are relatively insensitive to r under Scheme 2 because the
number of zones having at least one top-k POI is at most k.
3.7.1.3 Impact of m on Scheme 2
Now we illustrate the impact of m, the number of zones in each macro zone, on
Scheme 2. For simplicity, we show the simulation results for Type-2 queries only.
Fig. 3.7a shows that the user’s computation overhead decreases rapidly as m
increases from 1 to 10 and slowly as m further increases. The reason is that the LBSP
returns only one index and the corresponding auxiliary set for each candidate macro
zone that has no top-k POI. When k is small and R is large, most zones in R do not
have any top-k POI, so the number of indexes and auxiliary sets returned is approxi-
mately proportional to the number of macro zones and thus inversely proportional to m
when m is not too large. Otherwise, the number of macro zones overlapping with R
approaches a constant, leading to relatively stable computation overhead.
Fig. 3.7b shows that the LBSP-user communication overhead quickly decreas-
es as m increases from 1 to 10. The reason is that the larger m, the fewer POIs and
corresponding auxiliary sets returned to the user. As m further increases, the commu-
nication overhead slowly increases, as a larger m requires the LBSP to return more
information about other zones in the same macro zone along with every POI record or
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index in the query result. In practice, a moderate m should be chosen to minimize the
LBSP-user communication overhead.
3.7.1.4 Impact of n on Schemes 1 and 2
Figs. 3.8a and 3.8b show the impact of n, the number of POIs per zone, on the da-
ta collector’s computation overhead and the collector-LBSP communication overhead.
For brevity, we only show the simulation results which apply to both Type-1 or Type-2
queries. Fig. 3.8a shows that the data collector’s computation overhead increases lin-
early with n under both schemes. The reason is that the data collector performs one
hash computation to generate the index and chain it with adjacent indexes for each POI
record in both schemes. Moreover, as anticipated, the largerM , the more POIs, and the
higher the computation overhead. In addition, Fig. 3.8b shows that the collector-LBSP
communication overhead under both schemes increases with n, and Scheme 2 incurs
larger overhead because it requires additional information for other zones in the same
macro zone to be transmitted for each POI record.
We have also simulated the impact of λ, the number of POI attributes, and
observed that the data collector’s computation overhead and the collector-LBSP com-
munication overhead are both proportional to λ under both schemes.
3.7.2 Moving Top-k Queries
In this subsection, we report the simulation results for Scheme 3. In particular, we
compare Scheme 3 with realizing moving top-k query via independent snapshot queries
under Scheme 1. We simulate a moving top-k query in which the query region is a
circular area of radius r = 5000m centered at the user’s location. The user starts at a
random location along a random direction, moves at a speed of 5m/s for a total distance
of 5000m.
3.7.2.1 General Comparison between Schemes 1 and 3
Figs. 3.9a and 3.9b show the user’s computation overhead and LBSP-user communica-
tion overhead incurred by the first 20 snapshot top-k queries under Schemes 1 and 3,
respectively, where t = 20s. We can see that both schemes incur the same user-side
68
(a) computation cost (b) communication cost
Figure 3.9: Comparison of the first 20 snapshot queries in Schemes 1 and 3.
computation overhead and LBSP-user communication overhead for the first snapshot
top-k query, as the LBSP need return a complete query result in both cases. Under
Scheme 1, each snapshot query incurs similar computation and communication costs,
while under Scheme 3, all the snapshot queries (except the 1st, 7th, and 16th) incur
negligible user-side computation overhead and LBSP-user communication overhead.
This is anticipated, as the LBSP always need return a complete query result for any
snapshot query under Scheme 1 but does so only when there is an update in the top-k
POIs from the previous ones under Scheme 3. It is also worth noticing that Scheme 3
incurs slightly higher user-side computation overhead and LBSP-user communication
overhead for the 7th and 16th snapshot queries. This is because that the LBSP need
provide additional information in the query response to prove that all previous returned
ACKs are valid.
3.7.2.2 Impact of t
Figs. 3.10a and 3.10b compare Schemes 1 and 3 whent varies. We can see that the
total computation and communication cost incurred by Scheme 3 are relatively insensi-
tive to the change in t, as no matter how frequently the user issues snapshot top-k
queries, the LBSP only need return a complete query result when there is an update in
the top-k POIs. In contrast, the total computation and communication costs incurred by
Scheme 3 are inversely proportional to t, since the LBSP treats each snapshot query
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(a) computation cost (b) communication cost
Figure 3.10: The impact of t on Scheme 3.
(a) computation cost (b) communication cost
Figure 3.11: The impact of k on Scheme 3.
independently by always returning a complete query result. These results demonstrate
the significant advantage of Scheme 3 over Scheme 1.
3.7.2.3 Impact of k
Figs. 3.11a and 3.11b compare Schemes 1 and 3 when k varies. We can see that
the user-side computation overhead and LBSP-user communication overhead both in-
crease as k increases under both schemes. This is because that the larger k, the more
updates in the top-k POIs for the same distance that the user travels, and vice versa.
Under both schemes, the LBSP need return more complete query results, which lead
to higher user-side computation overhead and LBSP-user communication overhead.
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When k is small, Scheme 3 incurs significantly lower user-side computation overhead
and LBSP-user communication overhead than Scheme 1 does. For example, when
k = 1 and 5, the LBSP-user communication overhead incurred by Scheme 3 is only
3.5% and 13.5% that of Scheme 1, respectively. As k increases, the benefits of using
Scheme 3 gradually diminish, as the LBSP need return more complete query results
under both schemes.
3.8 Summary
This chapter considers a novel distributed system for collaborative location-based in-
formation generation and sharing. We have proposed three novel schemes to enable
secure top-k query processing via untrusted LBSPs for fostering the practical deploy-
ment and wide use of the envisioned system. Our schemes support both snapshot
and moving top-k queries, which enable users to verify the authenticity and correctness
of any top-k query result. The efficacy and efficiency of our schemes are thoroughly
analyzed and evaluated through detailed simulation studies.
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Chapter 4
VERIFIABLE PRIVACY-PRESERVING AGGREGATION IN PEOPLE-CENTRIC
URBAN SENSING SYSTEMS
4.1 Introduction
People-centric urban sensing systems (PC-USSs) refer to using human-carried mobile
devices such as smartphones and tablets with ever-growing capabilities in sensing,
computation, storage, and communications for urban-scale distributed data collection,
analysis, and sharing to facilitate the interaction between humans and their surrounding
environments. Examples of PC-USS applications include environment monitoring [31,
86], traffic measuring and congestion avoidance [70, 108], healthcare monitoring and
delivery [61], and many others [3, 8, 17, 33, 48, 55, 56, 68, 77, 85, 109]. PC-USSs are
expected to open a new era of exciting scientific, social, and commercial applications.
PC-USSs differ significantly from traditional wireless sensor networks that focus
on environment sensing and data collection. First, system devices are no longer owned
and managed by a single authority but belong to individuals with diverse interests. Sec-
ond, system devices have much more powerful resources than sensor nodes and can
be charged regularly. Third, the system features dynamic node mobility. Fourth, sens-
ing data are more related to the interactions among humans and between humans and
their surroundings instead of only about some physical phenomena of interest. Fifth,
but not the last, humans are no longer just passive data users but also active data
contributors.
The widespread deployment and adoption of PC-USSs face many obstacles, of
which user privacy and data integrity are among the most critical [17, 33, 56]. For in-
stance, in a study of the relationship between air quality and public health, researchers
desire some aggregate statistics of personal health data such as heart rates, blood
pressure levels, and weights at different sections of an urban area. Individuals may be
unwilling to disclose their personal data if there were no guarantee that their data would
not be used to invade their privacy. As an example for data-integrity breach, consider
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applications like CarTel [48] and VTrack [108] that use traffic statistics such as average
speed as an indicator of congestion to help system users do route planning. A selfish
and malicious driver may prevent other users from choosing his current road by manipu-
lating the aggregation result, i.e., cheating the server into accepting a lower-than-actual
average speed that indicates road congestion. These two examples highlight the ne-
cessity for verifiable privacy-preserving data aggregation techniques that can ensure
strong user privacy and also aggregation integrity.1
Designing a verifiable privacy-preserving aggregation scheme for PC-USSs is
particulary challenging. On the one hand, ensuring user privacy means that a user’s
original data cannot be disclosed to any other party. This requirement makes it hard
to detect if a user has faithfully participated in data aggregation. On the other hand,
ensuring aggregation integrity requires any misbehavior during data aggregation to be
detected with overwhelming probability. This requirement is extremely difficult to satisfy
without knowing users’ original data.
The contribution of this chapter is the design and evaluation of VPA, a novel
peer-to-peer based solution to verifiable privacy-preserving data aggregation in PC-
USSs. VPA consists of the following two components.
• The first component VPA+ aims at additive aggregation functions such as Sum,
Average, and Variance. Its basic idea is to divide the aggregation process into
two phases. In the first phase, each node submits a commitment to the aggrega-
tion server, which is a homomorphic message authentication code of its original
data. The homomorphic property of commitments enables the aggregation serv-
er to compute the aggregate commitment corresponding to the final aggregate,
while it is impossible for the aggregation server to recover any node’s original da-
tum. In the second phase, the original datum of each node is aggregated in a
privacy-preserving manner, in which users first exchange random shares of their
1We use “user privacy” and “data privacy” as well as “aggregation integrity” and “data integrity” inter-
changeably in this chapter.
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data with selected peers and then submit mixed data to the aggregation server.
The aggregation server can then verify the aggregation-result integrity using the
aggregate commitment derived in the first phase.
• The second component VPA⊕ is a non-trivial combination of the binary search
and verifiable privacy-preserving Count queries and can support a wide range
of non-additive aggregation functions like Max/Min, Median, Histogram, and Per-
centile, with accurate aggregation-results.
VPA is the first work of its kind as far as we know. The performance of VPA is thoroughly
analyzed and evaluated with detailed simulations.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the related
work. Section 4.3 gives the system and adversary models and the design objectives.
Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 present the solutions to additive and non-additive aggre-
gation, respectively. Section 4.6 evaluates the performance of VPA using extensive
simulation results. This chapter is finally concluded in Section 4.7.
4.2 Related Work
Although PC-USSs, also known as participatory or opportunistic sensing systems, have
received extensive attention (e.g., [3,8,17,33,48,55,56,68,77,85,86,109]), there is rel-
atively little work focusing on their security and privacy aspects. Kapadia et al. [56]
surveyed the security and privacy challenges in opportunistic sensing systems. Cor-
nelius et al. [17] presented the AnonySense architecture for anonymous tasking and
reporting in people-centric sensing systems. AnonySense relies on a Mix network like
Minimaster [76] to ensure user privacy, which we will not assume in our scheme. Ganti
et al. [33] proposed PoolView for computing community statistics of time-series data
in a privacy-preserving manner without considering aggregation-result integrity. More
recently, Cristofaro and Soriente [18] proposed PEPSI to protect data and query pri-
vacy from unauthorized subscribers. None of these schemes could achieve the same
objectives as our VPA.
74
Privacy-preserving aggregation in traditional sensor networks has been exten-
sively studied. The work [11,29,37,44] can support additive aggregation functions such
as Sum and Average. GP2S [136] can support both additive aggregation functions and
non-additive ones such as Max/Min, Median, and Histogram at the sacrifice in data ac-
curacy. The work [114] applies a particular class of encryption transformations to com-
pute two aggregation functions, Average and “movement detection” specific to sensor
networks. These schemes [11, 29, 37, 44, 114, 136] do not address aggregation-result
integrity, neither could be be directly applied to PC-USSs due to different application
scenarios.
There is also a big chunk of work on secure aggregation in sensor networks, see
[12,13,90,93,94,118,126] for example. Such work ensures that aggregation results are
not so different from the true values despite malicious intermediate aggregator nodes
and does not address individual nodes’ data privacy.
To the best of our knowledge, the work in [112] is the only one that simul-
taneously addresses data confidentiality and aggregation-result integrity. VPA differs
from [112] significantly in following aspects. First, the scheme proposed in [112] target-
s histogram aggregates in traditional sensor networks with static topology, while VPA
can support a large family of aggregates, including Sum, Average, Max/Min, Median,
Histogram, and Percentile. Second, the scheme proposed in [112] can only detect ill-
performed aggregation with some probability and protect users’ data privacy against
other users. In contrast, VPA can detect any false aggregation result with certainty and
ensure user data confidentiality against both curious users and aggregation servers.
Finally, location/identity privacy of mobile users is another active topic of re-
search, see [7, 32, 137] for example. This line of work is orthogonal to our work in this
chapter and can be integrated with our VPA.
4.3 Models and Design Goals
In this section, we present the system and adversary models as well as our design
goals.
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Figure 4.1: The abstract architecture of a people-centric urban sensing system (PC-
USS).
4.3.1 System Model
There is no universally accepted model for a PC-USS. For ease of illustration, we as-
sume an urban-sensing service provider which deploys a large-scale system similar to
a metro-scale wireless mesh network [137], as shown in Fig. 4.1. Our solution can be
easily extended to work with other system models such as cellular networks. The PC-
USS features a high-speed wireless backbone consisting of M powerful aggregation
servers (ASs for short) which also provide network access services for system nodes.
Each AS is in charge of a certain region referred to as a cell and interacts with nodes
therein. Here we use the term “node” to indicate a human who carries a portable device
such as a smartphone and tablet. The devices have different communication and com-
putation capabilities as well as various embedded sensors such as accelerator, digital
compass, proximity sensors, and humidity sensors [68].
A node may join the system at will to participate in data sensing and sharing
and also enjoy network access. To prevent fraudulent use of system resources and
also provide basic privacy assurance to nodes, the system and nodes need mutually
authenticate each other each time a node moves into a new cell.
We assume a similar mutual authentication protocol as in [137]. Assume that
an AS, denoted byA, can simultaneously accommodate up to 2λ users. After achieving
mutual authentication with a node, say i, A assigns node i a secret key ki, a temporal
integer-valued ID IDi (which is an unused one between [0, 2λ − 1]), and also an ID-
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based private key K−1i . The pair IDi/K
−1
i will serve as the temporal public/private
keys of node i which are valid only in A’s cell.
In addition, we assume an efficient method for A to keep track of node mobility
in its cell. For example, node i need periodically notify A about its existence; otherwise,
A would assume that i has left its cell and then reclaim IDi to be allocated to new
nodes. In the latter case, A updates all the private keys of the remaining nodes in its
cell using a single broadcast message with the approach in [139]. The use of such ID-
based public/private keys will be illustrated soon. Note that the mutual authentication
process is performed whenever a node enters a new cell.
About the communication capabilities, we assume that each node and the AS
can directly communicate with each other. In addition, each can communicate with
neighboring nodes through WiFi or Bluetooth interfaces, for which very efficient proto-
cols are available such as in [120]. Moreover, each node can transmit to the AS in a
multi-hop fashion through other nodes if necessary.
Without loss of generality, we consider the following scenario throughout. We
assume that the service provider, on behalf of a data client, wants to get statistical
aggregates of some personal data such as heart rates, blood pressure levels, glucose
levels, weights, and moving speeds. A query will be sent to selected ASs which in
turn broadcast the query to the nodes inside their respective cells. If some nodes have
data satisfying the query, they will participate in aggregation if provided with privacy
guarantees. The ASs can then aggregate the returned data and forward the aggregation
result to the service provider. The service provider often need provide extra incentives
such as credits to motivate participation in data aggregation, but the design of sound
incentives is outside the scope of this chapter.
4.3.2 Adversary Model
This chapter focuses on thwarting attacks on breaching nodes’ data privacy as well
as aggregation-result integrity. Other important issues such as DoS defenses [56] are
beyond the scope of this chapter.
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We assume that ASs are trusted to follow aggregation operations for generating
correct aggregation results, but they may be curious about individual user data. A
curious AS may collude with other curious nodes to attempt deducing the sensing data
of target nodes.
In contrast, a node could be curious, malicious, or both. Like a curious AS, a
curious node is interested in discovering other nodes’ data but faithfully follow aggrega-
tion operations, while a malicious node intends to make the AS derive false aggregation
result. More specifically, a malicious node may launch two types of false-data injection
attacks [118]. First, a malicious node may forge its own datum. Second, a malicious
node may forge a false intermediate aggregation result that could significantly affect the
final aggregation result. Most recent research [24, 35, 36, 95] has shown that perhaps
the only feasible defense against the former (i.e., ensuring the integrity of sensor read-
ings from human-carried mobile devices) is to use some trusted hardware such as a
Trusted Platform Module (TPM). We thus follow this line of research and assume that
every participating mobile device has an embedded TPM. To keep the TPM cost as
low as possible, we only require the TPM to have a minimal set of functionalities dur-
ing aggregation, which include collecting sensor readings and generating a message
authentication code (MAC). For this purpose, we assume that every TPM has a unique
public/private key pair bound to the affiliated mobile device. After achieving mutual au-
thentication with node i, the AS sends another secret key κi encrypted with the public
key of node i’s TPM. The TPM can then decrypt the ciphertext using its private key and
store κi for later use. Based on the assumption about TPM, we focus on mitigating the
forgery of intermediate aggregation results in our solution.
There might also be external eavesdroppers not participating in data aggrega-
tion. Since external eavesdroppers are fairly easy to defeat using end-to-end encryp-
tion (which we will use), we focus on counteracting internal attackers hereafter, which
includes both curious ASs and curious/malicious participating nodes.
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4.3.3 Design Goals
Given the aforementioned adversary model, VPA is designed with the following objec-
tives.
• Aggregation accuracy: VPA should output accurate aggregation results in the
absence of malicious attacks.
• Aggregation/data integrity: any attempt of injecting false data should be detected
with certainty.
• Data/user privacy: Each user’s datum should be hidden from all the other parties
with high probability.
• Efficiency: VPA should incur low communication and computation overhead.
4.4 VPA+: Verifiable Privacy-Preserving Additive Aggregation
In this section, we present VPA+, a novel scheme to enable verifiable privacy-preserving
additive aggregation. Without loss of generality, our discussion focuses on a cell with
AS A and a set of n nodes, denoted by U . We will also use Sum aggregation as an
example, based on which other additive aggregation functions such as Average and
Variance [11] can be easily realized.
4.4.1 Overview and Basic Idea
We observe that either of user privacy and aggregation integrity alone can be easily
achieved if we ignore the other. On the one hand, if aggregation integrity is the only
concern, a straightforward solution is to let each node submit its datum directly to A
along with a message authentication code (MAC). The AS can then verify the authen-
ticity of each datum and compute the correct sum. This naive approach, however, offers
no data privacy to users. On the other hand, many existing techniques such as [29,44]
can realize privacy-preserving data aggregation, but a malicious node can launch the
false-data injection attack without being detected.
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Inspired by the above observation, we divide the whole aggregation process
into two phases. In the first phase, each node submits to A a commitment, which is
a homomorphic MAC of its datum and has a nice one-way property that A cannot de-
duce the corresponding datum. The homomorphic property of individual commitments
enables A to compute an aggregate commitment corresponding to the Sum aggregate
of all nodes’ data. In the second phase, nodes perform privacy-preserving in-network
data aggregation for A to derive the Sum aggregate without disclosing any individual
datum with overwhelming probability. Finally, A can verify the integrity of the Sum ag-
gregate by using the aggregate commitment derived in the first phase. In what follows,
we detail the design of VPA+, which includes aggregation initialization, commitment
submission, privacy-preserving in-network aggregation, and aggregation verification.
4.4.2 Aggregation Initialization
The AS A initializes the aggregation process by selecting a large prime p and a gen-
erator g of the group Z∗p = {1, . . . , p − 1}. The parameters p and g should ensure
the computational hardness of the discrete logarithm problem, that is, given a random
y ∈ Z∗p, it is computationally infeasible to find the unique integer x ∈ [0, p − 2] such
that gx = y mod p. Assume that each node has reported to A what kinds of data it
could generate when moving into A’s cell. Let U denote the set of n = |U| users that A
has selected and motivated to participate in data aggregation.2 Finally, A broadcasts
an aggregation request 〈p, g,U , r〉, where r is a random nonce for message freshness.
It is worth noting that the aggregation request can be sent as part of A’s periodic ser-
vice beacons and need be authenticated properly as in [137] to prevent attackers from
sending fake aggregation requests, which we have ignored here for the focus of this
chapter. In addition, there can be various methods to transmit a condensed version of
U , which is also not discussed here for simplicity.
2HowA selects U from candidate users and appropriately stimulate their participation is an orthogonal
topic deserving independent investigation.
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4.4.3 Commitment Submission
In this phase, each node i ∈ U submits to A a commitment, which is a homomorphic
MAC of its datum di after appropriate expansion. In contrast to traditional MAC, a homo-
morphic MAC functionH(·) has the additional property that the given the homomorphic
MACs of two messages, say H(m1) and H(m2), anyone can derive H(m1 + m2)
without knowing m1 or m2. VPA+ uses a simple homomorphic MAC construction as
follows,
H(m) = gm mod p,
where m ∈ [0, p − 2]. It is easy to see that H(·) is homomorphic because ∀m1,m2 ∈
[0, p − 2],
H(m1 +m2) = g
m1+m2 = H(m1)H(m2) mod p.
Before generating the commitment, each node i first need expand its datum di
to introduce sufficient randomness. Note that the data range in many PC-USS appli-
cations is usually limited. For instance, in a traffic monitoring application, the driving
speed is between 0 and 100 miles. If node i directly submits H(di) to A, then A can
deduce di by exhaustive search. To avoid this situation, each node i expands di by
adding a random number. In particular, assume that each datum di is of l bits. Node i
generates a random number ri of φ bits known only to itself and computes
ei = 2
l+log2 n	 · ri + di . (4.1)
where φ is a system parameter determining the difficulty of exhaustive search. Alterna-
tively, we can view ei as the concatenation of ri, log2 n zeros, and di as follows
ei = ri,
log2 n	︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, . . . , 0, di .
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The reason to separate ri and di by log2 n zeros can be explained as follows.
If we perform Sum aggregation over all ei, then we have
∑
i∈U
ei = 2
l+log2 n	 ·
∑
i∈U
ri +
∑
i∈U
di
≤ 2l+log2 n	 ·
∑
i∈U
ri + n(2
l − 1)
< 2l+log2 n	 ·
∑
i∈U
ri + 2
l+log2 n	 .
It follows that ∑
i∈U
di =
∑
i∈U
ei mod 2
l+log2 n	 . (4.2)
This property will be used later by A to derive the correct aggregation result without
knowing {ri}i∈U .
To prevent malicious nodes from submitting arbitrary data, we require that di
and ei be generated and authenticated by node i’s TPM. Recall that A has assigned a
secret key ki to node i and another secret key κi to node i’s TPM after mutual authen-
tication (see Section 4.3.1). Node i submits to A the following message.
i → A : i, 〈H(ei), h(κi||H(ei))〉ki ,
where h(·) denotes a good hash function, and 〈·〉∗ denotes a symmetric-key encryption
operation using the key on the subscript.
On receiving the message, the AS locates ki and κi using node ID i. It uses
ki to decrypt the message, and then verifies h(κi||H(ei)) using κi. If the verifica-
tion succeeds, A considers H(ei) an authentic commitment and drops it otherwise.
If {H(ei)}ni=1 are all authentic, the AS proceeds to derive the aggregate commitment
corresponding to
∑n
i=1 ei by computing
H(
∑
i∈U
ei) =
∏
i∈U
H(ei) mod p
=
∏
i∈U
gei mod p
= g
∑
i∈U ei mod p .
82
4.4.4 Privacy-Preserving In-Network Data Aggregation
In this phase, nodes jointly perform in-network aggregation over their expanded da-
ta without disclosing them. This phase requires the establishment of an on-demand
temporary aggregation tree. In particular, the AS A broadcast an aggregation-tree for-
mation request, which specifies any node, say v ∈ U , as the root of the aggregation
tree. On receiving the request, node v rebroadcasts it via its Bluetooth or WiFi interface,
depending on the particular method (e.g., [120]) it uses to communicate with neighbor-
ing nodes. Upon receiving the request for the first time, each node further rebroadcasts
it and records the parent node from which this request came from. In this way, an
aggregation tree is formed and rooted at node v which can directly communicate with
A.
In what follows, we present two techniques for privacy-preserving in-network
Sum aggregation over all expanded data with different user-privacy guarantees and
communication overhead. To facilitate presentation, we define node i’s aggregation
neighbors as i’s neighboring nodes on the aggregation tree, denoted by Ti.
4.4.4.1 Method 1: Data Perturbation (DP)
In this method, each node i perturbs its expanded datum ei before actual aggregation.
Since ei is of l + log2 n+ φ bits, we have
∑
i∈U
ei ≤ n · (2l+log2 n	+φ − 1)
< 2l+2log2 n	+φ ,
i.e., that
∑
i∈U ei is at most of l + 2log2 n+ φ bits.
Denote by h1(·) a good hash function of l + 2log2 n + φ bits. Each node i
generates a perturbed datum αi by computing
αi = h1(ki||r) + ei mod 2l+2log2 n	+φ , (4.3)
where ki is the secret key shared between node i and the AS and r is the nonce
broadcasted by A.
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Each node then performs in-network aggregation over its perturbed datum by
adding it to the values received from its children on the aggregation tree and then trans-
mitting the result to its parent. Finally, the AS A can obtain ∑i∈U αi by summing the
values received from the root of the aggregation tree, i.e., node v. Since A knows ki for
each i ∈ U , it can compute all h1(ki||r) and derive
∑
i∈U ei by computing
∑
i∈U
ei =
∑
i∈U
αi −
∑
i∈U
h1(ki||r) mod 2l+2log2 n	+φ . (4.4)
Since ei is completely concealed by h1(ki||r), which is only known by A, other
curious nodes, e.g., node i’s neighbors on the aggregation tree, cannot derive ei by
monitoring i’s incoming and outgoing transmission. Unfortunately, node i’s data privacy
can still be breached if A colludes with node i’s aggregation neighbors.
4.4.4.2 Method 2: Peer-to-Peer Slicing and Mixing
To defend against A colluding with other curious nodes, we further propose another
approach based on peer-to-peer data slicing and mixing. In this approach, before par-
ticipating in in-network aggregation, each node i randomly divides its expanded datum
ei into multiple slices and mixes them with those from selected peers, such that da-
ta privacy can be preserved without affecting the correctness of the final aggregation
result.
Specifically, before answering the query, each node i slices ei into t+1 random
slices {si,j}t+1j=1 with t ≤ n− 1, such that
ei =
t+1∑
j=1
si,j mod 2
l+2log2 n	+φ .
Then node i keeps si,t+1 to itself while sending each other slice to a unique peer called a
cover node. Next, each node i adds the slices received from other nodes to its remained
slice si,t+1 and conducts in-network aggregation as in Method 1. Finally, A adds up all
the received values. It is easy to see that the result is exactly the Sum aggregate of
interest.
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This slicing technique shares the similar idea as PDA [44], while our application
scenario is totally different. In particular, PDA is designed for sensor networks with rel-
atively static network topology, where all the nodes know each other and have pairwise
shared keys whereby to encrypt/decrypt data slices transmitted from any node to its
chosen cover nodes. Such assumptions no longer holds in our target scenarios, where
nodes in a cell are dynamically changing. Since the nodes do not know each other
beforehand, they have no pre-shared keys for end-to-end encryption. This significant
difference necessitates novel cover-selection strategies. In what follows, we detail two
cover-selection approaches that specially tailored for our target scenario.
RandomCover Selection (RCS) As its name suggested, in this approach, each node
randomly chooses t cover nodes from U and sends a data slice to each of them. The
challenge is how a node can establish a shared key with each of its cover nodes for
end-to-end encryption of its shares. VPA+ uses the following method. Consider node
i as an example with data ei to share. It first slices ei into {si,j}t+1j=1 and then randomly
chooses a set of t nodes from U as its cover nodes, denoted by Ci ⊆ U . For any cover
node j ∈ Ci, node i computes a shared key ki,j based on its temporal public/private
keys IDi/K
−1
i and IDj by using the method in our previous work [137] and then sends
an encrypted unique slice si,τi,j to node j as follows.
i → j : IDi, 〈si,τi,j , h(si,τi,j )〉ki,j
Since the route to j might not be known, the packet transmission is normally
preceded by an on-demand route discovery process using protocols like AODV [87].
On receiving the message, node j can derive the same key ki,j using its temporal
public/private keys IDj/K
−1
j and IDi according to [137] and then decrypts the packet
to get si,τi,j . Node i repeats this process for all its cover nodes, and so does every other
node in U .
Each node waits for sufficient time to receive all the slices from other nodes
choosing it as cover. Let Si ⊂ U denote the set of nodes selecting i as a cover node.
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Each node i computes its share as
βi = si,t+1 +
∑
j∈Si
sj,τj,i mod 2
l+2log2 n	+φ . (4.5)
Finally, all the nodes perform in-network aggregation over there shares as in Method 1
so that the AS A finally receives∑i∈U βi which equals∑i∈U ei.
μ-Hop Cover Selection (μCS) Random cover selection may not be efficient because
cover nodes are randomly chosen regardless of their locations. As a result, an on-
demand route discovery process is often incurred to find a route to a chosen cover
node multi-hop away. This may cause unnecessarily high energy consumption because
a route request often involves cell-wide broadcasting.
We observe that it is unnecessary for each node i to predetermine the slices
{si,j}t+1j=1 and send each of them to a cover node. Instead, node i can broadcast a
random seed within its μ-hop neighborhood, in which every node is chosen as a cover
node and can compute a slice using their shared key.
Specifically, in μ-hop cover selection, each node i initiates the slicing process
by broadcasting a slicing request with a random seed ri and a TTL value set to μ.
Upon receiving a request with a TTL larger than one, each node further broadcasts
it after decreasing the TTL by one. A node should only process the first copy of the
same request which may be heard multiple times. In addition, each node memorizes
the parent node from which this request came from. In this way, a routing tree of depth
μ is formed and rooted at node i. When a node receives a request with the TTL value
equal to one, the node should send a slicing response to its parent node which in turn
forwards the response via the routing tree back to node i after appending its ID.
Each node waits sufficient time and then updates its share as follows. Consider
node i as an example. Suppose that node i has received slicing responses from the set
of nodes Ci and slicing requests from the set of nodes Si, i.e., the set of nodes choosing
i as covers. Node i derives a shared key ki,j for each j ∈ Ci
⋃Si according to [137]
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and updates its share by computing
βi = ei −
∑
j∈Ci
h1(ri||ki,j) +
∑
j∈Si
h1(rj ||ki,j) mod 2l+2log2 n	+φ . (4.6)
Finally, all the nodes perform in-network aggregation over their shares so that
the AS A finally obtains∑i∈U βi which equals∑i∈U ei.
Unlike in random cover selection, the number of cover nodes in μ-hop cover
selection is a random variable which cannot be determined before the process is com-
pleted. Intuitively, the larger μ, the more cover nodes discovered, the higher privacy
and the communication cost, and vice versa.
4.4.5 Aggregation-Result Verification
After in-network aggregation via Method 1 or 2, the AS obtain
∑
i∈U ei. It first verifies
its integrity by checking if
g
∑
i∈U ei =
∏
i∈U
H(ei) mod p.
If so, A considers∑i∈U ei authentic and proceeds to derive∑i∈U di by computing
∑
i∈U
di =
∑
i∈U
ei mod 2
l ,
which should hold according to Eq. (4.2).
4.4.6 Performance Analysis
Now we analyze the performance of VPA+ with regard to its aggregation-integrity pro-
vision, data-privacy guarantee, and the associated overhead.
4.4.6.1 Aggregation Integrity
We first have the following theorem regarding the aggregation integrity of VPA+.
Theorem 4.4.1. Assume that each node’s datum is generated and authenticated by
TPM and that p > 2l+2log2 n	+φ. VPA+ allows the AS to detect any false-data injection
attack.
We give the proof in Appendix J.
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4.4.6.2 Data Privacy
To evaluate the data-privacy provision of VPA+, we define exposure probability, denot-
ed by Pexp, as the probability that a node i’s data di is disclosed during aggregation. To
enable quantitative analysis, we assume that each node has Ntree aggregation neigh-
bors on average. We also assume that there are Mc out of M curious ASs and nc out
of n curious nodes.
We then have the following theorems regarding the exposure probability under
VPA+.
Theorem 4.4.2. The exposure probability under DP is given by
Pexp =
Mc
M
·
( n−nc
nc−Ntree
)
(
n
nc
) . (4.7)
We give the proof in Appendix K.
Theorem 4.4.3. The exposure probabilities under RCS and μCS are bounded by
Pexp ≤
(n−nc
nc−w
)
(
n
nc
) , (4.8)
where
w =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
max(Ntree, t) for RCS,
max(Ntree,
∑μ
x=1Nx) for μCS,
(4.9)
is the minimum number of nodes colluding with A.
We give the proof in Appendix L.
4.4.6.3 Overhead Analysis
Now we analyze the computation and communication overhead incurred by VPA+ for
each node.
For computation overhead, each node need perform one exponentiation to gen-
erate one commitment of its data. In addition, each node i need compute the shared
key ki,j for each node j ∈ Ci
⋃Si under RCS and μCS.
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We assume that the average distance two random chosen nodes is L hops.
Also denote by ltree, lseed, lhmac, lh the length of a aggregation tree formation request, a
slicing request in μCS, a homomorphic MAC, and h(·), respectively. We then have the
following theorem regarding the communication overhead incurred by VPA+.
Theorem 4.4.4. The communication overhead incurred by VPA+ in bits is given by
TVPA+ = nltree + Tcommit + Tagg , (4.10)
where
Tcommit = n(λ+ lhmac + lh) (4.11)
is the overhead incurred by transmitting commitments to A, and
Tagg =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
nldata for DP,
nt(nlreq + L(lrsp + ldata + λ)) + nldata for RCS,
n((1 +
∑μ−1
x=1)Nx(λ+ lseed) +
∑μ
x=1Nxλ) + nldata for μCS,
(4.12)
is the overhead incurred by in-network aggregation, and ldata = l + 2log2 n+ φ.
We give the proof in Appendix M.
4.5 VPA⊕: Verifiable Privacy-Preserving Non-additive Aggregation
VPA+ cannot be directly applied to non-additive aggregation functions such as Max/Min,
Median, Percentile, and Histogram, which have wide applications in practice. In this
section, we propose VPA⊕ as an extension of VPA+ to support non-additive aggrega-
tion.
4.5.1 Basic Idea
Our key observation is that all the above non-additive aggregation functions are closely
related to Count aggregation that ask for the number of nodes whose values are above,
below, or equal to a certain value. In particular, let Count[Q] be the number of nodes
with data satisfying the condition Q. Also denote by dmax, dmin, dmed, dσ−per, the Max,
Min, Median, and σ-percentile of a data set, respectively. It is easy to see that the
following conditions hold.
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• Max: ⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Count[d > dmax] = 0,
Count[d = dmax] > 0 .
(4.13)
• Min: ⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Count[d < dmin] = 0,
Count[d = dmin] > 0 .
(4.14)
• Median:
– If n is odd, then ⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Count[d ≤ dmed] ≥ n/2,
Count[d ≥ dmed] ≥ n/2 .
(4.15)
– If n is even, then there exists i, j ∈ U , such that di ≤ dj and⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Count[d ≤ di] ≥ n/2,
Count[d < di] < n/2,
Count[d ≥ dj ] ≥ n/2,
Count[d > dj ] < n/2 ,
(4.16)
and dmed = (di + dj)/2.
• σ-percentile: we only show the simplest case here⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Count[d ≤ dσ−per] ≥ σn/100,
Count[d ≥ dσ−per] ≥ (100 − σ)n/100 .
(4.17)
Conversely, if we can find d∗ such that the conditions in Eq. (4.13) (respectively, (4.14),
(4.15), (4.16) (4.17)) hold, then we have d∗ = dmax (respectively, dmin, dmed, dσ−per).
Since Count is an additive aggregation function, it can be realized by VPA+. Built
on the above observation, VPA⊕ combines VPA+ with binary search to realize non-
additive aggregation functions through a series of verifiable privacy-preserving Count
aggregations.
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4.5.2 Scheme Description
Given a non-additive aggregation request, A transforms it into a series of Count queries
with conditions Q1, Q2, . . . , until the desired d∗ is found, where Qx is determined by the
result of the previous Count query with condition Qx−1. Each Count query Qx asks
how many nodes possess data above, below, or equal to a threshold, called a count
index. Each node i with datum di satisfying condition Qx gives an answer “yes", or
“no" otherwise, by a single bit of value one or zero, respectively. The answers are then
aggregated via VPA+ to let A get Count(Qx) with both user-privacy and aggregation-
integrity guarantees.
Below we brief how to realize privacy-preserving Max/Min, Median, Histogram,
and Percentile aggregation queries under the assumption that each data value di is
an integer between [0, 2l − 1]. It is easy to extend our technique to other non-additive
aggregation functions.
4.5.2.1 Max/Min
Since the Min operation is opposite to the Max operation, we just illustrate the latter
for brevity. Given a Max aggregation request, A first issues a Count query with Q1 =
[d ≥ 2l−1] and then aggregates the received data via VPA+ to get the number of “yes”
answers, denoted by θ1. If θ1 ≥ 1, the maximum value should be in [2l−1, 2l − 1], so
A will send a new Count query with Q2 = [d ≥ 2l−1 + 2l−2]; otherwise, the maximum
value should be in [0, 2l−1−1], so A will send a new Count query with Q2 = [d > 2l−2].
The suspicion range in which the maximum value is located is reduced by half for each
additional Count query. This process continues until the suspicion range is reduced to
one, in which case the last count index is exactly the maximum value, and the last query
result equals the number of nodes with the maximum value.
4.5.2.2 Median/Percentile
Since Median is a special case of Percentile, we illustrate the former for simplicity,
which can be easily extended to the latter. A median value is described as the number
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separating the higher half of a sample, a population, or a probability distribution, from
the lower half. Median aggregation can be realized in a similar fashion as Max. Here
we present the case for n being odd for simplify, while the case of n being even can be
realized accordingly.
Given a Median aggregation request, A first issues a Count query with Q1 =
[d ≥ 2l−1] and obtains θ1 via VPA+. If θ1 ≥ (n+1)/2, A sends the second Count query
with Q2 = [d ≥ 2l−1 + 2l−2]; otherwise, A sends the next query with Q2 = [d ≥ 2l−2].
This process continues until the suspicion range of dmed is one, which takes total l
queries. Suppose that the last two queries are Ql−1 = [d ≥ ql−1] and Ql = [d ≥ ql]
whereby A receives θl−1 and θl, respectively. It follows that ql−1 and ql differ by one.
There are four cases.
• Case 1: if ql−1 < ql and θl ≥ n/2, then we have dmed = ql. The reasons are
as follows. First, we must have θl−1 < n/2, as otherwise dmed ≤ ql − 1, and
ql should not be queried. Second, there must exist a query Qx = [d ≥ ql + 1]
with x ∈ [1, l − 2], due to the property of binary search. Third, it must hold that
θx < n/2, as otherwise dmed > ql+1 and neither ql−1 nor ql should be queried.
• Case 2: if ql−1 > ql and θl ≥ n/2, then we have dmed = ql.
• Case 3: if ql−1 < ql and θl < n/2, then dmed = ql + 1.
• Case 4: if ql−1 > ql and θl < n/2, then dmed = ql + 1.
The reasoning for Cases 2∼4 are similar to that of Case 1 and is thus omitted.
4.5.2.3 Histogram
In statistics, a histogram is a graphical display of tabulated frequencies, shown as bars,
and shows the proportion of cases falling into each of several categories. Using Count
query to realize Histogram is straightforward. In particular, given a Histogram aggrega-
tion request, A partitions the data range [0, 2l−1] into a certain number of consecutive,
non-overlapping intervals according to the aggregation request. It then sends a Count
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query for each interval, and the corresponding query result will equal the number of
nodes with data in that interval.
4.5.3 Performance Analysis
Since VPA⊕ is built upon VPA+, it can also ensure perfect aggregation integrity. We
thus focus on analyzing the user-privacy provision and overhead of VPA⊕.
4.5.3.1 Data Privacy
The exposure probability Pexp used to analyze the performance of VPA+ can no longer
precisely measure the privacy provision of non-additive aggregation. For example, even
if the answer of node i to a Count query Qx is disclosed, the adversary can only narrow
down the search of di to a certain range instead of precisely determining di. Assume
that the adversary knows that dj is in a range of length  after the whole query process.
It is clear that the ratio ρ = /2l can be used to analyze the privacy performance of
the non-additive aggregation process: the larger ρ, the higher level of privacy provision,
and vice versa.
In particular, when ρ = 1, the adversary has no clue about what di is; when
ρ = 2−l, i.e.,  = 1, the adversary has precisely located di. We call ρ the suspicion
ratio of di hereafter. Without loss of generality, we use Max as an example to evalu-
ate the performance of the non-additive aggregation process. The studies about other
non-additive aggregation functions can be conducted similarly. Before proceeding, we
want to mention that the Max/Min aggregation functions naturally disclose some infor-
mation: any user’s data will be smaller or equal to dmax and larger or equal to dmin. No
scheme can prevent this kind of privacy breach which is due to the aggregate functions
themselves. In the following, we will ignore such natural privacy breach and focus on
the loss of privacy occurring in the query process.
We make the following assumptions for analytical tractability. We assume that
the aggregation tree is static for the entire sequence of l Count queries. For clarity, we
consider a special case where the maximum value dmax = 2l − 1. The similar process
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can be used to analyze the more general case that dmax may be any value in [0, 2l−1].
We then have the following theorems regarding the expected suspicion ratio of VPA⊕.
Theorem 4.5.1. Assume that dmax = 2l − 1, the expected suspicion ratio of VPA⊕
under DP or μCS is given by
E[ρ] = 1− Pexp + (2−2l +
l∑
x=1
2−2x)Pexp , (4.18)
where Pexp is the exposure probability of VPA+ that given in Eq. (4.7) for DP and E-
q. (4.8) for μCS.
We give the proof in Appendix N.
Theorem 4.5.2. Assume that dmax = 2l − 1, the expected suspicion ratio under of
VPA⊕ under RCS is given by
E[ρ] =
l−1∑
x=0
2−x−1E[ρx] + 2−lE[ρl] , (4.19)
where
E[ρx] =
x∑
k1=0
Pr(ye = k1)
l+1∑
k2=x+1
Pr(ne = k2)ρ[ye, ne] , (4.20)
Pr(ye = k) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1− Pexp)x if k = 0,
Pexp(1− Pexp)k−1 if 1 ≤ k ≤ x ,
(4.21)
Pr(ne = k) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Pexp(1− Pexp)k−x−1 if x+ 1 ≤ k ≤ l,
(1− Pexp)l−x if k = l + 1 ,
(4.22)
ρ[ye, ne] =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2−ye − 2−ne if ye + 1 ≤ ne ≤ l,
2−ye if ne = l + 1 ,
(4.23)
Pexp is the exposure probability of VPA+ that given in Eq. (4.8) for RCS.
We give the proof in Appendix O.
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Table 4.1: Default simulation settings
Para. Val. Para. Val. Para. Val. Para. Val.
M 10 Mc 5 n 200 nc 50
λ 8 φ 160 μ 1 t 5
N1 20.9 N2 39.3 N3 48.1 N4 48.2
l 10 L 3.39 ltree 160 lseed 160
lreq 160 lrsp 160 lhmac 1024 Ntree 1.86
4.5.3.2 Overhead Analysis
VPA⊕ differs from VPA+mainly in the communication overhead. Since it takes l queries
to complete the aggregation process, each of which incurs communication overhead of
TVPA+ , we thus have
TVPA⊕ = l · TVPA+ ,
where TVPA+ is given in Eq. (4.10).
4.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate VPA+ and VPA⊕ using extensive simulations.
4.6.1 Simulation Setting
We simulate 10 cells of 1 km2, each with an AS located at the center and 200 nodes
randomly distributed within the cell. The transmission range of each node is 200m. This
gives the average hop distance between two random nodes L = 3.39.
For our purpose, the simulation code is written in C++ and each data point
represents an average of 50 simulation runs with different random seeds. Table 4.1
summarizes the default setting used in our simulation if not mentioned otherwise.
4.6.2 Evaluation of VPA+
Fig. 4.2a shows both the theoretical and simulation results of the exposure probabilities
of DP, RCS and μCS varying with nc, the number of curious nodes. We can see that
the exposure probabilities of all three schemes decrease as nc increases. Among three
schemes, DP has the highest exposure probability, followed by RCS and μCS. The rea-
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(a) exposure probability (b) exposure probability
Figure 4.2: Impact of nc and Mc.
(a) exposure probability (b) communication overhead
Figure 4.3: Impact of t, the number of cover nodes on RCS.
son is that on average, each node has only less than two neighbors on the aggregation
tree (i.e., a spanning tree), making it easier for the adversary to compromise (or collude
with) all the neighbors of a target node under DP. In contrast, it is much more difficult
to compromise all the cover nodes under RCS and μCS. In addition, we can see that
the Pexp of DP obtained via theoretical analysis is slightly higher than that obtained by
simulations. The reason is that we round Ntree to Ntree when computing
(
n−nc
nc−Ntree
)
in
Eq. (4.7), leading to higher Pexp.
Fig. 4.2b shows the impact of Mc, the number of curious ASs on the exposure
probability of DP. Since curious ASs has no impact on RCS and μCS, there exposure
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(a) exposure probability (b) exposure probability
Figure 4.4: Impact of μ.
(a) suspicion ratio (b) suspicion ratio
Figure 4.5: Impact of nc and Mc on suspicion ratio.
probabilities are shown only for references. We can see that the exposure probability of
DP increases linearly with the number of curious AS increases, which is expected.
Fig. 4.3a shows the impact of t, the number of cover nodes, on the exposure
probability of RCS, where the Pexps of DP and μCS are shown only for reference. We
can see that the Pexp of RCS decreases as t increases, and quickly drops to zero when
t > 4. The reason is that the probability of all the t cover nodes being compromised
decreases exponentially as t increases.
Fig. 4.3b shows the communication overhead of RCS varying with t. We can see
that under the default settings, RCS incurs significantly higher communication overhead
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(a) suspicion ratio (b) communication overhead
Figure 4.6: Impact of l.
than that of DP and RCS. This is anticipated since finding a cover node under RCS
requires an AODV-like route discovery that involves a network-wide flooding.
Fig. 4.4 shows the impact of μ on the exposure probability and communication
overhead of μCS, where the results of DP and RCS are only shown for reference. We
can see from Fig. 4.4a that the exposure probability of μCS is not much affected by μ
because Pexp is already close to zero when μ = 1. In addition, We can see that the
communication overhead of μCS increases moderately as μ increases, which is of no
surprise.
4.6.3 Evaluation of VPA⊕
Fig. 4.5a shows the suspicion ratios of DP, RCS and μCS, varying with nc. We can see
that the suspicion ratios of all three schemes decrease as nc increases. The reason
is that the higher nc, the lower Pexp, and the lower suspicion ratio, and vice versa. In
addition, under the default setting, μCS has the highest suspicion ratio, followed by that
of RCS and DP.
Fig. 4.5b shows the impact of Mc on the suspicion ratio of DP, where the per-
formance of RCS and μCS are only shown for reference. We cans see that the larger
Mc, the lower suspicion ratio, and vice versa, which is easy to understand.
Fig. 4.6 shows the impact of l on the suspicion ratio and communication over-
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head of VPA⊕. We can see from Fig. 4.6a that the change in data range has negligible
impact on the suspicion ratio of VPA⊕. The reason is that the suspicion ratio is deter-
mined by the last disclosed yes answer and the first disclosed no answer. Under the
default setting, DP has the lowest suspicion ratio due to its highest Pexp among the
three schemes (cf. Fig. 4.2a), while the suspicion ratios of both RCS and μCS are close
to one. In addition, we can see from Fig. 4.6b that the communication overhead of
VPA⊕ increases linearly as l increases, as it takes l Count queries to locate the desired
aggregate.
4.6.4 Discussion
We summarize the evaluation results as follows.
• All three variants of VPA+ (i.e., DP, RCS, and μCS) can ensure aggregation in-
tegrity by detecting any false-data injection attempt.
• DP can provide user/data privacy with high probability while incurring the mini-
mum communication overhead.
• RCS can provide user/data privacy against curious ASs with overwhelming prob-
ability while incurring the highest communication overhead.
• μCS can provide user/data privacy against curious ASs with overwhelming prob-
ability while incurring relatively low communication overhead.
• Built upon VPA+ and binary search, VPA⊕ can ensure both aggregation integrity
and user/data privacy with communication overhead linear to the bit length of
data.
In practice, μCS and the resulting VPA⊕ may be the best choices whose performance
can be adjusted as needed.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the design and evaluation of VPA, a novel peer-
to-peer approach to verifiable privacy-preserving aggregation for people-centric urban
99
sensing systems. VPA can support a wide range of additive and non-additive aggrega-
tion functions with strong user-privacy and aggregation-integrity guarantees. The high
efficacy and efficiency of VPA are confirmed by thorough theoretical analysis and sim-
ulation results.
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Chapter 5
PRIVATE MATCHING FOR PROXIMITY-BASED MOBILE SOCIAL NETWORKING
5.1 Introduction
Proximity-based mobile social networking (PMSN) becomes increasingly popular due
to the explosive growth of smartphones. In particular, eMarketer estimated the US and
worldwide smartphone users to be 73.3 million and 571.1 million in 2011, 1 respec-
tively, and almost all smartphones have WiFi and Bluetooth interfaces. PMSN refers
to the social interaction among physically proximate mobile users directly through the
Bluetooth/WiFi interfaces on their smartphones or other mobile devices. As a valu-
able complement to web-based online social networking, PMSN enables more tangible
face-to-face social interactions in public places such as bars, airports, trains, and sta-
diums [120]. In addition, PMSN may be the only feasible social networking tool when
mobile users cannot access the Internet for online social networking, e.g., due to lack of
Internet access minutes or very weak signals from cellular base stations or WiFi access
points.
PMSN is conducted via applications running on smartphones or other mobile
devices. Such applications can be offered by small independent developers. For in-
stance, there are currently over 50 Bluetooth/WiFi chatting applications in the Android
Market for Android devices and 60 in the App Store for Apple devices. Developing
advanced Bluetooth/WiFi social networking applications also has recently attracted at-
tention from the academia [120]. Moreover, online social network providers such as
Facebook and Twitter may add PMSN functionalities to their future applications for s-
martphones and other mobile devices.
Private (profile) matching is indispensable for fostering the wide use of PMSN.
On the one hand, people normally prefer to socialize with others having similar interests
or background over complete strangers. Such social reality makes profile matching [65]
the first step towards effective PMSN, which refers to two users comparing their per-
1http://www.emarketer.com/Report.aspx?code=emarketer_2000763
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sonal profiles before real interaction. On the other hand, people have growing privacy
concerns for disclosing personal profiles to arbitrary persons in physical proximity be-
fore deciding to interact with them [6, 21, 65, 69]. Although similar privacy concerns
also exist in online social networking, preserving users’ profile privacy is more urgent
in PMSN, as attackers can directly associate obtained personal profiles with real per-
sons nearby and then launch more targeted attacks. This situation leads to a circular
dependency between personal-profile exchange and engagement in PMSN and thus
necessitates private matching, in which two users to compare their personal profiles
without disclosing them to each other.
Some elegant schemes such as [6,65,69] have recently been proposed to en-
able coarse-grained private matching for PMSN. Common to these schemes is the
implicit assumption that each user’s personal profile consists of multiple attributes cho-
sen from a public set of attributes, which can be various interests [65], friends [6], or
disease symptoms [69] in different contexts. Private matching is then converted in-
to Private Set Intersection (PSI) [58, 122] or Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-
CA) [19,30], whereby two mutually mistrusting parties, each holding a private data set,
jointly compute the intersection [58,122] or the intersection cardinality [19,30] of the two
sets without leaking any additional information to either party. These schemes [6,65,69]
can enable only coarse-grained private matching and are unable to further differentiate
users with the same attribute(s). For example, Alice, Bob, and Charlie all like watch-
ing movies and thus have “movie” as an attribute of their respective profile. Alice and
Bob, however, both go to the cinema twice a week, while Charlie does so once every
two weeks. If Alice can interact with only one of Bob and Charlie, e.g., due to time
constraints, Bob is obviously a better choice. Under the existing schemes [6, 65, 69],
however, Bob and Charlie appear the same to Alice. To solve this problem and thus
further enhance the usability of PMSN calls for fine-grained private matching.
A natural first step towards fine-grained private matching for PMSN is to use
fine-grained personal profiles. The basic idea is to associate a user-specific numerical
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value with every attribute. For example, assume that every attribute corresponds to a
different interest such as movie, sports, and cooking. The first time every user uses the
PMSN application, he is prompted to create his profile by assigning a value to every
attribute in the public attribute set defined by the PMSN application. Every attribute
value is an integer in [0, 10] and indicates the level of interest from no interest (0) to
extremely high interest (10). 2 Every personal profile is then defined as a set of attribute
values, each corresponding to a unique attribute in the public attribute set.
Fine-grained personal profiles have significant advantages over traditional coarse-
grained ones comprising only interested attributes from a public attribute set. First, fine-
grained personal profiles enable finer differentiation among the users having different
levels of interest in the same attribute. Continue with the previous example. Alice now
can choose Bob over Charlie, as she and Bob have closer attribute values for “movie.”
In addition, fine-grained personal profiles enable personalized profile matching in the
sense that two users can select the same agreed-upon metric from a set of candi-
date metrics to measure the similarity between their personal profiles or even different
metrics according to their individual needs. The accompanying challenge is, however,
how to ensure the privacy of fine-grained profile matching, which cannot be solved by
existing solutions [6,65,69].
This chapter explores fine-grained private (profile) matching to foster the wide
use of PMSN. Our main contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We motivate the requirement for and formulate the problem of fine-grained private
(profile) matching for PMSN for the first time in the literature.
• We propose the notion of fine-grained personal profiles and a corresponding suite
of novel private-matching protocols for different metrics measuring profile similar-
ity. Our first three protocols are for the 1 distance, which is the sum of absolute
difference in each attribute. We also propose a threshold-based protocol based
2Note that a user only needs to manually set the attribute values for interested attributes and leave all
the other attribute values as their default values (0).
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on the 1 distance, in which two users can determine whether the 1 distance
between their profiles is smaller than some personally chosen threshold. We fi-
nally extend the third protocol to be a threshold-based protocol based on the MAX
distance, which is the maximum absolute difference among all attributes.
• We provide thorough security analysis and performance evaluation of our pro-
posed protocols and demonstrate their efficacy and efficiency under practical set-
tings.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 formulates the prob-
lem of fine-grained private matching in PMSN. Section 5.3 presents a suite of novel
fine-grained private-matching protocols. Section 5.5 analyzes and evaluates the perfor-
mance of the proposed protocols. Section 5.6 discusses the related work. Section 5.7
concludes this chapter.
5.2 Problem Formulation and Cryptographic Tool
In this section, we first state our assumption on PMSN and then formulates the problem
of fine-grained private matching. Finally, we brief introduce Paillier’s cryptosystem [82],
the cryptographic tool underlying our protocol.
5.2.1 Proximity-Based Mobile Social Networking (PMSN)
We assume that each user carries a smartphone or some other mobile device with
the same PMSN application installed. The PMSN application can be developed by
small independent developers or offered by online social network service providers like
Facebook as a function module of their applications built for mobile devices. More and
more advanced PMSN applications have also been developed by the academia [120].
For convenience only, we shall not differentiate a user from his mobile device later.
A PMSN session involves two users and consists of three phases. First, two
users need discover each other in the neighbor-discovery phase. Second, they need
compare their personal profiles in the matching phase. Last, two matching users enter
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the interaction phase for real information exchange. Our work is concerned with the first
and second phases.
The PMSN application uses fine-grained personal profiles for fine-grained match-
ing. In particular, the application developer defines a public attribute set consisting of
d attributes {A1, . . . , Ad}, where d may range from several tens to several hundreds
depending on specific PMSN applications. The attributes may have different meanings
in different contexts, such as interests [65], disease symptoms [69], or friends [6]. For
easier illustration, we hereafter assume that that each attribute corresponds to a per-
sonal interest such as movie, sports, and cooking. To create a fine-grained personal
profile, every user selects an integer ui ∈ [0, γ − 1] to indicate his level of interest in
Ai (for all i ∈ [1, d]) the first time he uses the PMSN application. As a fixed system
parameter, γ could be a small integer, say 5 or 10, which may be sufficient to differ-
entiate user’s interest level. The higher ui, the more interest the user has in Ai, and
vice versa. More specifically, 0 and γ − 1 mean no interest and extremely high interest,
respectively. Every personal profile is then defined as a vector 〈u1, . . . , ud〉. The user
can also modify his profile later on as needed.
There are two additional points worth noting. First, our scheme incurs negligible
additional burden on the PMSN users in contrast to coarse-grained private matching
schemes [6, 65, 69]. More specifically, a user only need rate a few selected attributes
while leaving all the others as the default value 0. Second, the assumed attribute range
[0, γ − 1] is only for ease of illustration, and our protocols can directly support arbitrary
attribute ranges. For example, the attribute range can be [−γ+1, γ− 1], where −γ+1
corresponds to extreme dislike, and the default value 0 means neutral.
5.2.2 Problem Statement: Fine-Grained Private Matching in PMSN
We consider Alice with profile u = 〈u1, . . . , ud〉 and Bob with profile v = 〈v1, . . . , vd〉
as two exemplary users of the same PMSN application from here on. Assume that Al-
ice wants to find someone to chat with, e.g., when waiting for the flight to depart. As
the first step (Neighbor Discovery), she broadcasts a chatting request via the PMSN
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application on her smartphone to discover proximate users of the same PMSN applica-
tion. Suppose that she receives multiple responses including one from Bob who may
also simultaneously respond to other persons. It should be noted that normally PMSN
pseudonyms instead of real names are used in neighbor discovery. Due to time con-
straints or other reasons, both Alice and Bob can only interact with one stranger whose
profile best matches hers or his. The next step (Profile Matching) is thus for Alice (or
Bob) to compare her (or his) profile with those of others who responded to her (or whom
he responded to). Our subsequent discussion will focus on the profile-matching process
between Alice and Bob for the sake of simplicity. As in [21], we assume that the PMSN
application is completely distributed and does not involve any third party in neighbor
discovery, profile matching, and subsequent real user interactions.
Alice and Bob are both assumed to have privacy concerns about disclosing
their personal profiles to complete strangers, so a privacy-preserving matching protocol
is needed. In particular, let F denote a set of candidate matchings defined by the
PMSN application developer, where each f ∈ F is a function over two personal profiles
that measures their similarity. Our private-matching protocols allow Alice and Bob to
either negotiate one common metric from F or choose different metrics according to
their individual needs. We shall focus on the latter more general case henceforth, in
which private matching can be viewed as two independent protocol executions, with
each user initiating the protocol once according to her/his chosen matching. Assume
that Alice chooses a matching metric f ∈ F and runs the privacy-matching protocol with
Bob to compute f(u,v). According to the amount of information disclosed during the
protocol execution, we define the following three privacy levels from Alice’s viewpoint,
which can also be equivalently defined from Bob’s viewpoint for his chosen matching
metric.
Definition 5.2.1. Level-I privacy: When the protocol ends, Alice only learns f(u,v),
and Bob only learns f .
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Definition 5.2.2. Level-II privacy: When the protocol ends, Alice only learns f(u,v),
and Bob learns nothing.
Definition 5.2.3. Level-III privacy: When the protocol ends, Alice only learns if f(u,v) <
τA holds for some threshold τA of her own choice without learning f(u,v), and Bob
learns nothing.
For all three privacy levels, neither Alice nor Bob learns the other’s personal
profile. With level-I privacy, although Bob cannot learn f(u,v), he learns the matching
metric f chosen by Alice. In contrast to level-I privacy, level-II privacy additionally re-
quires that Bob learn nothing other than f ∈ F . Finally, level-III privacy discloses the
least amount of information by also hiding f(u,v) from Alice. We will introduce a suite
of private-matching protocols satisfying one of the three privacy levels. Besides priva-
cy guarantees, other design objectives include small communication and computation
overhead, which can translate into the total energy consumption and matching time and
thus are crucial for resource-constrained mobile devices and the usability of PMSN.
There might be passive attackers eavesdropping on the messages between
Alice and Bob. All our protocols can ensure that the eavesdroppers are completely
blind to the profiles of Alice and Bob and the matching metric(s) chosen by them, which
will not be disclosed in plain text during the protocol execution. For simplicity, we will
neglect passive eavesdroppers in subsequent protocol illustrations and analysis.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider some other possible attack-
s. For example, Bob may manipulate the protocol output by using an arbitrary profile
and/or not faithfully following the protocol operations (e.g., by changing intermediate
computation results). It is fundamentally difficult to defend against this attack without
involving a trusted third party as in [58, 65]. In particular, Alice cannot tell whether the
protocol output is caused by Bob’s misbehavior or they indeed having similar profiles.
Our protocols, however, can guarantee one of the three privacy levels for Alice against
Bob. Our protocols are also vulnerable to Denial-of-Service attacks in which an attacker
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keeps sending or replying to chatting requests without finishing private matching with
good users in order to consume their device resources. In addition, attackers may track
PMSN users if they use static pseudonyms in neighbor discovery, private matching, and
other PMSN communications. Moreover, intelligent attackers may launch the man-in-
the-middle (MiM) attack by surreptitiously relay messages between Alice and Bob who
are not physically proximate. These attacks are not unique to our private-matching sce-
nario, and similar ones can apply to any wireless protocol involving message exchanges
between multiple parties. The DoS attack can be mitigated by incorporating message
puzzles [52] into protocol design, the tracking attack can be alleviated by letting users
employ dynamic pseudonyms in PMSN communications, and the MiM attack can be
tackled by using the device pairing protocol in [40] . Tight space limitations do not allow
us to elaborate on these issues in detail here.
5.2.3 Cryptographic Tool: Paillier Cryptosystem
Our protocols rely on the Paillier cryptosystem [82], and we assume that every PMSN
user has a unique Paillier public/private key pair which can be generated via a function
module of the PMSN application. How the keys are generated and used for encryption
and decryption are briefed as follows to help illustrate and understand our protocols.
• Key generation. An entity chooses two primes p and q and compute N = pq
and λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1). It then selects a random g ∈ Z∗N2 such that gcd(L(gλ
mod N2), N) = 1, where L(x) = (x − 1)/N . The entity’s Paillier public and
private keys are 〈N, g〉 and λ, respectively.
• Encryption. Letm ∈ ZN be a plaintext to be encrypted and r ∈ ZN be a random
number. The ciphertext is given by
E(m mod N, r mod N) = gmrN mod N2 , (5.1)
where E(·) denotes the Paillier encryption operation on two integers modulo N .
To simplify our expressions, we shall hereafter omit the modular notation inside
E(·).
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• Decryption. Given a ciphertext c ∈ ZN2 , the corresponding plaintext can be
derived as
D(c) =
L(cλ mod N2)
L(gλ mod N2)
mod N , (5.2)
where D(·) denotes the Paillier decryption operation hereafter.
The Paillier’s cryptosystem has two very useful properties.
• Homomorphic. For any m1,m2, r1, r2 ∈ ZN , we have
E(m1, r1)E(m2, r2) = E(m1 +m2, r1r2) mod N
2,
Em2(m1, r1) = E(m1m2, r
m2
1 ) mod N
2 .
• Self-blinding.
E(m1, r1)r
N
2 mod N
2 = E(m1, r1r2) ,
which implies that any ciphertext can be changed to another without affecting the
plaintext.
The Paillier cryptosystem is semantically secure for sufficiently large N and g,
which means that it is infeasible for a computationally bounded adversary to derive
significant information about a message (plaintext) when given only its ciphertext and
the corresponding public key. To facilitate our illustrations, we assume that N and g
are of 1024 and 160 bits, respectively, for sufficient semantical security of the Paillier
cryptosystem [21]. Under this assumption, a public key 〈N, g〉 is of 1184 bits, a cipher-
text is of 2 log2N=2048 bits, a Paillier encryption needs two 1024-bit exponentiations
and one 2048-bit multiplication, and a Paillier decryption costs essentially one 2048-bit
exponentiation.
5.3 Fine-Grained Private Matching Protocols
In this section, we present three private-matching protocols to support different match-
ing metrics and offer different levels of privacy. In particular, Protocol 1 is for the 1-
distance matching metric and can offer level-I privacy, Protocol 2 supports a family of
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additively separable matching metrics and can offer level-II privacy, and Protocol 3 is
an enhancement of Protocol 3 for supporting level-III privacy.
A complete matching process involves Alice with profile u = 〈u1, . . . , ud〉 and
Bob with profile v = 〈v1, . . . , vd〉, each running an independent instance of the same or
even different private-matching protocol. Let f denote any matching metric supported
by Protocols 1 to 3. The larger f(u,v), the less similar u and v, and vice versa. We
can thus consider f(u,v) some kind of distance between u and v. Assume that Alice
has a threshold τA and will accept Bob if f(u,v) < τA. Similarly, Bob has a threshold
τB and will accept Alice if f(u,v) < τB. If both accept each other, they can start real
information exchange. Our subsequent protocol illustrations and analysis will be from
Alice’s viewpoint, which can be similarly done from Bob’s viewpoint. We assume that
Alice has a Paillier public key 〈N, g〉 and the corresponding private key λ, which are
generated as in Section 5.2.3. A practical security protocol often involves some rou-
tines such as using timestamps to mitigate replay attacks and message authentication
codes for integrity protection. To focus on explaining our key ideas, we will neglect such
security routines in protocol illustrations.
5.3.1 Protocol 1 for Level-I Privacy
Protocol 1 is designed for the 1 distance as the matching metric. Recall that every per-
sonal profile is a vector of dimension d. As probably the most straightforward matching
metric, the 1 distance (also called the Manhattan distance) is computed by summing
the absolute value of the element-wise subtraction of two profiles and is a special case
of the more general α distance defined as
α(u,v) = (
d∑
i=1
|vi − ui|α)
1
α , (5.3)
where α ≥ 1. When α = 1, we have 1(u,v) =
∑d
i=1 |vi− ui |. The 1 distance allows
a user to evaluate whether the overall absolute difference between his and another
user’s profiles is above a threshold chosen by himself.
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Protocol 1 is designed to offer level-I privacy from Alice’s viewpoint with regard
to Bob. It is a nontrivial adaptation from the protocol in [91] with significantly lower
computation overhead to be shown shortly. Our basic idea is to first convert 1(u,v)
into the 2 distance between the unary representations of u and v and then compute
the 2 distance using a secure dot-product protocol.
In particular, for all x ∈ [0, γ−1], we define a binary vector h(x) = 〈x1, . . . , xγ−1〉,
where xi is equal to one for 1 ≤ i ≤ x and zero for x < i ≤ γ − 1. We also
abuse the notation by defining another binary vector uˆ = h(u) = 〈h(u1), . . . , h(ud)〉 =
〈uˆ1, . . . , uˆ(γ−1)d〉 and vˆ = h(v) = 〈h(v1), . . . , h(vd)〉 = 〈vˆ1, . . . , vˆ(γ−1)d〉. It follows that
1(u,v) =
d∑
i=1
|ui − vi|
=
(γ−1)d∑
i=1
|uˆi − vˆi|
=
(γ−1)d∑
i=1
|uˆi − vˆi|2 = 22(uˆ, vˆ) .
(5.4)
The correctness of the above equation is straightforward. We can further note that
22(uˆ, vˆ) =
(γ−1)d∑
i=1
|uˆi − vˆi|2
=
(γ−1)d∑
i=1
uˆ2i − 2
(γ−1)d∑
i=1
uˆivˆi +
(γ−1)d∑
i=1
vˆ2i
=
(γ−1)d∑
i=1
uˆ2i − 2uˆ · vˆ +
(γ−1)d∑
i=1
vˆ2i .
(5.5)
Since Alice and Bob know
∑(γ−1)d
i=1 uˆ
2
i and
∑(γ−1)d
i=1 vˆ
2
i , respectively, we just need a
secure dot-product protocol for Bob to compute uˆ · vˆ without knowing Alice’s profile u
or disclosing his profile v to Alice. Subsequently, Bob can return −2uˆ · vˆ+∑(γ−1)di=1 vˆ2i
for Alice to finish computing 22(uˆ, vˆ) and thus 1(u,v).
5.3.1.1 Protocol Details
The detailed operations of Protocol 1 are as follows.
1. Alice does the following in sequence.
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a. Construct a vector uˆ = h(u) = (h(u1), . . . , h(ud)) = (uˆ1, . . . , uˆ(γ−1)d),
where uˆj is equal to one for every j ∈ Ju = {j|(i − 1)(γ − 1) < j ≤
(i− 1)(γ − 1) + ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ d} and zero otherwise.
b. Choose a distinct rj ∈ ZN and compute E(uˆj , rj) for every j ∈ [1, (γ − 1)d]
using her public key.
c. Send {E(uˆj , rj)}(γ−1)dj=1 and her public key to Bob.
2. Bob does the following after receiving Alice’s message.
a. Construct a vector vˆ = h(v) = (h(v1), . . . , h(vd)) = (vˆ1, . . . , vˆ(γ−1)d),
where vˆj is equal to one for every j ∈ Jv = {j|(i − 1)(γ − 1) < j ≤
(i− 1)(γ − 1) + vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ d} and zero otherwise.
b. Compute
E(uˆ · vˆ,
∏
j∈Jv
rj) = E(
∑
j∈Jv
uˆj,
∏
j∈Jv
rj)
=
∏
j∈Jv
E(uˆj , rj) mod N
2 ,
(5.6)
where the first equality sign is very obvious, and the second is due to the
homomorphic property of the Paillier cryptosystem.
c. Compute
E((N − 2)uˆ · vˆ, s) = EN−2(uˆ · vˆ,
∏
j∈Jv
rj) mod N
2 ,
where s = (
∏
j∈Jv rj)
N−2 mod N . This equation holds again due to the
homomorphic property of the Paillier cryptosystem.
d. Compute E(
∑d(γ−1)
j=1 vˆ
2
j , r) with a random r ∈ ZN .
e. Compute
E(
d(γ−1)∑
j=1
vˆ2j − 2uˆ · vˆ, rs) = E(
d(γ−1)∑
j=1
vˆ2j + (N − 2)uˆ · vˆ, rs)
= E(
d(γ−1)∑
j=1
vˆ2j , r) · E((N − 2)uˆ · vˆ, s) mod N2 ,
(5.7)
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and send it back to Alice. Note that the first equality sign is because vˆ2j −
2uˆ · vˆ = vˆ2j +(N − 2)uˆ · vˆ mod N , and that the second is again due to the
homomorphic property of the Paillier cryptosystem.
3. Alice decrypts E(
∑d(γ−1)
j=1 vˆ
2
j −2uˆ ·vˆ, rs) using her private key to get
∑d(γ−1)
j=1 vˆ
2
j −
2uˆ · vˆ and finally computes
1(u,v) =
d(γ−1)∑
j=1
vˆ2j − 2uˆ · vˆ +
d(γ−1)∑
j=1
uˆ2j . (5.8)
5.3.1.2 Protocol Analysis
We now analyze the privacy provision of Protocol 1 and the related computation and
communication overhead.
Theorem 5.3.1. Protocol 1 ensures level-I privacy if the Paillier cryptosystem is seman-
tically secure and a personal profile is a vector of dimension d ≥ 2.
Proof. Bob receives and operates only on ciphertexts {E(uˆ1, r1)}(γ−1)dj=1 and does not
know Alice’s private key. Since the Paillier cryptosystem is semantically secure, com-
putationally bounded Bob cannot decrypt the ciphertexts to learn anything about Alice’s
profile u. As to Alice, she only get
∑d(γ−1)
j=1 vˆ
2
j − 2uˆ · vˆ. If she wants to find out Bob’s
profile v, she must solve an equation with d unknowns, which is infeasible for d ≥ 2.
Therefore, Alice knows nothing about v other than the result 1(u,v).
The computation overhead incurred by Protocol 1 is mainly related to modular
exponentiations and multiplications. In particular, Alice need perform (γ − 1)d Pailli-
er encryptions in Step 1.a, each costing two 1024-bit exponentiations and one 2048-
bit multiplication according to Eq. (5.1). Note that Alice can preselect many random
numbers and precompute the corresponding ciphertexts in an offline manner to re-
duce the online matching time.3 In addition, Alice need perform one Paillier decryption
in Step 3, which is essentially a 2048-bit exponentiation. As for Bob, he need per-
form
∑d
i=1 vi − 1 2048-bit multiplications in Step 2.b, one 2048-bit exponentiation in
3Alice can even do such offline computations on her regular computer and then synchronize the results
to her mobile device.
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Step 2.c, two 1024-bit exponentiations and one 2048-bit multiplication (i.e., one Paillier
encryption) in Step 2.d, and one 2048-bit multiplication in Step 2.e. Considering Alice
and Bob together, we can approximate the online computation cost of Protocol 1 to be∑d
i=1 vi + 1 2048-bit multiplications, two 2048-bit exponentiations, and two 1024-bit
exponentiations. In contrast, a direct application of the secure dot-protocol in [91] will
require Bob to perform totally (γ − 1)d − 1 more 2048-bit exponentiations in Steps 2.b
and 2.c.
The communication overhead incurred by Protocol 1 involves Alice sending her
public key 〈N, g〉 and (γ − 1)d ciphertexts in Step 1.c and Bob returning one ciphertext
in Step 2.e. Since a public key and a ciphertext are of 1184 and 2048 bits, respectively,
the total net communication cost of Protocol 1 is of 2048(γ − 1)d + 3232 bits without
considering message headers and other fields.
5.3.2 Protocol 2 for Level-II Privacy
We now introduce Protocol 2 which can satisfy level-II privacy. In contrast to Protocol 1
working only for the 1 distance, Protocol 2 can apply to a family of additively separable
matching metrics and also hide the matching metric chosen by one user from the other.
The secrecy of a user’s selected matching metric can help prevent an attacker from
generating better tailored profiles to deceive the victim user into a successful matching.
To illustrate Protocol 2, we first introduce the definition of additively separable
functions as follows.
Definition 5.3.1. A function f(u,v) is additively separable if it can be written as f(u,v) =∑d
i=1 fi(ui, vi) for some functions f1(·), . . . , fn(·).
Many common matching metrics are additively separable. For example, the 1
distance can be written as 1(u,v) =
∑d
i=1 |ui − vi |, the dot product is u · v =∑d
i=1 uivi, and the α norm is 
α
α =
∑d
i=1 |ui − vi|α. In addition, assuming that
Alice assigns a weight wi to attribute i, we can define the weighted 1 distance as∑d
i=1wi|ui − vi| which is also additively separable.
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Protocol 2 works by first converting any additively separable function into a dot-
product computation. In particular, given an additively separable similarity function f
of interest, Alice constructs a vector u˜ = 〈u˜1, . . . , u˜γd〉, where u˜j = fi(ui, k), i =
(j − 1)/γ + 1, and k = (j − 1) mod γ, for all j ∈ [1, γd]. Assume that Bob also
relies on his profile v to construct a binary vector v˜ = (v˜1, . . . , v˜γd), where the jth bit v˜j
equals one for all j ∈ J ′v = {j|j = (i − 1)γ + vi + 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ d} and zero otherwise.
It follows that u˜j v˜j = u˜j = fi(ui, vi) for all j ∈ J ′v and zero otherwise. We then can
easily obtain the following result.
f(u,v) =
d∑
i=1
fi(ui, vi)
=
∑
j∈J ′v
u˜j
=
γd∑
j=1
u˜j v˜j = u˜ · v˜
(5.9)
So we can let Alice run a secure dot-protocol protocol with Bob to obtain u˜ · v˜ = f(u,v)
without disclosing u or f to Bob.
5.3.2.1 Protocol Details
The detailed operations of Protocol 2 are as follows.
1. Alice first constructs a vector u˜ as discussed above and then chooses a distinct
random rj ∈ ZN to compute E(u˜j , rj) for all j ∈ [1, γd] using her public key.
Finally, she sends {E(u˜j , rj)}γdj=1 and her public key to Bob.
2. Bob constructs a vector v˜ as described above after receiving Alice’s message.
He then computes
E(u˜ · v˜,
∏
j∈J ′v
rj) = E(
∑
j∈J ′v
uˆj,
∏
j∈J ′v
rj)
=
∏
j∈J ′v
E(uˆj , rj) mod N
2 ,
(5.10)
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which holds due to Eq. (5.9) and the homogenous property of the Paillier cryp-
tosystem. Next, he selects a random number rB ∈ ZN to compute
E(u˜ · v˜, rB
∏
j∈J ′v
rj) = E(u˜ · v˜,
∏
j∈J ′v
rj) · rNB mod N2 , (5.11)
which holds due to the self-blinding property of the Paillier cryptosystem intro-
duced in Chapter 5.2.3. Finally, Bob returns E(u˜ · v˜, rB
∏
j∈J ′v rj) to Alice.
3. Alice uses her private key to decrypt E(u˜ · v˜, rB
∏
j∈J ′v rj) and finally get u˜ · v˜,
i.e., f(u,v).
Note that it is necessary for Bob to perform one more encryption in Step.2 using
a random number rB unknown to Alice. Otherwise, Alice may be able to easily infer
Bob’s profile v by purposefully choosing her profile v and random numbers {rj}γdj=1.
5.3.2.2 Protocol Analysis
We now analyze the privacy provision of Protocol 2 and the related computation and
communication overhead.
Theorem 5.3.2. Protocol 2 ensures level-II privacy if the Paillier cryptosystem is se-
mantically secure and a personal profile is a vector of dimension d ≥ 2.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 5.3.1 except the additional point that Bob
does not know the matching metric f employed by Alice. It is thus omitted here for lack
of space.
The computation overhead incurred by Protocol 2 also mainly relates to mod-
ular exponentiations and multiplications. In particular, Alice need perform γd Paillier
encryptions in Step 1, each requiring two 1024-bit exponentiations and one 2048-bit
multiplication. As in Protocol 1, Alice can do these encryptions beforehand in an offline
manner. In addition, Alice need do one Paillier decryption in Step 3, corresponding to
one 2048-bit exponentiation. Moreover, Bob need perform d − 1 = |J ′v| − 1 2048-bit
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multiplications in Eq. (5.10) plus one 1024-bit exponentiation and one 2048-bit multipli-
cation in Eq. (5.11). In summary, the total online computation overhead of Protocol 2
can be approximated by d 2048-bit multiplications, one 2048-bit exponentiation, and
one 1024-bit exponentiation.
The communication overhead incurred by Protocol 2 involves Alice sending her
public key 〈N, g〉 and γd ciphertexts in Step 1 and Bob returning one ciphertext in
Step 2. Similar to that of Protocol 1, the total net communication cost of Protocol 2 can
be computed as 2048(γd + 1) + 1184 bits without considering message headers and
other fields.
5.3.3 Protocol 3 for Level-III Privacy
Protocol 3 is designed to offer level-III privacy. In contrast to Protocol 2, it only lets Alice
know whether f(u,v) is smaller than a threshold τA of her own choice, while hiding
f(u,v) from her. Protocol 3 is desirable if Bob does not want Alice to know the actual
similarity score f(u,v) between their profiles.
Protocol 3 is based on a special trick. In particular, assuming that there are three
arbitrary integers δ, δ1, and δ2 such that δ > δ1 > δ2 ≥ 0, we have 0 < (δ1 − δ2)/δ <
1. Since we assume f(u,v) and τA both to be integers, f(u,v) < τA is equivalent
to f(u,v) + (δ1 − δ2)/δ < τA and thus δf(u,v) + δ1 < δτA + δ2. On the other
hand, if f(u,v) ≥ τA, we would have f(u,v) + (δ1 − δ2)/δ > τA. According to this
observation, Bob can choose random δ, δ1, and δ2 unknown to Alice and then send
encrypted δf(u,v) + δ1 and δτA + δ2 to Alice. After decrypting the ciphtertexts, Alice
can check whether δf(u,v)+δ1 is smaller than δτA+δ2 to learn whether f(u,v) < τA.
5.3.3.1 Protocol Details
The detailed operations of Protocol 3 are as follows.
1. Alice first constructs a vector u˜ as in Step 1 of Protocol 2. She then chooses a
distinct random rj ∈ ZN to compute E(u˜j , rj) for all j ∈ [1, γd] and also another
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distinct random rτA to compute E(τA, rτA). Finally, she sends {E(u˜j , rj)}γdj=1,
E(τA, rτA), and her public key to Bob.
2. Bob first construct a binary vector v˜ whereby to compute E(u˜ · v˜,∏j∈J ′v rj)
(i.e., E(f(u,v),
∏
j∈J ′v rj)) as in Step 2 of Protocol 2. He then randomly choose
r′1, r
′
2, δ, δ1, δ2 ∈ ZN such that δ > δ1 > δ2 to compute
E(δu˜ · v˜ + δ1, s1) = E(u˜ · v˜,
∏
j∈J ′v
rj)
δE(δ1, r
′
1) mod N
2
(5.12)
and
E(δτA + δ2, r
′
2rτA) = E(τA, rτA)
δ · E(δ2, r′2) mod N2 , (5.13)
where s1 = r′1(
∏
j∈J ′v rj)
δ mod N . Both equations hold due to the homomor-
phic property of the Paillier cryptosystem. Finally, Bob returns E(δu˜v˜ + δ1, s1)
and E(δτA + δ2, r′2rτA) to Alice.
3. Alice decrypts the ciphertexts to get δu˜·v˜+δ1 and δτA+δ2. If the former is smaller
than the latter, Alice knows f(u,v) < τA. Otherwise, she knows f(u,v) ≥ τA.
5.3.3.2 Protocol Analysis
We now analyze the privacy provision of Protocol 3 and the related computation and
communication overhead.
Theorem 5.3.3. Protocol 3 ensures level-III privacy if the Paillier cryptosystem is se-
mantically secure and a personal profile is a vector of dimension d ≥ 2.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 5.3.2 except the additional points that
Bob does not know Alice’s threshold τA and that Alice does know the comparison result
f(u,v).
The computation overhead incurred by Protocol 3 also mainly relates to modu-
lar exponentiations and multiplications. In particular, Alice need perform γd+ 1 Paillier
encryptions in Step 1, each requiring two 1024-bit exponentiations and one 2048-bit
multiplication. As in Protocol 2, Alice can do these encryptions beforehand in an offline
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manner. In addition, Alice need do two Paillier decryptions in Step 3, each correspond-
ing to one 2048-bit exponentiation. Moreover, Bob need perform d − 1 = |J ′v| − 1
2048-bit multiplications in Eq. (5.10) plus one 1024-bit exponentiation and one 2048-bit
multiplication in Eq. (5.11). Furthermore, Bob need do one 2048-bit exponentiation, one
Paillier encryption, and one 2048-bit multiplication in each of Eqs. (5.12) and (5.13). In
summary, the total online computation cost of Protocol 3 is d+3 2048-bit multiplications,
four 2048-bit exponentiations, and four 1024-bit exponentiations.
The communication overhead incurred by Protocol 3 involves Alice sending her
public key 〈N, g〉 and γd+ 1 ciphertexts in Step 1 and Bob returning two ciphertexts in
Step 2. Similar to that of Protocol 2, the total net communication cost of Protocol 3 can
be computed as 2048(γd + 3) + 1184 bits without considering message headers and
other fields.
5.4 Extension: MAX-Distance Matching
In this section, we present another private-matching protocol based on the MAX dis-
tance. Given two personal profiles u and v, the MAX distance between them is defined
as follows.
max(u,v) = max{|v1 − u1|, . . . , |vd − ud|} (5.14)
Protocols 1 to 3 all enable a user to check whether the overall absolute difference
between her and another user’s profiles is below a personally chosen threshold. In con-
trast, Protocol 4 allows the user to check whether the maximum attribute-wise absolute
difference does not exceed her personal threshold.
At the first glance, max(u,v) is not an additively separable function, so it cannot
be computed using Protocol 2 or 3. In what follows, we first show how to convert
max(u,v) into an additively separable function based on a concept called similarity
matching and then present the protocol details and analysis.
5.4.1 From the MAX Distance to an Additively Separable Function
The conversion from max(u,v) to an additively separable function relies on similarity
matching defined as follows.
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Definition 5.4.1. Given two user’s personal profiles u = 〈u1, . . . , ud〉 and v = 〈v1, . . . , vd〉,
their i attributes are considered similar if |ui − vi| ≤ τ for a specific threshold τ .
Definition 5.4.2. The similarity score of u and v, denoted by Φ(u,v, τ), is defined as
the total number of similar attributes, i.e.,
Φ(u,v, τ) =
d∑
i=1
φ(ui, vi, τ) ,
where
φ(ui, vi, τ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 if |ui − vi| ≤ τ,
0 otherwise .
The similarity score has three essential properties. First, it is additively separa-
ble, implying that Alice can run Protocol 2 with Bob to compute Φ(u,v, τ) or Protocol 3
to check whether Φ(u,v, τ) < τA. Second, it is directly affected by the value of τ .
In particular, the larger τ , the higher Φ(u,v, τ), and vice versa. Last, it relates to
max(u,v) based on the following theorem.
Theorem 5.4.1. For all τ ≥ max(u,v), we have Φ(u,v, τ) = d; likewise, for all τ <
max(u,v), we have Φ(u,v, τ) < d.
Proof. By the definition of the MAX distance, we have |ui − vi| ≤ max(u,v) for all
1 ≤ i ≤ d. It follows that φ(ui, vi, τ) = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d if τ ≥ max(u,v). Therefore,
we have therefore have s(u,v, τ) = d for all τ ≥ max(u,v). Similarly, by the defini-
tion of MAX distance, there exists k such that |uk − vk| = max(u,v). It follows that
φ(uk, vk, τ) = 0, so we have Φ(u,v, τ) < d for all τ < max(u,v).
5.4.2 Protocol 4: MAX-Distance Matching for Level-III Privacy
Protocol 4 depends on Protocol 3 for level-III privacy. Let τmax to denote Alice’s MAX-
distance threshold kept secret from Bob. According to Theorem 4, checking whether
max(u,v) < τmax is equivalent to checking whether Φ(u,v, τmax) = d.
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5.4.2.1 Protocol Details
1. Alice first constructs a vector u˜ = 〈u˜1, . . . , u˜γd〉, where u˜j = φi(ui, k, τmax), i =
j/γ+1, and k = (j − 1) mod γ for all j ∈ [1, γd]. He then chooses a random
rmax ∈ ZN to compute E(d, rmax) and a distinct random rj ∈ ZN to compute
E(u˜j , rj) for all j ∈ [1, γd]. Finally, she sends {E(u˜j , rj)}γdj=1, E(d, rτmax), and her
public key to Bob.
2. Bob performs almost the same operations as in Step 2 of Protocol 2 (except
replacing rA by rmax) and returns E(δu˜ · v˜ + δ1, s1) and E(δd + δ2, r′2rτmax) to
Alice. As in Protocol 2, we have u˜ · v˜ = Φ(u,v, τmax).
3. Alice does the same as in Step 3 of Protocol 3 to check whether δu˜ ·v˜+δ1 < δd+
δ2. If so, she learns u˜·v˜ < d (i.e., Φ(u,v, τmax) < d) and thus max(u,v) > τmax.
Otherwise, Alice knows max(u,v) ≤ τmax.
Since Protocol 4 is a special case of Protocol 3 and thus can also ensure level-III
privacy with the same communication and computation overhead as that of Protocol 3.
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5.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the communication and computation overhead as well as
overall execution time of our protocols in contrast to previous work. Since previous
work [6,21,65,69] on private matching for PMSN is not applicable to fine-grained private
matching addressed by our protocols, we only compare our work with RSV, which refers
to the 1 distance protocol in [91] and can satisfy level-I privacy. We are not aware of
any existing work that can offer level-III privacy as our Protocol 3. We omit the rather
straightforward derivation process for the communication and computation costs of RSV
and refer interested readers to [91] for details.
Table 5.1 summarizes the theoretical performance of Protocols 1∼4 and RSV,
where mul1,mul2, exp1, and exp2 denote one 1024-bit multiplication, 2048-bit multipli-
cation, 1024-bit exponentiation, and 2048-bit exponentiation, respectively. It is clear
that all our protocols incur significantly lower online computation overhead than RSV
with similar communication overhead.
5.5.1 Implementation
We implement our four protocols and RSV on LG P-970 smartphones, which has a
1GHz Cortex-A8 processor, 512 MB RAM, Android v2.2 Operating System, a 802.11
b/g/n WiFi interface, and Bluetooth v2.1 with Enhanced Data Rate (EDR). As in [21], we
use a publicly available Java implementation of Paillier cryptosystem [51]. The whole
PMSN application consists of 5000+ lines of Java code, in which our four protocols
share the majority of the codes. Since Android platform currently does not support WiFi
ad-hoc mode, we let two smartphones communicate with each other through Bluetooth.
In our experiments, we are only able to achieve a transmission rate of approximately
800 kb/s, lthough Bluetooth v2.1 with EDR is expected to operate at a transmission rate
of 2.1 Mb/s. If better Bluetooth implementations are available, the execution time of our
protocols can be significantly reduced.
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In our implementation, assuming that Alice initiates the matching protocol with
Bob, each protocol consists of five main steps as follows.
1. Alice prepares the message through offline computation, e.g., generating a num-
ber of ciphertexts according to our protocol specifications;
2. Alice sends the message to indicate the start of the protocol;
3. Bob receives and buffers the message;
4. Once the transmission completes, Bob computes the intermediate result accord-
ing to our protocol specifications, and sends it back to Alice;
5. On receiving the intermediate result, Alice computes the final matching result.
We use custom message headers in the application layer to distinguish these mes-
sages.
5.5.2 Experimental Results
We first measure the computation time of different basic operations of Paillier cryp-
tosystem on LG P-970 and a Dell XPS 9100 desktop with Intel Core i7 920 2.6GHZ
CPU, 9GB RAM, and Windows 7 Operating System. The desktop is used for offline
computation. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the mean, maximum, minimum, medium, and
standard deviation of the execution time of mul1, mul2, exp1, exp2, Enc, and Dec on dif-
ferent platforms, where Enc and Dec denote one Paillier encryption and one decryption,
respectively, and each value is computed statistically from 10,000 runs. We can see
that it takes much less time to perform the same operation on Dell XPS 9100 than on
LG P-970. For example, one Paillier encryption takes on average 167.21 ms and 37.53
ms on LG P-970 and Dell XPS 9100, respectively. In what follows, we assume that
the offline computation is performed on desktop and is not counted into the protocol
execution time.
In our experiments, we generate random profiles with each having d attributes,
where every attribute value is chosen from [0, γ − 1] uniformly at random. The perfor-
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Table 5.2: Execution time of different operations (ms) on LG P-970
Operation Mean Max Min Median Std.
mul1 0.73 40.25 0.58 0.61 1.16
exp1 81.08 112.0 77.0 78.0 6.22
mul2 0.88 43.00 0.73 0.76 1.14
exp2 159.06 197.0 153.0 154.0 9.75
Enc 167.21 295.0 158.0 159.0 17.53
Dec 165.6 227.0 160.0 161.0 10.27
Table 5.3: Execution time of different operations (ms) on Dell XPS 9100
Operation Mean Max Min Median Std.
mul1 0.0076 0.10 0.0042 0.0062 0.0055
exp1 18.84 28.0 17.0 18.0 1.54
mul2 0.033 0.28 0.031 0.031 0.0080
exp2 36.26 40.0 34.0 36.0 1.46
Enc 37.53 40.0 35.0 37.0 1.16
Dec 37.66 41.0 36.0 37.0 1.20
mance metrics used include the offline computation time on the desktop, online com-
putation time on the smartphone, the total net communication cost in bits, and the total
online execution time including the online computation, communication, and internal
processing time. Note that a complete matching process involves two independent ex-
ecutions of the same or even different private-matching protocols, initiated by Alice and
Bob, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that Alice and Bob choose the same pro-
tocol and only show the results for one protocol execution. The total matching time thus
should be twice the shown total online execution time. Finally, since Protocol 4 has the
same communication and computation overhead as Protocol 3, its performance results
are not shown for brevity.
5.5.2.1 Impact of d
We first check the case when γ = 5 and d varies. It is not surprising to see from
Fig. 5.1a that the offline computation costs of all the four protocols are proportional to
d. In addition, Protocols 2 and 3 incur comparable offline computation overhead higher
than that of Protocol 1 and RSV which incur the same computation overhead. The main
reason is that both Protocols 2 and 3 require γd + 1 offline Paillier encryptions,4 while
4Recall that one Paillier encryption corresponds to two 1024-bit exponentiation and one 2048-bit mul-
tiplication.
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(a) offline computation cost (b) online computation cost
(c) communication cost (d) protocol execution time
Figure 5.1: Impact of the profile dimension d, where γ = 5.
RSV and Protocol 1 require (γ − 1)d. Since users can do such offline computations
on their regular computers and then synchronize the results to their mobile devices, the
offline computation cost thus does not contribute to the total protocol execution time.
Fig. 5.1b shows the online computation costs of all the protocols in the log 10
scale for a fixed γ = 5 and varying d. It is clear that Protocols 1 to 3 all incur much
lower online computation overhead than RSV. The main reasons are that 1024-bit and
2048-bit exponentiations dominate the online computation costs of all the protocols and
that Protocols 1 to 3 all require a constantly small number of modular exponentiations,
while RSV requires a much larger number of modular exponentiations that increases
almost linearly with d.
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Fig. 5.1c compares the total net communication costs of all the protocols for
a fixed γ = 5 and varying d. We can see that all the protocols incur comparable
communication costs which all increase almost linearly as d increases, which is of no
surprise.
Fig. 5.1d shows the total protocol execution time for a fixed γ = 5, which com-
prise the online computation, communication, and internal processing time and is dom-
inated by the former. We can see that there are some fluctuations in the protocol exe-
cution time, mainly due to unstable transmission rate of the Bluetooth interface. In addi-
tion, Protocol 2 has the shortest execution time among Protocols 1 to 3, while Protocol 3
has the longest for achieving level-III privacy. All our protocols, however, can finish with-
in 15 seconds under all simulated scenarios in contrast to the much longer execution
time required by RSV. For example, when d = 100, RSV require 80.1 seconds to finish,
while Protocols 1 to 3 only require 4.2, 4.2, and 4.7 seconds, respectively. Recall that
a complete private-matching process involves two protocol executions. Our three pro-
tocols are thus much more feasible and user-friendly solutions to private matching for
PMSN.
5.5.2.2 Impact of γ
The impact of γ on the protocol performance is shown in Fig. 5.2, where d is fixed to be
100. Similar results can be observed as in Fig. 5.1. In particular, the online computation
time of Protocols 1 to 3 are relatively insensitive to the increase in γ while that of RSV
increases linearly as γ increases.
5.5.2.3 Energy Consumption
As in [21], we measure the energy consumption of our protocols using PowerTutor [131].
Table III shows that the energy consumption of one execution of RSV and Protocols 1
to 3, where d = 100 and γ = 5. We can see that all our protocols consumes about
one eighth of the energy RSV does. In addition, a fully charged LG P-970 has 20,160J
and one execution of any of our protocols only consumes less than 0.06% of the total
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(a) offline computation cost (b) online computation cost
(c) communication cost (d) protocol execution latency
Figure 5.2: Impact of the highest attribute value γ, where d = 200.
Table 5.4: Comparison of energy consumption for four protocols, where d = 100 and
γ = 5
Energy Consumption (J)
Protocol Alice Percentage Bob Percentage Total
RSV [91] 100 0.46% 98 0.45% 198
Protocol 1 12 0.055% 9.6 0.047% 21.6
Protocol 2 12.3 0.057% 9.6 0.047% 21.9
Protocol 3 13.2 0.061% 13.9 0.064% 27.1
energy, which indicate that our private matching protocols are very practical in terms of
power consumption.
5.5.3 Discussion
The experimental results show that all our protocols incur similar offline computation and
communication overhead but significantly lower online computation overhead and thus
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total protocol execution latency in comparison with RSV, making them more practical
than RSV to realize private matching in PMSN.
To further reduce the total execution latency of our protocols, there are two di-
rections to explore. First, since a significant portion of the total protocol execution time
is the transmission time, it is possible to reduce the total execution latency by using ad-
vanced wireless interface with higher transmission rate. For example, Bluetooth 3.0 and
4.0 have a promised speed of 25 Mb/s, and Wi-Fi Direct has the maximum transmis-
sion rate of up to 250 Mb/s, while our current achievable transmission rate via Bluetooth
interface on LG P-970 is only 800 kb/s. As more and more emerging mobile devices
support these advanced interfaces, the transmission time and total protocol execution
latency of our protocols will be significantly reduced. For instance, when d = 100 and
γ = 5, with a transmission rate of 25 Mb/s, the total execution times of Protocols 1 to
3 will be close to the online computation time, i.e., 2.1s, 1.4s, and 2.4s, respectively.
Second, our currently implementation uses the publicly available Java implementation
of Paillier cryptosystem [51] without any optimization, further optimization is expected
to further reduce the online computation time.
5.6 Related Work
In this section, we briefly discuss some work in several areas which is most germane to
our work in this chapter.
Privatematching for PMSN. Asmentioned in Chapter 5.1, the private matching schemes
proposed in [6, 65, 69] aim at coarse-grained personal profiles and match two users
based on a privacy-preserving computation of the intersection (cardinality) of their at-
tribute sets. In contrast, our protocols support fine-grained personal profiles and thus
much finer user differentiation, which is important for fostering the much wider use of
PMSN. To our best knowledge, Dong et al. presented the only piece of work in [21]
that does not match two users in PMSN using the intersection (cardinality) of their at-
tribute sets. Instead, they proposed using the social proximity between two users as the
matching metric, which measures the distance between their social coordinates with
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each being a vector precomputed by a trusted central server to represent the location of
a user in an online social network. By comparison, our work does not rely on the affili-
ation of PMSN users with a single online social network and addresses a more general
private matching problem for PMSN by supports fine-grained personal profiles and a
wide spectrum of matching metrics.
Secure multi-party computation. Private matching for PMSN can also be viewed as
special instances of secure two-party computation, which was initially introduced by Yao
in [121] and later generalized to secure multi-party computation by Goldreich et al. [39]
and many others. In secure two-party computation, two users with private inputs x and
y, respectively, both want to compute some function f(x, y) without any party learning
information beyond what can be inferred from the result f(x, y). It was shown that all
secure multi-party computation problems can be solved using the general approach in
using the general approach [39], which is nevertheless too inefficient to use in practice.
The existing literature on secure multi-party computation thus focused on devising more
efficient solutions for specific functions. Our work in this chapter belong to this category
and gives efficient solutions to many PMSN matching metrics.
Privacy-preserving data mining and scientific computation. Securely computing
some function over two vectors has also been investigated in the context of privacy-
preserving data mining and scientific computation. In particular, secure dot-product
computation was studied in [23, 38, 50, 97]. As in [21], we adopt the method in [38] as
a component of our protocols and make significant contributions on relating the com-
putation of many PMSN matching metrics to secure dot-product computation. Privacy-
preserving correlation computation was studied in [57, 89] and is loosely related to our
work here. Moreover, some novel methods were proposed in [91] for securely comput-
ing the approximate 1 distance of two private vectors. As said before, our Protocol 1 is
adapted from the protocols [91] but with significantly smaller computation overhead. In
addition, Du et al. proposed a set of protocols based on commutative encryptions for
securely computing the difference between two private vectors based on different met-
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rics [22], including the 1 distance, the 2 distance, and a more general function. Since
all known commutative encryption schemes are deterministic, i.e., the same plaintext
always leads to the same cyphertext, it is less secure than Paillier cryptosystem [65]. It
is not clear how to apply their protocols to our problem here in an efficient and secure
fashion.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we formulated the problem of fine-grained private (profile) matching
for proximity-based mobile social networking and presented a suite of novel solutions
that support a variety of private-matching metrics at different privacy levels. Detailed
performance analysis and experimental evaluation confirmed the high efficiency of our
protocols over prior work under various practical settings.
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Chapter 6
SECURE CROWDSOURCING-BASED COOPERATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING
6.1 Introduction
Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is a key function for dynamic spectrum access
and is essential for avoiding interference with licensed primary users and identifying
spectrum holes [4]. It relies on spatially distributed cognitive radio (CR) users to jointly
detect the occupancy of a licensed channel in a specific location and time range. In
contrast to spectrum sensing by individual CR users, CSS could largely mitigate many
factors such as multipath fading and shadowing [4] and thus has considerably better
performance.
Centralized CSS involves a centralized fusion center (FC) which instructs se-
lected CR users to sense a specific channel and then makes a global decision about
channel occupancy by aggregating received local sensing results. Local spectrum
sensing at cooperative CR users normally relies on energy detection, matched filter
detection, or cyclostationary-feature detection. Data fusion can be in the form of ei-
ther soft or hard combination, which requires the CR users to report raw sensing data
or local decisions to the FC, respectively. As in [16, 26, 53, 64, 73], we consider soft
combining in this chapter.
A promising method for effective CSS over a large geographic region is to ex-
plore the emerging crowdsourcing paradigm, in which special spectrum-sensing providers
(SSPs) [26–28,98] outsource spectrum-sensing tasks to distributed mobile users called
mobile detectors who themselves may also be secondary CR users. The feasibility of
crowdsourcing-based CSS (CCSS for short) is deeply rooted in the ubiquitous penetra-
tion of mobile devices into everyday life. Specifically, according to a recent Cisco re-
port [1], the number of mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets will exceed the
world population in 2012 and hit 10 billion in 2016, which implies sufficient geographic
coverage especially in highly populated regions such as metropolitan areas. Moreover,
they can always accurately self-localize based on hybrid GPS, WiFi, and cellular po-
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sitioning techniques. Since dynamic spectrum access is expected to be pervasive in
future wireless systems, it is widely expected that future mobile devices can perform
spectrum sensing via either internal spectrum sensors or external ones acquired from
other parties like the SSP [4,26–28,74].
CCSS, though appealing, is vulnerable to false sensing reports, each containing
a power measurement much larger (or smaller) than the true value to inflate (or deflate)
the final average. A false sensing report can come from a normal mobile detector with a
faulty spectrum sensor, a dishonest one wishing to save energy by faking data without
actual sensing, or a malicious one aiming to prevent other users from using the channel
by submitting an extremely high (or low) power measurement. Without sound defenses
in place, the SSP may be misled by false sensing reports to falsely determine that the
channel is busy (or vacant). It is thus critical to ensure secure soft combination such
that the impact of possible false sensing reports can be minimized.
The prior work on secure CSS against false sensing reports can be generally
classified into three categories. The first category such as [26, 28, 53, 64, 73] uses
various anomaly detection techniques to identify false sensing reports and would fail if
they constitute the majority, as discussed in [27]. The second category such as [16,53,
130] uses reputations to differentiate malicious mobile detectors from legitimate ones
and is unable to handle sudden change in mobile detectors’ behaviors. More recent
work [27] relies on some trusted nodes to detect false sensing reports which requires
real signal propagation data from primary users (PUs) that are often difficult to obtain.
A sound soft combination scheme that can withstand a majority of malicious mobile
detectors without too strong assumptions remains an open challenge.
As the first work of its kind, we propose a novel scheme to realize secure CCSS
in the presence of malicious mobile detectors possibly being the majority without requir-
ing real signal propagation data from PUs. Our scheme relies on using a few trusted
anchor detectors to evaluate the instantaneous trustworthiness of mobile detectors in
combination with their reputation scores. Our scheme can enable robust PU detection
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even when the majority of mobile detectors are malicious as long as there are enough
trustworthy sensing reports submitted from legitimate mobile detectors. Our contribu-
tion in this chapter can be summarized as follows.
• We propose a novel metric to measure the instantaneous trustworthiness of a
sensing report based on trusted anchor detectors and the relationship between
receiving power and distance.
• We design a novel secure soft combination scheme based on the prioritized
weighted sequential probability ratio test, in which sensing reports are assigned
different weights based on their reputation scores and prioritized according to
their instantaneous trustworthiness.
• We confirm the high efficacy and efficiency of our scheme by extensive simulation
studies.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 introduces the
system and adversary models. Section 6.3 presents our proposed solution. Section 6.4
reports the performance evaluation based on detailed simulation studies. Section 6.5
discusses the related work. Section 6.6 concludes this chapter.
6.2 System and Adversary Models
In this section, we introduce our system, signal propagation, local spectrum sensing,
and adversary models.
6.2.1 System Model
Fig. 6.1 shows the CCSS architecture under consideration. The SSP divides its service
region into equally-sized cells and deploys some anchor detectors at strategic location-
s, e.g., the corners or center of each cell. Similar to the trusted nodes in [27], anchor
detectors can be remotely attested by the SSP and excluded if they are detected as
compromised. Due to cost constraints, the SSP cannot afford to deploy too many an-
chor detectors. As a result, although anchor detectors can provide the most trustworthy
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Spectrum-Sensing
Provider (SSP)
Spectrum Owners
Spectrum Buyers
Researchers
Policy Makers
System Users
normal mobile detectors
faulty/malicious mobile detectors
anchor detectors
large-scale primary user
Figure 6.1: A crowdsourcing-based cooperative spectrum sensing architecture.
spectrum-sensing reports, the SSP still relies on the majority of mobile detectors to
reach sufficiently high detection accuracy. Our subsequent discussion will focus on a
cell with anchor detectors denoted by Θa and mobile detectors denoted by Θ, where
|Θa|  |Θ|.
Mobile detectors correspond to humans using mobile devices such as smart-
phones and tablets to participate in CSS, and they can perform spectrum sensing via
either spectrum sensors embedded into mobile devices or external ones which are pro-
vided by the SSP and can communicate with mobile devices. Finally, we assume that
mobile detectors can accurately self-localize via hybrid GPS, cellular, and WiFi position-
ing techniques.
We consider large-scale PUs such as TV stations and cellular base stations
(expected in the future [54, 78]) with a large transmission range and known fixed loca-
tions. Extending our work to support small-scale and/or mobile PUs such as wireless
microphones is left as our future work.
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6.2.2 Signal Propagation and Spectrum-sensing Models
We adopt the signal propagation model in [96], under which the received primary signal
strength at mobile detector i can be expressed as
Pi = P0(
d0
di
)αeXieYi (Watt) (6.1)
where d0 is the reference distance, P0 is the received primary signal strength at d0, di is
the distance from mobile detector i to the primary user, α is the pathloss exponent with
typical value between 2 and 5, eXi and eYi represent the effect of shadowing fading and
multi-path fading, respectively, where Xi ∼ N (0, σ2).
Assuming that the channel bandwidth is much larger than the coherent band-
width, the effect of multi-path fading is negligible, i.e., Yi = 0 for all i. In addition, we
assume that Xi and Xj are independent for all i = j, i.e., each mobile detector expe-
riences i.i.d. Gaussian shadowing and fading, which holds when the distance between
mobile detectors i and j exceeds decorrelation distance [5].
We assume energy detection for local spectrum sensing at mobile detectors,
which is the most widely-used detection technique for its simplicity and efficiency. In
particular, on receiving a sensing task from the SSP, each mobile detector collects m
RSS (received signal strength) samples. The sensing report from detector i is denoted
as xi = (xi,1, · · · , xi,m). The test statistic of the energy detector is the average RSS
(including the noise power), i.e., Si =
1
m
∑m
k=1 xi,k, which can be approximated as a
Gaussian random variable using the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) [100,107] as
Si ∼
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
N (No, 2N
2
o
m ) H0 : Primary user is absent
N (No + P¯i, 2(P¯i+No)
2
m ) H1 : Primary user is present ,
(6.2)
where P¯i = E(Pi) is the average received power at detector i, and No is the noise
power, e.g., -96 dBm for a 6MHz TV channel.
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6.2.3 Adversary Model
We assume that the adversary is aware of our scheme and has full control over multiple
malicious detectors who may launch the following attacks.
• A malicious mobile detector may report high RSS values when the primary signal
is absent, aiming at increasing the probability of false alarm and preventing CR
users from using the channel.
• A malicious mobile detector may also report low RSS values when the primary
signal is present, aiming at increasing the probability of miss detection and caus-
ing increased interference to the primary user.
Malicious mobile detectors could be the majority in a cell. We, however, assume that
there are enough normal detectors submitting faithful sensing reports. Otherwise, it is
fundamentally difficult to realize robust PU detection with desired miss detection and
false alarm probabilities.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider other possible attacks against
cooperative sensing. For example, a powerful adversary may jam the channel to pre-
vent mobile detectors from communicating with the SSP. These attacks are not unique
to cooperative sensing and can be mitigated by spread-spectrum techniques [88,132].
6.3 Secure Combination for CCSS
In this section, we first outline our secure combination scheme for CCSS and then detail
its design.
6.3.1 Overview
Our scheme relies on using trusted anchor detectors to evaluate the instantaneous
trustworthiness of mobile detectors in combination with their reputation scores. The key
insight is that a mobile detector’s reputation score and the instantaneous trustworthi-
ness of his sensing report have different trust implications. On the one hand, the rep-
utation score is to predict his future performance based on his past long-term behavior
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and is nevertheless incapable of handling sudden change in his current behavior. On
the other hand, the instantaneous trustworthiness of his sensing report only reflects the
level of fitting with the trusted reports from anchor detectors in the current sensing task
while is unable to incorporate his long-term behavior. Although the reports from anchor
detectors are trusted to have not undergone malicious modifications, they may be inac-
curate due to possible multi-path fading/shadowing and other channel impairments. We
thus propose to explore both the instantaneous trustworthiness and reputation scores
of mobile detectors to realize robust PU detection.
Specifically, our scheme uses instantaneous trustworthiness and reputation s-
cores of mobile detectors in different ways. To enable robust data fusion, we propose a
prioritized weighted-probability-ratio test to combine sensing reports, in which the sens-
ing reports are ordered according to their instantaneous trustworthiness and assigned
different weights according to their reputation scores. The sensing reports are fed to
the algorithm one at a time, and a decision is made when certain criterion is reached.
By doing so, as long as there are sufficient normal mobile detectors, the final decision
will not be misled even if malicious mobile detectors are the majority.
In what follows, we detail the design of our scheme, including instantaneous
trustworthiness measure, prioritized weighted sequential probability ratio test, and fine-
grained reputation management.
6.3.2 Instantaneous Trustworthiness Measure
We first introduce a novel metric to evaluate the instantaneous trustworthiness of any
mobile detectors i ∈ Θ ∪ ΘA (or equivalently, their reports). For convenience only, we
abuse the notation by letting Θ and Θa denote the mobile and anchor detectors who all
submitted a sensing report to the SSP, where the cardinality |Θ| is normally much larger
than |Θa|.
Our key insight can be explained as follows. According to Eqs. (6.1) and (6.2),
we know that the receiving powers at two honest mobile detectors either are both close
to noise if the primary user is absent, or satisfy certain condition with respect to their
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distances to the primary user if the primary user is present. Consider any two mo-
bile detectors i and j with their distances to the primary user di and dj , respectively.
Their test statistics are denoted by Si and Sj , respectively, which are assumed to be
independent Gaussian random variables. We define the following random variable
Zi,j = ρ(d
α
i (Si −No)− dαj (Sj −No)) , (6.3)
where ρ =
√
1
2(d2αi +d
2α
j )
.
When the primary user is absent, we have
E(Zi,j|H0) = E(ρ(dαi (Si −No)− dαj (Sj −No))) = 0 ,
and
VAR(Zi,j |H0) = ρ2VAR(dαi (Si −No)− dαj (Sj −No))
= ρ2(VAR(dαi Si) + VAR(d
α
j Sj))
=
2d2αi N
2
o + 2d
2α
j N
2
o
2m(d2αi + d
2α
j )
=
N2o
m
.
Similarly, when the primary user is present, we have
E(Zi,j |H1) = E(ρdαi (Si −No)− dαj (Sj −No))
= E(dαi P¯i − dαj P¯j)
= E(dαi P0(
d0
di
)αeXieYi − dαj P0(
d0
dj
)αeXjeYj )
= E(P0d
α
0 e
Xi − P0d0eXj )
= P0d
α
0 (E(e
Xi)− E(eXj ))
= 0 ,
where the third equality holds because Yi = 0 (cf. Section 6.2.2). Since FCC requires
that unlicensed CR devices reliably detect incumbent signals at very low SNRs (e.g., as
low as -22 dB in the IEEE 802.22 standard [99]), it is typically assumed that No  Pi
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for all i ∈ Θ ∪Θa. It follows that
VAR(Zi,j |H1) = ρ2VAR(dαi (Si −No)− dαj (Sj −No))
= ρ2(VAR(dαi Si) + VAR(d
α
j Sj))
=
2d2αi (P¯i +No)
2 + 2d2αj (P¯j +No)
2
2m(d2αi + d
2α
j )
≈ N
2
o
m
.
Therefore, no matter whether the primary user is present or not, Zi,j is approximate-
ly Gaussian distributed with zero mean and variance N2o /m if the reports Si and Sj
are highly correlated with the distance di and dj . Otherwise, the distribution of Zi,j is
unpredictable.
Assume that Sj is provided by a trustworthy anchor detector j ∈ Θa. We can
thus assess the trustworthiness of Si with regard to Sj through the likelihood of Zi,j
being generated from the Gaussian distribution N (0, N2o /m). In particular, assume
that detectors i and j report si and sj as an observation of Si and Sj , respectively,
based on which the SSP constructs an observation zi,j of Zi,j . The likelihood of zi,j
being generated from N (0, N2o /m) is given by
L(zi,j |N (0, N2o /m)) =
1√
2πN2o /m
e
−mz
2
i,j
N2o , (6.4)
which monotonically decreases as |zi,j | increases. Therefore, we define the relative
instantaneous trustworthiness of si with regard to sj as |zi,j |. The smaller |zi,j |, the
more trustworthy si with regard to sj , and vice versa. In addition, we have |zj,j| = 0 for
any anchor detector j ∈ Θa.
We then measure the overall instantaneous trustworthiness of si by combin-
ing all the relative instantaneous trustworthiness values {|zi,j |}j∈Θa . In particular, we
view detector si’s |Θa| relative instantaneous trustworthiness values as a point in the
|Θa|-dimensional space Pi = (|zi,1|, · · · , |zi,|Θa||) and define the overall instantaneous
trustworthiness of si as the Euclidean distance between Pi and the origin, which is
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given by
ti = (
∑
j∈Θa
|zi,j |2)
1
2 . (6.5)
The smaller ti, the more trustworthy of si, and vice versa.
We have a few remarks about the instantaneous trustworthiness measure ti.
First, when there is only one anchor detector, say j, we have tj = 0 as zj,j = 0, mean-
ing that sj is the most trustworthy sensing report. Second, it is possible that an anchor
detector j generates a bad sensing report due to temporal channel impairments. In
this case, a malicious mobile detector i with false sensing report may gain high rela-
tive instantaneous trustworthiness with regard to anchor detector j, i.e., low |zi,j |. It is,
however, impossible for him to simultaneously gain high instantaneous trustworthiness
at the other anchor detectors. It is therefore necessary to have multiple anchor detec-
tors. Finally, when the primary user is present, a malicious mobile detector may submit
a false sensing report along with a falsified location aiming at cheating the SSP into
computing a wrong but high instantaneous trustworthiness. Our instantaneous trust-
worthiness measure is resilient to this attack, as if the false sensing report and location
could together lead to a lower ti (i.e., high instantaneous trustworthiness), it is equiva-
lent to a sensing report submitted by a good mobile detector i′ at the reported location.
6.3.3 Prioritized Weighted Sequential Probability Ratio Test
Once the SSP evaluates the instantaneous trustworthiness of all anchor and mobile
detectors in Θ∪Θa, it applies the Weighted Sequential Probability Ratio Test (WSPRT)
technique [16] to aggregate the sensing reports by prioritizing those with higher instan-
taneous trustworthiness and also assigning higher weights to those from detectors with
higher reputation scores, which we call Prioritized Weighted Sequential Probability Ra-
tio Test (PWSPRT).
To perform PWSPRT, the SSP first ranks all the sensing reports according to
their instantaneous trustworthiness ti in an ascending order. We then define the follow-
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ing decision variable
V =
∑
i∈Θ
ln(
P(Si|H1)
P(Si|H0))
wi , (6.6)
where P(S|Hk) refers to the probability density function of a random variable S under
Hk (k = 0 or 1), Θ denotes a subset of detectors in Θ ∪ Θa whose reports have been
aggregated, and wi ∈ [0, 1] is the normalized reputation score of detector i used as the
weight here, which will be explained in Section 6.3.4.
The SSP’s decision is based on the following criterion:
• Accept H1 and terminate if V ≥ A;
• Accept H0 and terminate if V ≤ B;
• Aggregate an additional report and add the corresponding detector index to Θ if
A < V < B,
where A andB are two decision thresholds derived from the desired miss detection and
false alarm probabilities. In particular, let χ and ψ denote the desired miss detection
and false alarm probabilities, respectively. The decision thresholds are given in [111]
as
A = ln(
1− χ
ψ
) and B = ln(
χ
1− ψ ) . (6.7)
In each iteration, the SSP chooses a sensing report with the lowest rank from the re-
maining reports, updates V according to Eq. (6.6), and checks if a final decision can
be reached. In addition, in case a decision cannot be reached after aggregating all the
sensing reports, the SSP permissively accepts H0 to avoid potential interference with
the primary user. In the end, the SSP updates the reputation profile for each mobile
detector (see Section 6.3.4).
Our scheme obviously has greater resilience to false sensing reports. In partic-
ular, a sensing report from a less reputable mobile detector will be assigned a smaller
weight and is thus less likely to drastically affect the final decision. In addition, a sens-
ing report with low instantaneous trustworthiness will be counted only if a final decision
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cannot be reached after combining all the other sensing reports with higher instanta-
neous trustworthiness (i.e., smaller ti). As long as there are sufficient mobile detectors
in the cell, a robust decision can still be reached even if there are much more malicious
mobile detectors.
6.3.4 Fine-Grained Reputation Management
As discussed in Section 6.3.3, the reputation scores of mobile detectors are used to
combine their sensing reports in PWSPRT. Now we present a novel reputation system
for the SSP to record the past sensing performance of mobile detectors.
Our reputation system will be built upon our previous work [138] which is firmly
rooted in the classical Bayesian inference theory used to estimate one or more unknown
quantities from the results of a sequence of multinomial trials. For clarity, we outline the
adopted Dirichlet-Multinomial model as follows and refer to [34] for more details. A
multinomial trial process is a sequence of independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.)
random variables U1, U2, ..., each taking one of  possible outcomes {oi}	i=1. We
then denote the common probability density function (PDF) of the trial variables by
pi = P(Uj = oi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ , where pi > 0 and
∑	
i=1 pi = 1. Let p = (p1, ..., p	)
and z = (z1, ..., z	) which is the vector of observation counts of each outcome after
N multinomial trials, namely,
∑k
i=1 zi = N . The multinomial sampling distribution [34]
states that
f(z|p) = Mult(N |p1, ..., p	) = N !∏	
i=1 zi!
	∏
i=1
pzii .
It is commonly assumed in Bayesian inference that p has a conjugate prior distribution1
known as the Dirichlet,
f(p) = Dir(p|α1, ..., α	) = Γ(
∑	
i=1 αi)∏	
i=1 Γ(αi)
	∏
i=1
pαi−1i ,
where pi = 0 if αi < 1 and Γ is the gamma function2. The positive parameters αi
can be interpreted as “prior observation counts” for events governed by pi. Then the
1The property that the posterior distribution follows the same parametric form as the prior distribution
is called conjugacy [34].
2If x is an integer, Γ(x) = (x− 1)!.
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posterior distribution is also Dirichlet [34],
f(p|z) = f(z|p)× f(p)
f(z)
=
Γ(
∑	
i=1 (αi + zi))∏	
i=1 Γ(αi + zi)
	∏
i=1
pαi+zi−1i
= Dir(p|α1 + z1, ..., α	 + z	),
(6.8)
which can be used to make statements about p considered as a set of random quanti-
ties. The posterior mean of pi, which maybe be interpreted as the posterior probability
of observing outcome oi in a future multinomial trial, is
E[pi|z] = αi + zi∑	
i=1 (αi + zi)
. (6.9)
In what follows, we detail how to apply the Dirichlet-Multinomial model in our scheme.
Let  = 2(q + 1) for some integer q ≥ 1. The SSP first divides the range
(−∞,∞) into 2q + 2 intervals, denoted by I1, · · · , I2q+2. Recall that A and B (B <
0 < A) are the decision thresholds used in PWSPRT, which correspond to H1 and H0,
respectively (cf. Eq. (6.7)). The jth interval is given by
Ij =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(−∞, B] if j = 1,
( (k
q+2−j−1)B
kq−1 ,
(kq+1−j−1)B
kq−1 ] if 2 ≤ j ≤ q + 1,
( (k
j−q−2−1)A
kq−1 ,
(kj−q−1−1)A
kq−1 ] if q + 2 ≤ j ≤ 2q + 1,
(A,∞) if j = 2q + 2 ,
(6.10)
where k > 1 is a system parameter. Let |Ij | denote the length of the jth interval. It
follows that |Ij| = k|Ij+1|cˇnˇ for all 2 ≤ j ≤ q, and |Ij | = k|Ij−1|cˇnˇ for all q+2 ≤ j ≤ 2q.
The reason to have the length of intervals form two geometric sequences is that most
normal detectors will have a relative small negative or positive contribution in low SNR
environment. By choosing small length for the intervals in the middle, we can better
differentiate the performance levels among different detectors.
After each sensing task, the SSP maps the performance of each mobile de-
tector into one of the  levels. In particular, for each i ∈ Θ, let ci = lnP(Si|H1) −
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lnP(Si|H0) be the potential contribution of mobile detector i in PWSPRT, regardless of
its weight wi. The SSP first maps ci into one of the  intervals, say Iηi . The perfor-
mance level of mobile detector i is then given by
li =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
ηi if H1 is accepted,
 + 1− ηi if H0 is accepted.
(6.11)
In other words, if mobile detector i ∈ Θ has a positive (or negative) contribution to the
final decision, its sensing performance will be mapped into one of the higher (lower)
q + 1 levels.
The SSP maintains a reputation profile for every mobile detector i ∈ Θ ∪ Θa,
represented by  counters {ci,s}	s=1. Each counter ci,s corresponds to the sth perfor-
mance level and is initialized to c0. After every sensing task, the SSP increases the
corresponding counter of every mobile detector Θ involved in PWSPRT according to
his performance level.
The SSP then computes wi,s =
ci,s∑
s=1 ci,s
for all s ∈ [1,], where wi,s refers
to the expected probability that detector i will have level-s sensing performance (cf.
Eq. (6.9)). If the SSP desires a performance level no less than l ∈ [1,], it computes
the reputation score for detector i as
wi =
l∑
s=1
wi,s .
Let wmax be maximum reputation score among all mobile detectors Θ ∪ Θa. The nor-
malized reputation score of detector i is then given by
wi = wi/wmax , (6.12)
which will be used as the weight of detector i in PWSPRT.
The choice of l is important. In particular, the higher l is, the lower the weight
wi for each i ∈ Θ ∪ Θa, the fewer mobile detectors with a non-zero weight, and vice
versa. We will study the tradeoff between sensing quality and resilience to malicious
mobile detectors using simulations in Section 6.4.
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In addition, past performance may not always be relevant for determining the
current performance of mobile detectors who may update their devices and/or vary their
behaviors over time. To deal with this situation, the SSP could choose a discount fac-
tor ν between [0, 1.0] to assign more weight to recency. At regular intervals, the SSP
updates {ci,s}	s=1 := {νci,s}	s=1. Discounting the past not only helps identify mobile de-
tectors who behave well initially and poorly afterwards, but also permits a disreputable
mobile detector to reform by starting to have good performance.
6.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the proposed scheme using extensive simulation. As the
only piece of prior work that targets malicious detectors being the majority, the solution
in [27] relies on real signal propagation data which may be very difficult to obtain es-
pecially in urban environments. It is thus less meaningful to directly compare our work
with [27] because our scheme does not require real signal propagation data. Instead,
we compare our work with the techniques proposed in [16] (denoted by CPB) and [53]
(denoted by KKB) that are under similar signal-propagation models and assumptions
as well as the standard SPRT [141] that corresponds to no defense in place.
6.4.1 Simulation Setup
As in [73], we consider an IEEE 802.22 WRAN environment with a single DTV trans-
mitter with 6MHz bandwidth and 150.3 km transmission range [100]. We simulate a
rectangle cell of 5 × 5 km2. The distance between the center of the cell to the primary
user is 145 km. We set the minimum distance between any two detectors to be 200m to
decorrelate their shadow fading Xi [5]. In addition, we call a malicious mobile detector
i has an attack strength T (dB) if it reports a si + T where si is the true average of the
RSSI values [73]. We assume that there are 100 mobile detectors in the cell, among
which M are malicious.
Table I lists the default parameters used in our simulation unless stated other-
wise. The simulation is done in Matlab, and each point is the average of 10000 runs,
each with a random seed. In addition, since both CPB [16] and our scheme use reputa-
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Table 6.1: Default simulation setting
Para. Value Description
|Θ| 100 Number of mobile detectors
M 50 Number of malicious mobile detectors
|Θa| 5 Number of anchor detectors
d0 1m Reference distance
P0 90 dBm The received power at d0
m 6× 103 [73] Number of samples
α 3.7 Path loss exponent
χ 0.01 Desired miss detection probability
ψ 0.1 Desired false alarm probability
σ 5.5 dB [100] The standard deviation of shadow fading Xi
αs 1 Initial value for each counter in reputation profile
 22 Total number of service levels
k 1.4 Ratio between adjacent performance intervals
l 12 Minimum desired service level
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Figure 6.2: Instantanoes trustworthiness vs. attack strength.
tion scores, meaning that the outcomes of later rounds are partially determined by those
of previous rounds, we divide the total 10000 rounds into 100 groups, each containing
100 rounds, and the reputation score of each mobile detector is reset at the beginning
of each group.
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Figure 6.3: The average rank of malicious mobile detectors vs. attack strength.
6.4.2 Simulation Results
6.4.2.1 Instantaneous Trustworthiness
We first report the simulation result for the proposed instantaneous trustworthiness
measure, which is one of the key components of our scheme.
Fig. 6.2 shows the instantaneous trustworthiness of a malicious mobile detector
with its attack strength T varying between −0.3 and 0.3 dB. We can see that the instan-
taneous trustworthiness increases as the attack strength |T | increases. The reason is
that the higher the attack strength, the larger deviation from the expected received pow-
er at its location, the larger |zi,j| with regard to each anchor node j, the larger ti, and
vice versa. In addition, instantaneous trustworthiness also increases as the number of
anchor detectors increases, because each additional anchor detector corresponds to
one relative instantaneous trustworthiness value that will be counted in the overall in-
stantaneous trustworthiness. As a result, the more anchor detectors, the more sensitive
the instantaneous trustworthiness measure to false sensing data attack.
Fig. 6.3 shows the average ranks of 50 malicious mobile detectors and 50 nor-
mal detectors varying with attack strength. We can see that the average rank of a
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malicious detector increases rapidly from 50 and converges to 75 as the attack strength
increases, which means that the 50 malicious detectors constantly rank between 51
and 100, leading to an average rank of 75. In contrast, the average rank of 50 nor-
mal detectors decreases and converges to 25, meaning that the 50 normal detectors
consistently rank between 1 and 50. These results are expected since malicious (or
normal) detectors will have low (or high) instantaneous trustworthiness with high prob-
ability. In addition, we can see that the more anchor detectors, the smaller variance of
the average rank for both malicious and normal mobile detectors. This means that by
aggregating the relative instantaneous trustworthiness with regard to multiple anchor
nodes, the rank based on instantaneous trustworthiness can effectively differentiate
malicious detectors from normal detectors.
6.4.2.2 Reputation System
Fig. 6.4 shows the average normalized reputation scores of 50 normal detectors and
50 malicious detectors in each round with a different desired service level l. We can
see that the average reputation score of normal mobile detectors increases slowly after
each round, while that of malicious mobile detectors remains stable. The reason is
that in each round, most detectors involved in PWSPRT will be normal detectors with
high probability, so only the reputation counters of a subset of normal detectors will
be updated, leading to a slow increase in their average reputation scores. For the
same reason, the reputation counters of malicious detectors will not be updated, whose
average reputation score will remain stable. Such updates can still guarantee good
detectors having higher reputation scores than malicious ones. In addition, we can
see that the higher l is, the smaller the initial reputation score for each detector, and
the larger difference between the average reputation scores of normal detectors and
malicious ones after sufficient rounds. This represents the tradeoff between the desired
service level and convergence time as well as the final difference in the reputation
scores of normal detectors and malicious ones.
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Figure 6.4: The progressive average reputation scores of normal and malicious mobile
detectors.
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Figure 6.5: Miss detection probability vs. # of malicious detectors.
6.4.2.3 Resilience to Malicious Mobile Detectors
Fig. 6.5 shows the miss detection probabilities of our scheme, CPB, KKB, and SPRT
varying with the number of malicious detectors, where the attack strength of malicious
detectors is −0.1 dB. We can see that the miss detection probability of SPRT increases
as the number of malicious detectors increases, which is expected. In addition, the miss
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Figure 6.7: Miss detection probability vs. attack strength.
detection probabilities of CPB and KKB are close to zero when the number of malicious
detectors is below 60, meaning both of them are resilient to false sensing data attack
when the malicious detectors do not constitute the majority. As the number of malicious
detectors further increases, the miss detection probabilities of CPB increases and even-
tually exceeds that of SPRT. The reason is that once the malicious detectors dominate
the cell, they will always determine the final decision and have their reputation scores
increased, while the normal detectors will always make the “wrong" decision and have
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Figure 6.8: False alarm probability vs. attack strength.
their reputation scores decreased. Similar trend can be observed about KKB, because
normal detectors’ sensing reports will be considered as outliers and filtered out once
the malicious detectors constitute the majority. In contrast, the miss detection proba-
bility of our scheme is insensitive to the increase in the number of malicious detectors
and remains below 0.05 even when the number of malicious detectors exceeds 90. The
reason is that malicious detectors will be ranked after normal detectors with high proba-
bility using our instantaneous trustworthiness measure, so the SSP can make a correct
decision as long as there are sufficient normal detectors.
Fig. 6.6 shows the false alarm probabilities of our scheme with CPB, KKB, and
SPRT varying with the number of malicious detectors, where the attack strength of
malicious detectors is 0.1 dB. Similar to Fig. 6.5, the false alarm probability of SPRT
increases as the number of malicious detectors increases, which is of no surprise. The
false alarm probabilities of CPB and KKB are both close to zero when the number of
malicious detectors is smaller than 20 and increase as the number of malicious detec-
tors further increases, which further demonstrate that they are effective against small
fraction of malicious detectors but ineffective when the malicious detectors become the
majority. In contrast, the false alarm probability of our scheme is much less sensitive
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Figure 6.9: False alarm probability vs. # of mobile detectors under no attack.
to the increase in the number of malicious detectors. In addition, the more anchor
detectors, the lower the false alarm probability, and vice versa.
Fig. 6.7 compares the miss detection probabilities of our scheme with CPB,
KKB, and SPRT with the attack strength varying between 0 to -0.2 dB, where the num-
ber of malicious detectors is 50. We can see that the miss detection probabilities of
CPB, KKB, and SPRT all increase as the attack strength increases. The reason is that
neither CPB nor KKB can withstand the malicious mobile detectors being the majority,
not to mention SPRT. In contrast, the miss detection probability of our scheme is rela-
tively insensitive to the increase in attack strength as our instantaneous trustworthiness
measure can effectively differentiate malicious detectors from the normal ones. As long
as there are enough normal detectors, the SSP can make a correct decision under our
scheme.
Fig. 6.8 compares the false alarm probabilities of our scheme with CPB, KKB,
and SPRT. The result is very similar to that in Fig. 6.7 and is omitted here.
6.4.2.4 Performance under No Attack
Fig. 6.9 compares the false alarm probabilities of our scheme and SPRT varying with the
number of mobile detectors where there is no malicious detectors. We can see that the
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false alarm probability of SPRT decreases from 1 to below 0.1 as the number of mobile
detectors increases from 0 to 20 and remains stable as the number of mobile detectors
further increases, which is expected for SPRT. In contrast, the false alarm probability of
our scheme first decreases as the number of mobile detectors increases from 0 to 20
and then slightly increases as the number of mobile detectors further increases. The
reason is that our scheme relies on the instantaneous trustworthiness measure to order
all the sensing reports, which further relies on a few anchor detectors. The order for
aggregating sensing reports in our scheme is thus different from the random order used
in SPRT. Since an anchor detector may also report an inaccurate sensing report due to
temporal channel impairment, a mobile detector with similar inaccurate sensing report
will obtain high instantaneous trustworthiness (i.e., low ti) if there are only a few anchor
detectors, leading to the increase in the false alarm probability. In addition, we can
see that using multiple anchor detectors can largely mitigate this limitation, because it
is very unlikely for an inaccurate sensing report to simultaneously attain high relative
instantaneous trustworthiness with regard to all the anchor detectors. We have also
simulated the miss detection probability of our scheme under no attack. The result is
very similar to that of Fig. 6.9 and is thus omitted here.
6.4.3 Discussion
We summarize the simulation results as follows.
• Our instantaneous trustworthiness metric can effectively differentiate normal de-
tectors from malicious ones with the help of a small number of anchor detectors.
• Our scheme can enable robust PU detection even when the malicious detectors
constitute the majority as long as there are sufficient number of normal detectors.
• When there are too few anchor detectors and too many mobile detectors, our
scheme has a slightly worse performance than SPRT in case there is no attack.
It is thus necessary to have multiple anchor detectors, say five, to achieve robust
PU detection in practice.
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The simulation results clearly demonstrate the significant advantage of our scheme over
existing schemes under the similar models and assumptions.
6.5 Related Work
In this section, we briefly discuss some work in several areas which is most germane to
our work in this chapter.
As mentioned in Section 6.1, previous works can be generally classified into
three categories. The schemes proposed in [16,26,28,53,64,73] use various anomaly
detection techniques to identify false sensing reports, which would fail if false sensing
reports constitute the majority. The second category such as [16,53,130] relies on rep-
utation system to differentiate malicious CR users from legitimate users based on their
past behaviors, but is unable to handle sudden change in mobile detectors’ behaviors.
The only piece of work that targets majority of false sensing reports appears in [27],
which assumes that neighboring cells can help overturn the decision by the real signal
propagation data from primary users. In contrast, our scheme does not rely on inter-cell
crosscheck nor requires real signal propagation data from primary users. In addition,
detecting false sensing reports in a distributed sensing architecture has been studied
in [116,125], which are orthogonal to our work in this chapter.
Another line of work is to mitigate the Primary User Emulation attack, i.e., testing
whether the legitimate primary user is using a licensed channel or whether an attacker
is impersonating the primary user to use the channel. Proposed solutions include pri-
mary user location estimation [15], authenticating primary user’s signal via physically
collocated helper node [67] or properly manipulating channel coding and modulation at
the physical layer.
In addition, detecting possible spectrum misuse by arbitrary secondary users
has been studied in [66, 117]. ALDO [66] uses statistical significance testing to detect
illegitimate secondary users based on RSS measurements and the characteristics of
radio propagation. The authors of [117] propose to let every legitimate channel user
embed a cryptographic spectrum permit into its physical-layer cyclostationary features,
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which can be verified by mobile “police devices" dispatched by the spectrum owner.
These works target different type of attack and are thus orthogonal to our work in this
chapter.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a novel secure crowdsourcing-based cooperative
spectrum sensing scheme. The key idea behind our scheme is to jointly consider the
instantaneous trustworthiness of mobile detectors in combination with their reputation
scores during data fusion. Our scheme can enable robust cooperative sensing even if
the malicious CR users are the majority. Extensive simulation results have demonstrat-
ed the effectiveness of our proposed scheme.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation, we offer novel solutions to five challenging security and privacy is-
sues in heterogeneous mobile wireless networks, spanning wireless sensor networks,
mobile crowdsourcing, and mobile social networking. In particular, we design a secure
and loss-resilient code dissemination scheme for wireless sensor networks deployed
in hostile and harsh environments. Moreover, we devise a novel scheme to enable
mobile users to detect any inauthentic or unsound location-based top-k query query
result returned by an untrusted location-based service providers. In addition, we devel-
op a novel verifiable privacy-preserving aggregation scheme for people-centric mobile
sensing systems. Furthermore, we present a suite of privacy-preserving profile match-
ing protocols for proximity-based mobile social networking, which can support a wide
range of matching metrics with different privacy levels. Finally, we introduce a secure
combination scheme for crowdsourcing-based cooperative spectrum sensing systems.
7.1 Future Work
As our future work, we plan to further evaluate the performance of our solutions via
prototype implementations on real network testbeds or platforms such as smartphones
and Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP). We also plan to extend our solutions
by exploring the following directions.
First, we intend to extend LR-Seluge to defend against denial-of-receipt attack,
in which a compromised sensor node keeps requesting new pages from a target node.
In addition, besides the location-based top-k queries, we also intend to extend our so-
lution introduced in Chapter 3 to support other types of location-based queries, e.g.,
location-based range queries. Moreover, we intend to improve VPA to make it resilient
to denial-of-service attack, in which a malicious user keeps submitting false data to dis-
rupt the aggregation process. Furthermore, we plan to explore novel private matching
mechanisms that do not rely on public key cryptosystem. Last but not the least, we plan
to extend our secure combination scheme to support hard combination.
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Proof. With Seluge, the sender has to keep (re)transmitting every packet until it is re-
ceived by all N nodes. Let Tj be the number of transmissions needed for all N re-
ceivers to receive the j-th packet, ∀1 ≤ j ≤ k. After the t-th transmission of the j-th
packet, the probability that node i has received it is 1− pti, and the probability that all N
nodes have received it is thus
Pr(Tj ≤ t) =
N∏
i=1
(1− pti) . (7.1)
Therefore, the probability that it takes exactly t transmissions for all N nodes to receive
the j-th packet can be computed as
Pr(Tj = t) = Pr(Tj ≤ t)− Pr(Tj ≤ t− 1)
=
N∏
i=1
(1− pti)−
N∏
i=1
(1− pt−1i ) .
(7.2)
The expected number of transmissions for the j-th packet is then E[Tj] =
∑∞
t=1 t ·
Pr(Tj = t). Since different packets are independent from each other, the expected
number of total transmissions to transmit k packets is then E[
∑k
j=1Tj] = kE[Tj ].
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Proof. In LR-Seluge, the greedy round-robin scheduling at local senders makes it very
difficult to directly analyze the performance of LR-Seluge. Instead, we analyze a vari-
ation of LR-Seluge whose communication cost can be viewed as the upper bound of
LR-Seluge. In this variation, instead of using SNACK packets, each receiver returns an
ACK packet only after receiving k′ packets of the current page. Since the local sender
has no information about which packets are missing at each node, it has to repeatedly
transmit the n erasure-coded packets until receiving an ACK from every node. This
variation is apparently less efficient than LR-Seluge, as the sender may unnecessarily
transmit some packets which have reached all the receivers.
Now we analyze how many rounds are needed for the local sender to trans-
mit all the n encoded packets such that each of the N nodes can receive at least k′
packets for successfully decoding the original page. Let R and Ri be the number of
rounds needed for all the N nodes and node i to receive at least k′ encoded packets,
respectively. After r rounds, the probability that node i has received a given packet is
1−pri , and the probability that node i has received at least k′ encoding packets is given
by
Pr(Ri ≤ r) =
n∑
j=k′
(
n
j
)
(1− pri )jpr(n−j)i , (7.3)
The probability that all nodes have received at least k′ packets after r rounds can then
be computed as
Pr(R ≤ r) =
N∏
i=1
Pr(Ri ≤ r) . (7.4)
It follows that
E[R] =
∞∑
r=1
r · (Pr(R ≤ r)− Pr(R ≤ r − 1)) . (7.5)
Since each round involves n packet transmissions, the expected total number of trans-
missions for the above LR-Seluge variant is nE[R], which upper-bounds that of LR-
Seluge.
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Proof. We first show that the user can detect any inauthentic query result containing
fake POI records or indexes. Recall that the hash of every record is embedded in its
index, and adjacent indexes are chained together. Therefore, any fake record or index
will make the user compute an invalid leaf node for the Merkle hash tree, which can
be immediately detected by the user after verifying the data collector’s non-forgeable
signature on the Merkle root hash.
Now we show that incorrect query results can also be detected. The key ratio-
nale is that if the LBSP returns Xi,j = D′i,j or φi,j , he must also return Xi,1, · · · ,Xi,j−1
for the query result to pass the authenticity check. Let kPOI denote the correct top-k
records with the lowest attribute rating γ and k˜POI the incorrect top-k records with the
lowest attribute rating γ˜ = γ. If γ˜ < γ, there must be at least k POI records with
attribute-q ratings higher than γ˜ in the query region, which should all be returned for
k˜POI to pass the authenticity check. This apparently contradicts with the fact that γ˜ is
the lowest rating in k˜POI. If γ˜ > γ instead, k˜POI must contain at least one POI record
outside the query region with attribute-q rating higher than γ, which can be directly
detected.
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Before go to the proof of Theorem 3.6.2, We first we need to prove the following
lemmas.
Lemma 7.1.1. Assume that Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn are i.i.d. random variables uniformly dis-
tributed in the range [0, 1]. Let Y˜1, Y˜2, · · · , Y˜n be the random variables defined by
sorting the values (realizations) of Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn in decreasing order. Then Y˜k ∼
Be(n− k + 1, k) is a Beta random variable with p.d.f.
f(x, n− k + 1, k) = Γ(n+ 1)
Γ(n− k + 1)Γ(k)x
n−k(1− x)k−1 , (7.6)
where Γ(t) = (t− 1)!.
Proof. Consider an interval [x, x + dx]. For Y˜k to be in [x, x+ dx], it is necessary that
exactly k − 1 elements are larger than x + dx, and that at least one is between x and
x+ dx. Since the probability that more than one is in [x, x+ dx] is already O(dx2), the
probability of Y˜k falling in the interval [x, x + dx] is equal to the probability that exactly
k − 1, 1 and n − k elements fall in the intervals (x + dx, 1), (x, x + dx) and (0, x)
respectively, which is given by
P (Y˜n ∈ (x, x+ dx)) = n!
(n− k)!(k − 1)! (1− x− dx)
k−1xn−kdx ,
and the result follows.
Lemma 7.1.2. The expected number of POIs with rating higher than γ in each zone is
given by
E[τ ] =
kn
δn + 1
, (7.7)
where δ is the ratio between the areas of the query region and a single zone.
Proof. Assume that there are n POIs uniformly distributed in each zone. The expect-
ed number of POIs in the query region can be estimated as δn. According to Lem-
ma 7.1.1, the kth highest rating within the query region is a Beta random variable, i.e.,
γ ∼ Be(δn − k + 1, k). It follows that
E[γ] =
δn− k + 1
δn + 1
. (7.8)
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We therefore have
E[τ ] = n(1− E[γ]) = kn
δn + 1
. (7.9)
Lemma 7.1.3. The expected number of hash computations needed to verify {hi,1}i∈I
using Merkle hash tree is given by
E(Nmerkle) =
d−1∑
j=1
2j−1(1− (1− 2−(j−1))|I|) . (7.10)
Proof. In the Merkle hash tree, the number of nodes at level j is 2j−1 for all j ∈ [1, d].
To verify hi,1, the user need to compute each internal node along the path from hi,1 to
the root of the tree.
For each node at level j, the probability that it is on the path between a randomly
chosen leaf node and the root hash is 2−(j−1). It follows that it is on at least one
of the path between {hi,1}i∈I and the root hash, and thus appears in
⋃
i∈I Ti, with
probability (1 − 2−(j−1))|I|. The expected number of nodes at level j in ⋃i∈I Ti is
then 2j−1(1− (1− 2−(j−1))|I|). Therefore, the expected number of hash computations
needed to verify {hi,1}i∈I is given by
E(Nmerkle) =
d−1∑
j=1
2j−1(1− (1− 2−(j−1))|I|) .
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.6.2.
Proof. The total number of hash computations needed by Scheme 1 consists of three
parts. First, the user need perform one hash computation for each returned data record
to generate the corresponding index, leading to k hash computations. Second, for each
zone i ∈ I , the user need compute hi,1, which incurs τi + 1 hash computations, where
τi can be estimated as E[τ ] derived in Eq. (7.7). Finally, the user need perform Nmerkle
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hash computations to verify {hi,1}i∈I . Summing up these three part, we have
E[Nhash,1] = k + |I| · (E[τ ] + 1) +
d−1∑
j=1
2j−1(1− (1− 2−(j−1))|I|) ,
where E[τ ] and Nmerkle are given in Eqs. (7.7) and (7.10), respectively.
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The following lemma is needed in proving Theorem 3.6.3.
Lemma 7.1.4. The expected number of distinct elements in
⋃
i∈I Ti is given by
|
⋃
i∈I
Ti| =
d−1∑
j=1
2j(1− (1− 2−j)|I|) (7.11)
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 7.1.3 and thus omitted.
We now prove Theorem 3.6.3.
Proof. The communication overhead between the data collector and the LBSP is given
by
T1 = Tid + Tindex + Tauth , (7.12)
where Tid,Tcert,Tauth are the communication overhead incurred by transmitting zone
IDs, indexes and authentication information (i.e., hash images and data collector’s sig-
nature), respectively.
For each zone i ∈ I , the LBSP need return the corresponding zone ID to the
user, so we have
Tid = |I| · d . (7.13)
In addition, the LBSP need return τi + 1 POIs for each zone i ∈ I . The total
number of POIs need be returned can be estimated as
∑
i∈I(τi + 1). Among them, k
POIs returned as data records, and rest of them are indexes. It follows that
Tindex = (
∑
i∈I
(τi + 1)− k) · (Lloc + Lr + Lh)
= (|I| · (E[τ ] + 1)− k) · (Lloc + Lr + Lh) ,
(7.14)
where E[τ ] is given in Eq. (7.7).
Finally, the LBSP need return one hash image, i.e., hi,τi+2, for each zone i ∈ I ,⋃
i∈I Ti for {hi,1}i∈I , and the data collector’s signature on the root of the Merkle hash
tree. We therefore have
Tauth = (|I|+ |
⋃
i∈I
Ti|) · Lh + Lsig , (7.15)
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where |⋃i∈I Ti| is given by Eq. (7.11). Substituting Eqs. (7.13), (7.14) and (7.15) into
Eq. (7.12), we have
E[T1] = (|I| · (E[τ ] + 1)− k) · (Lloc + Lr + Lh) + |I| · d
+
d−1∑
j=1
2j(1− (1− 2−j)|I|) · Lh + Lsig ,
where E[τ ] = knδn+1 , and the theorem is proved.
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Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.6.1, the user can easily detect any inauthentic
query result containing fake POI records or indexes. The proof is omitted here for
brevity.
Now assume that the LBSP returns an authentic but incorrect query result, from
which the user derives incorrect top-k POI records k˜POI with the lowest attribute rating
γ˜. Against, let γ denote the correct lowest top-k attribute rating. If γ˜ > γ, we can apply
the same argument in proving Theorem 3.6.1 to show that the user can discover that
at least one POI in k˜POI is outside the query region. If γ˜ < γ, the LBSP should have
deleted at least one POI record in the query region with an attribute rating higher than
γ˜. Suppose that the LBSP did not returnD′i,j with A
′
i,j,q > γ˜ in the macro zone e. There
are two cases.
• If the LBSP returned nothing from zone i, it must have returned at least one index
with a rating < γ˜ in the macro zone e, say φi1,j1. It follows that A
′
i,1,q > A
′
i,j,q >
γ˜ > A′i1,j1,q and 〈j,A′i,1,q〉 ∈
⋃j1
x=1 Ii1,x, from which the user knows that the LBSP
omitted valid information from zone i.
• If the LBSP returned some POI records or indexes for zone i, it must have re-
turned Xi,1, . . . ,Xi,τ˜i+1 to pass the authenticity check. Since A
′
i,j,q > γ˜, we have
j < τ˜i, and D′i,j or φi,j must have been returned, leading to a contradiction.
Therefore, the user can detect any incorrect query result.
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Proof. Similar to Scheme 1, the number of hash computations needed by Scheme 2
consists of three parts.
First, the user need perform k hash computations to obtain the index for the
returned data records. Second, for each zone i with τi > 0, the user need perform
τi + 1 hash computations to obtain hi,1.
Let I ′ ∈ I be the set of zones in the query region that has POI with rating higher
than γ, i.e., τi > 0. We now estimate |I ′|. The probability that zone i ∈ I has no POI
with rating higher than γ is γn. The probability that zone i ∈ I has at least one POI with
rating higher than γ is then 1 − γn. It follow that the expected number of zones in the
query region that has at least one POI with rating higher than γ is given by
|I|′ = |I| · (1− γn) , (7.16)
where γ = (δn − k + 1)/(δn + 1).
For each zone i ∈ I ′, the conditional probability that τi = x given that τi > 0
can be computed as
P (τi = x|τi > 0) = P (τi = x, τi > 0)
P (τi > 0)
=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(nx)(1−γ)xγn−x
1−γn if 1 ≤ x ≤ n,
0 otherwise .
(7.17)
It follows that
E[τi|τi > 0] = n(1− γ)/(1 − γn) . (7.18)
The expected number of hash computations required to obtain {hi,1|i ∈ I ′} is
then given by
E[N2] =
∑
i∈I′
(τi + 1)
= |I| · (1− γn) · (n(1− γ)
1− γn + 1)
= |I|(n− nγ + 1− γn) .
(7.19)
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Finally, the user also need to verify {hi,1|i ∈ I ′} using Merkle hash tree. The
number of hash computation required is given by
E[Nmerkle] =
d−1∑
j=1
2j−1(1− (1− 2−(j−1))|I|′)) . (7.20)
We therefore have
E[Nhash,2] = k + E[N2] + E[Nmerkle]
= k + |I|(n− nγ + 1− γn)
+
d−1∑
j=1
2j−1(1− (1− 2−(j−1))|I′|) ,
where γ = (δn − k + 1)/(δn + 1) and |I ′| is given in Eq. (7.16).
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Proof. Similar to that of Scheme 1, the communication overhead between the LBSP
and user is given by
T1 = Tid + Tembed + Tindex + Tauth , (7.21)
where Tembed is the communication overhead incurred by transmitting embedded 〈j,A′j,1,q〉.
We first estimate Tindex. Recall that the expected number of zones τi > 0 is
mˇ(1− γn). For each of them, the LBSP need return τi + 1 POIs. It follows that
Tindex = mˇ(1− γn)(n(1 − γ)
1− γn + 1) · (Lloc + Lr + Lh)
= mˇ(n− nγ + 1− γn) · (Lloc + Lr + Lh) .
(7.22)
Now we estimate Tauth. Similar to that in Scheme 1, we have
Tauth = (mˇ(1− γn) +
d−1∑
j=1
2j(1− (1− 2−j)mˇ(1−γn))) · Lh + Lsig . (7.23)
For Tid, we have
Tid = mˇ(1− γn) · d , (7.24)
For Tembed, we further divide it into two parts: Tembed,1, the 〈j,Aj,1〉s from the
mˇ zones in the query region, and Tembed,2, the 〈j,Aj,1〉s from them− mˇ zones outside
the query region.
For Tembed,1, there are two cases. First, when k < mˇ, there are at most k zones
with τi > 0. Each of these k zones at most embeds the information from other k − 1
zones in I . Second, when k ≥ mˇ, there are at most mˇ zones with τi > 0. Each of the
mˇ at most embed the information from other mˇ− 1 zones in I . We therefore have
Tembed,1 ≤ t(t− 1) · (d+ Lr) , (7.25)
where t = min(k, mˇ).
Now we estimate Tembed,2. Take zone i ∈ I ′ as an example. Let I ′i,1,I ′i,2, · · · ,I ′i,ni+1
denote the sets of zone IDs outside the query region whose highest POI with attribute-
q rating in the range (χ,Ai,1), (Ai,1, Ai,2), · · · , (Ai,ni , χ), respectively. We then have∑ni+1
j=1 |I ′i,j| = m− mˇ.
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The c.d.f. of A′i,1,q is given by
P (A′i,1,q ≤ a) = P (Ai,1,q ≤ a,Ai,2,q ≤ a, · · · , Ai,n,q ≤ a)
=
n∏
i=1
P (Ai,1,q ≤ q)
= an .
According to Lemma 7.1.1, we have E(A′i,j,q) = (n − j + 1)/(n + 1). For each zone
i′ ∈ Me \ I , the probability that i′ ∈
⋃j
x=1 I ′i,x is given by
P (i′ ∈
j⋃
x=1
I ′i,x) = P (A′i′,1,q >
n− j + 1
n+ 1
)
= 1− (n − j + 1
n+ 1
)n .
(7.26)
Therefore, the expected number of 〈j,Aj,1〉 in
⋃j
x=1 I ′i,x can be estimated as (m −
mˇ)(1 − ((n − j + 1)/(n + 1))n), we thus have∑jx=1 |I ′i,x| = (m − mˇ)(1 − ((n − j +
1)/(n + 1))n). It follows that
|I ′i,j| = (m− mˇ)((
n− j + 2
n+ 1
)n − (n− j + 1
n+ 1
)n) (7.27)
The total number of 〈j,Aj,1,q〉 appear in these τi + 1 POIs is given by
τi+1∑
j=1
|I ′i,j| =
τi+1∑
x=1
(m− mˇ)((n − j + 2
n+ 1
)n − (n− j + 1
n+ 1
)n)
= (m− mˇ)(1 − (n− τi
n+ 1
)n); .
(7.28)
We therefore have
Tembed,2 =
∑
i∈I′
|I ′i,j|
= |I ′|(m− mˇ)(1 − (n− E[τi|τi > 0]
n+ 1
)n)
= mˇ(1− γn)(m− mˇ)(1 − (n− E[τ ]
n+ 1
)n) · (d+ Lr) .
(7.29)
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Substituting Eqs. (7.22), (7.23), (7.24), (7.25) and (7.29) into Eq. (7.21), we
have
T2 ≤ mˇ(1− μn)d+ mˇ(n− nμ+ 1− μn)(Lloc + Lr + Lh)
+ (mˇ(1− μn) +
d−1∑
j=1
2j(1− (1− 2−j)mˇ(1−μn)))Lh + Lsig
+ mˇ(1− μn)(m− mˇ)(1− (n− ν
n+ 1
)n)(d+ Lr)
+ t(t− 1)(d + Lr) .
where μ = E[γ] = (mˇn − k + 1)/(mˇn + 1), ν = E[τ ] = n(1 − μ)/(1 − μn), and
t = min(k, mˇ). The theorem is proved.
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Proof. Suppose that the user has issued a sequence of snapshot top-k queriesQ1, . . . , Qw
to realize a moving top-k query under Scheme 3. For each received complete query
result, the user can easily verify if it contains the authentic and correct top-k POIs ac-
cording to Scheme 1. The only option left for the LBSP is to purposefully omit some
complete query results by returning ACKs for some snapshot top-k queries, for which
we will show that it will be detected as well.
Assume that the LBSP has omitted a complete query result including kPOIa and
returns an ACK instead in response to query Qa. According to the query-processing
process, the LBSP need return a complete query result in response to both query Q1
and Qw; otherwise, it would be easily detected. So there exist 1 ≤ x < a < y ≤ w,
such that the user has received complete query results for queriesQx andQy as well as
ACKs for queriesQx+1, . . . , Qy−1. We thus have kPOIa = kPOIx under the assumption
about the LBSP’s misbehavior.
If kPOIa = kPOIx, there are two possible cases: at least one POI in kPOIx is
not in the ath query region Ra, or all the POIs in kPOIx are all in Ra, but there is at
least one POI inRa but not inRx with attribute-q rating higher than the lowest attribute-
q rating γx in Ra. In the former case, the user knows that the LBSP should have
returned a complete query result instead of an ACK in response to Qa, so the LBSP
can be detected immediately. In the later case, there must exist at least one POI with
rating higher than γx in Ra, say POIi,j . According to the query-processing process, the
complete query result for query Qy need to include the index φi,j for POIi,j According
to the query-result verification process, the user will detect that φi,j contains attribute-q
rating larger than γx and a POI location in the suspicion range Sx→y =
⋃y−2
j=xPj , thus
detecting the misbehavior of the LBSP.
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Proof. Assume that the AS receives {H(ei) : i ∈ U} during the commitment sub-
mission phase, whereby it derives H(
∑
i∈U ei) = g
∑
i∈U mod p. Suppose that some
malicious nodes injected false data during the data-aggregation phase so that the AS
receives e′ =∑i∈U ei. The AS cannot detect the false-data injection attack if and only
if
ge
′
= g
∑
i∈U ei mod p .
However, for any y ∈ Z∗p, there is a unique x ∈ [0, p−2] such that gx = y mod p. Since
p > 2l+2log2 n	+φ >
∑
i∈U ei, there is no e
′ =∑i∈U ei can satisfy the above equation.
It is thus impossible for the adversary to inject false data without being detected under
VPA+.
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Proof. Consider node i as an example. Under DP, node i’s data ei is exposed if the AS
is curious and colludes with all the neighbors of node i in the aggregation tree, which
are denoted by Ti. The probability that the AS being curious is Mc/M . Assume that
|Ti| = Ntree and that there are nc curious nodes. The probability of all nodes in Ti being
curious is
(
nc
Ntree
)(
n−nc
nc−Ntree
)
/
(
n
nc
)
. We therefore have
Pexp =
Mc
M
·
( n−nc
nc−Ntree
)
( n
nc
) . (7.30)
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Proof. Under RCS and μCS, node i’s data ei is exposed if all the nodes in Ci, Si and Ti
are curious, where Si is the set of nodes that choose node i as a cover. For RCS, we
have |Ci| = t and for μCS, we have |Ci| =
∑μ
x=1Nx, where Nx is the number of the
x-hop neighbors of node i. Since max(|Ci|, |Si|, |Ti|) ≤ |Ci
⋃Si⋃ Ti|, we have
Pexp ≤
(n−nc
nc−w
)
( n
nc
)
where
w =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
max(Ntree, t) for RCS,
max(Ntree,
∑μ
x=1Nx) for μCS .
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Proof. The communication overhead incurred by VPA+ consists of three parts: Ttree,
the overhead incurred by forming aggregation tree, Tcommit, the overhead incurred by
submitting commitment to A, and Tagg, the overhead incurred by privacy-preserving
aggregation.
We first estimate Ttree. During the aggregation-tree formation process, each
node broadcasts the tree formation request once. Therefore we have
Ttree = nltree ,
where ltree is the length of the tree formation request in bits.
Now we estimate Tcommit. Suppose that H(e) and h(·) are of lhmac and lh bits,
respectively. The length of each commitment message is lhmac + lh. Recall that each
node ID is of λ bits. We then have
Tcommit = n(λ+ lhmac + lh) .
Finally, we estimate Tagg for DP, RCS and μCS.
• DP: during the aggregation phase, each node need transmit the intermediate
aggregation result to its parent node. We therefore have
Tagg = nldata ,
where ldata = l + 2log2 n+ φ.
• RCS: before in-network aggregation, each node need send one slice to each of
the t chosen cover nodes, which involves one route discovery to the chosen cover
node. Each route discovery incurs a communication overhead of nlreq + Llrsp,
where lreq and lrsp denote the length of a AODV route discovery request and a
response, respectively. In addition, transmitting one slice incurs a communication
overhead of L(ldata + λ). Therefore we have
Tagg = nt(nlreq + L(lrsp + ldata + λ)) + nldata .
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• μCS: For μCS, during slicing and mixing, each node i and all the nodes within
its μ− 1-hop neighborhood need broadcast a random seed along with IDi once,
which incurs communication overhead of (1 +
∑μ−1
x=1)Nx(λ + lseed). In addition,
each nodes in its μ−1-hop neighborhood need return its node ID to node i, which
leads to communication overhead
∑μ
x=1Nxλ. We therefore have
Tagg = n((1 +
μ−1∑
x=1
Nx)(λ+ lseed) +
μ∑
x=1
Nxxλ) + nldata .
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Before we prove Theorem 4.5.1, we first have the following lemmas.
Lemma 7.1.5. Assume that dmax = 2l − 1. Let {χi,j}lj=1 be the sequence of answers
from a node i, where χi,j ∈ {0, 1} for all j ∈ [1, l]. If χi,j = 1, then χi,j′ = 1 for all
j′ < j; likewise, if χi,j = 0, then χi,j′ = 0 for all j′ > j.
Proof. Assuming that dmax = 2l − 1, we have Qj = [d ≥
∑j
i=1 2
l−i] for all j ∈ [1, l].
It follows that Qj+1 ⊂ Qj for all j ∈ [1, l − 1]. Therefore, if χi,x = 1, then di ∈ Qj .
It follows that di ∈ Qj′ and χi,j′ = 1 for all j′ < j. The second part can be proved
similarly and is thus omitted.
Lemma 7.1.6. Assume that dmax = 2l − 1. Let χi,ye and χi,ne be the first exposed yes
answer and last exposed no answer, where 0 ≤ ye < ne ≤ l+1, ye = 0 and ne = l+1
denote the case that no yes answer is disclosed and the case that no no answer is
exposed, respectively. The suspicion ratio after l count queries is given by
ρ[ye, ne] =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2−ye − 2−ne if ye + 1 ≤ ne ≤ l,
2−ye if ne = l + 1.
(7.31)
Proof. Suppose Qye = [d ≥
∑ye
j=1 2
l−j ] and χi,ye = 1. The disclosure of χi,ye = 1
let the adversary know that di ≥
∑ye
j=1 2
l−j . Similarly, suppose that ne exists, i.e., at
least one no answer is exposed. The disclosure of χi,ne = 0 let the adversary know
that di <
∑ne
j=1 2
l−j . It follows that
ye∑
j=1
2l−j ≤ di <
ne∑
j=1
2l−j .
Therefore, we have
ρ[ye, ne] = 2
−l(
ne∑
j=1
2l−j −
ye∑
j=1
2l−j)
=
ne∑
j=1
2−j −
ye∑
j=1
2−j
=
ne∑
j=ye+1
2−j
= 2−ye − 2−ne .
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Note that the disclosure of other answers does not give the adversary additional infor-
mation, since Qj+1 ⊂ Qj for all j ∈ [1, l − 1].
In addition, if no “no” answer is disclosed, we have
ρ = 2−ye .
Now we prove Theorem 4.5.1.
Proof. We first consider DP and μCS in which each node i directly interacts with the
same set nodes during the whole sequence of l count queries. This means that if
χi,1 is exposed, which happens with probability Pexp, then all the subsequent answers
{χi,1}lj=2 are also exposed. On the other hand, if χi,1 is kept secret, which happens
with probability 1− Pexp, so are {χi,1}lj=2.
We further partition the data range [0, 2l − 1] into l + 1 equivalent classes,
denoted by {Cx}lx=0, where Cx = [2l − 2l−x, 2l − 2l−x−1 − 1] for x ∈ [0, l − 1], and
Cl = [2
l − 1, 2l − 1]. It follows if di ∈ Cx, then χi,j = 1 for all j ∈ [1, x], and χi,j = 0 for
all j ∈ [x+ 1, l]. In other words, different nodes have the same sequence of answers if
their data are in the same equivalent classes.
Assume that di ∈ Cx. If {χi,1}lj=1 are exposed, which happens with probability
Pexp, then we have ye = x and ne = x+ 1. According to Eq. (4.23), we have
ρ =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2−x−1 if 0 ≤ x ≤ l − 1,
2−l if x = l,
in this case. If {χi,1}lj=1 are kept secret, which happens with probability 1− Pexp, then
we have ρ = 1.
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Combining the above two cases, we can compute the expected suspicion ratio
as
ρ =
l−1∑
x=0
Pr(di ∈ Cx)((1 − Pexp) + 2−x−1Pexp)
+ Pr(di ∈ Cl)((1 − Pexp) + 2−lPexp)
=
l−1∑
x=0
2−x−1((1 − Pexp) + 2−x−1Pexp)
+ 2−l((1− Pexp) + 2−lPexp)
= 1− Pexp + (2−2l +
l∑
x=1
2−2x)Pexp .
(7.32)
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Proof. In RCS, each node i chooses the cover nodes independently for each query.
This means that each χi,j is exposed independently with probability Pexp. Suppose
di ∈ Cx. So node i returns x yes answers and l−x no answers. The p.d.f. of ye is then
given by
Pr(ye = k) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1− Pexp)x if k = 0,
Pexp(1− Pexp)k−1 if 1 ≤ k ≤ x,
0 otherwise.
(7.33)
Similarly, p.d.f. of ne can be computed as
Pr(ne = k) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Pexp(1− Pexp)k−x−1 if x+ 1 ≤ k ≤ l,
(1− Pexp)l−x if k = l + 1,
0 otherwise.
(7.34)
For all data in di ∈ Cx, the expected suspicion ratio can be computed as
E[ρx] =
x∑
k1=0
Pr(ye = k1)
l+1∑
k2=x+1
Pr(ne = k2)ρ[ye, ne] . (7.35)
Finally, the expected suspicion ratio can be computed as
E[ρ] =
l∑
x=0
Pr(di ∈ Cx)E[ρx]
=
l−1∑
x=0
2−x−1E[ρx] + 2−lE[ρl] .
(7.36)
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